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Abstract
Some cross-cultural psychologists have shown differences in cognition between 
Eastern and Western cultures, described as holistic versus analytic (H-A) systems o f 
thought. It is widely assumed that Buddhism has contributed to holistic cognition. This 
thesis explores holistic thought among Western Buddhists by integrating methods and 
theories mainly from cross-cultural and social psychology, but also the cognitive 
anthropology o f religion.
H-A reasoning among Buddhists, Anglicans and Secular-Humanists in the UK is 
investigated in a main experiment, providing good backing for hypothesised H-A group 
differences. Moreover, it supports a hypothesis about the effect o f meditation on the 
categorisation o f visual stimuli and strength o f holistic beliefs. However, only explicit 
H-A measures are subject to religious context effects, as evident in their association 
with religiosity, the religious self-concept and religious integration. Inducing a Buddhist 
context through religious priming does not result in a holism shift.
A follow-up study (2) uses pictorial primes and shows an interaction effect between 
priming condition and strength o f Buddhist self-concepts on holistic beliefs. Study 3 
clarifies religious versus secular differences that were found for the grouping measure 
used in Study 1 in a correlational design with measures of independence- 
interdependence, religious identification as well as attraction to Buddhist and Secular- 
Humanist ideas. It indicates that both self-selection and learning effects may account for 
secular vs religious H-A differences.
The last experiment (Study 4) further develops so-called 'tolerance o f contradictions' 
(TC) as an aspect o f H-A cognition and introduces the cognitive anthropological 
concept o f counterintuitive (Cl) beliefs. As expected, results show that religious groups 
have a higher tolerance o f CL Furthermore, compared to normal or bizarre concepts, Cl 
content reduces TC only among secular individuals, and to some degree Anglicans, but 
has no such effect on Buddhists.
Implications for cross-cultural psychology, the psychology of religion as well as the 
interdisciplinary field o f ‘cognition and culture’ are discussed.
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Chapter 1 -  Introduction
1.1 Cognition, Culture and Religion
Despite the declining importance o f organised religion in the lives o f many 
individuals in post-industrial societies (see e.g. Furlong, 2000, on the Church o f 
England), the domain o f religion has always been home to exceptionally durable 
ideas—values, beliefs and practices that appear to be more robust than those found in 
other cultural institutions. The endurance of religious beliefs and practices has led to 
theories about the cognitive foundations o f their transmission, including the 
identification o f two ‘modes o f religiosity’ with contrasting sociopolitical and 
psychological characteristics (Whitehouse, 2000, 2004, 2005) and cognitive universals 
that underlie non-natural representations (Sperber, 1996; Boyer 1994, 2000; see also 
Sperber and Hirschfeld, 1999; Lawson, 2001). The cognitive science o f religion has 
become an important area o f inquiry within the emerging interdisciplinary field o f 
‘cognition and culture’ (e.g. Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; Nisbett & Norenzayan, 2002; 
Nisbett, Peng, Choi & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng, Ames, & Knowles, 2001; Sperber & 
Hirschfeld, 1999). However, religion has not found much interest among ‘culture and 
cognition’ researchers who study cognition in a ‘top down’ approach: cognitive 
differences as a consequence o f cultural diversity (e.g. Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, 
Choi & Norenzayan, 2001). This thesis contains four studies that investigate the 
overarching question whether religion affects areas o f cognition previously discussed 
under the heading o f ‘holistic versus analytic’ (H-A) thought.
1.2 Cross-Cultural Differences in Cognition
Some attempts to explain human attitudes and beliefs as a result o f  broad cultural 
differences have made distinctions between so-called collectivist and individualist
10
cultures (e.g. Triandis, 1995; Hofstede, 1980), influencing the development of more 
interdependent or independent orientations of people towards others (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Peng, Ames and Knowles (2001) have termed theories and research in 
these respective areas values and se lf approaches to ‘culture and human inference’. The 
starting point for this thesis is mainly a third perspective, which Peng et al. call the folk 
theories or simply theories tradition. Recent studies in this tradition by cross-cultural 
psychologists have revealed significant differences in cognition between individuals 
from East Asia and those o f Western European cultural descent, most dramatically the 
United States (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi & 
Norenzayan, 2001; cf. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett, 1998). Nisbett et al. (2001) 
classify cognitive differences associated with those cultural regions as holistic versus 
analytic thought (henceforth referred to as H-A cognition), ‘systems o f reasoning’ that 
cluster together in a variety o f experimental findings.
H-A cognition represents a pattern o f thinking on several levels, involving 
differences in perception, attention, conceptual structures and inferences about 
causality. Holistic cognition assigns greater weight to fields, contexts and relationships, 
while analytic cognitive processes focus on objects, categories and formal logic. In 
addition, dialectical reasoning has been considered an aspect o f holism, contrasted with 
analytic cognition’s lower tolerance o f logical contradictions. Nisbett (2003) theorises 
that these differences in cognition are the result o f variations in social structures and 
practices (rooted in ecological, economic and social histories) leading to cultural 
differences in attention, metaphysics and folk epistemologies, which are then applied in 
cognitive processes.
1.3 Why Religion? Why Buddhism?
The overarching question addressed in the following chapters is whether within- 
cultural religious differences can explain H-A patterns o f thought. Theories and research
11
by both cognitive anthropologists and psychologists of religion suggest that religious 
experience has cognitive consequences beyond the immediate context o f religiosity. The 
anthropologist Harvey Whitehouse’s ‘modes theory’ of religiosity (2000, 2004, 2005) 
proposes that two types of religion, the doctrinal and imagistic, can capture 
commonalities o f religions in the spiritual landscape across space and time. Despite the 
complexity o f religious systems, their endurance can be explained in part by their 
individual-level cognitive implications in the form o f either semantic or episodic 
memory.
Some research in the psychology o f religion has been interested in how religiosity 
affects other aspects o f life, such as coping and health, which is influenced by cognitive 
processes like causal attributions (Loewenthal & Cornwall, 1993; Loewenthal,
MacLeod, Goldblatt, Lubitsh, & Valentine, 2000; Lupfer, Brock, & Depaola, 1992; 
Pargament, 1997; in Nielsen, 2000; Parsuram & Sharma, 1996; Spilka, Shaver, & 
Kirkpatrick, 1985; Wikstrom, 1987). The study of H-A thought among religious and 
secular populations, as endeavoured by this thesis, has the potential to enhance our 
understanding o f religions’ more general cognitive effects.
The primary religion of interest in this thesis is Buddhism—in the form o f individual 
identification, religiosity as well as social integration—as an instance o f Eastern religion 
in the West. The motivation for this choice is twofold. First, Buddhism has been 
credited as an important source o f East Asian thought (Fiske et al., 1998; Ho, 1995; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus et al., 1997) and holistic reasoning (Bose, 2002; 
Hernandez & Iyengar, 2001; Nisbett, 2003; Noda, 2000; Omstein, 1972; Ragsdale, 
2003), but has never been empirically investigated from that perspective. Second, 
Buddhism is not only the most widespread religion in East Asia1, but also the most
1 Source: CIA World Fact Book. Buddhists are a) the largest religious population in Japan, b) equally 
numerous as Christianity in South Korea, and c) constitute an unknown portion of the population in 
Taiwan, along with Taoists and Confucians. There are no reliable statistics about religious affiliations in 
Mainland China and North Korea.
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represented Asian religion among the white British population, with 50,000 self­
identified Buddhists counted by the 2001 Census. This number represents one-third of 
the total Buddhist population in Britain.2
It has been claimed that religion is the most overlooked dimension in mainstream 
psychology (Weaver, Kline, Samford, Lucas, Larson, & Gorsuch, 1998) as well as 
cross-cultural psychology (Tarakeshwar, Stanton, & Pargament, 2003). By examining 
Buddhism as a mediating variable between culture and H-A thought, we may come 
closer to understanding some o f  the processes and dynamics at work in the relationship 
between culture and cognition. Studying Buddhism outside o f its native context is also 
reflective o f psychology in today’s multiculturalism or globalisation, where populations 
and ideas are flowing across borders in an ever-shrinking world (e.g. Sampson, 1989; 
Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Hong & Chiu, 2001; Nisbett, 2003).
1.4 Thesis Outline
1.4.1 Introduction
Theoretical arguments for the cultural origins o f H-A thought have been made. 
However, as will be shown later, they are far from complete. I believe that there are 
three main tasks o f future research in this area. First, attempts should be made to 
empirically study mechanisms operating between sociocultural systems, including their 
components, and individual thought. This includes research on group (or subcultural) 
differences within cultures. Second, a shift from relatively static to more dynamic 
research should be made by looking at learning, change or the coexistence o f different 
systems of thinking. Finally, the interaction between relatively universal and culturally 
variable cognitive processes could be investigated in order to fuse the ‘top down’ and 
‘bottom up’ approaches of the ‘cognition and culture’ field.
2 Source: Census, April 2001, UK Office for National Statistics.
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1.4.2 Theoretical Chapters
The next chapter mainly addresses the first and second point outlined above by 
discussing the place of religion, spirituality and religious contexts o f reasoning in 
culture and H-A cognition. In order to understand and explain H-A differences from the 
perspective of Buddhism, I will first review theories and research that have been 
conducted in the cross-cultural psychology of H-A thought. I will then concentrate on 
the question whether religiosity and religious contexts of reasoning may influence H-A 
cognition. This is done in a review o f theories and findings in the area of biculturalism 
as well as cultural knowledge activation. Moreover, critical and complementary 
approaches to the study of sociocultural systems and the individual are discussed.
In an attempt to contribute towards a ‘religion and cognition’ model for this thesis, I 
review Nisbett’s (2003) H-A model o f culture and cognition along with Peng et al.’s 
(2001) ‘culture and human inference’ model and House’s (1981) ‘individual and social 
structure’ theory. From the perspective o f the latter, I will argue that a distinction 
between structure and content can be made not only with respect to individual thought, 
but also in sociological terms. To this end, I will make a case for a conceptual 
separation, on a collective ‘systems’ level, between individual integration in social 
structure vis-a-vis that structure's ‘cultural content’. With respect to religion this means 
that we need to take into account individuals’ spiritual values, beliefs and practices 
along with their contacts in religious social structures that may reinforce such ‘religious 
content’. I expect that these cultural and structural components o f religiousness may 
(separately or jointly) lead to effects on H-A reasoning. Hence, the model used 
throughout this thesis largely retains the character o f the original H-A theory and 
research (albeit with a mid-level focus due to its emphasis on religion), but is expanded 
by adding closely related ideas from cross-cultural and social psychology.
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Chapter 3 reviews different approaches to religion and cognition. After an 
introduction to the psychology o f religion, the teachings o f Buddhism and their 
relevance to H-A cognition are discussed. Keeping in mind sociological and 
psychological factors, I will articulate more detailed hypotheses about the relationship 
between religion, particularly Buddhism, and H-A cognition. In the chapter’s second 
section, the top-down approach evident in H-A research is re-analysed by adopting a 
bottom-up viewpoint o f universally intuitive aspects of cognition. This provides the 
basis underlying the concept o f counter-intuitiveness (Cl), contradictory beliefs that 
prevail in the domain o f religion. Parallels between Cl, tolerance o f contradictions (TC) 
and Eastern dialectical thinking are discussed. While Cl constitutes a ‘cognitively 
optimal’ feature o f religiosity, Whitehouse’s ‘modes theory’ o f religiosity (2000, 2004, 
2005) is concerned with more complex or ‘cognitively costly’ aspects of religion. It is 
argued that Buddhism, particularly the kind practiced by Westerners, is related to the 
‘imagistic’ mode, compared to Christian religions that have been used as prime 
examples of the ‘doctrinal’ mode. The expected cognitive consequences o f these two 
modes are largely congruent with those implied by the social, religious and cross- 
cultural psychological literature.
1.4.3 Empirical Work
A question o f central importance in Study 1 o f this thesis (Chapter 4) is whether 
individuals with a white British cultural background who practice Buddhism exhibit 
more holistic reasoning than other groups. Samples o f Christians belonging to the 
Church o f England and representatives o f a British Secular-Humanist population serve 
as comparison groups in this online experiment. In addition to an analysis o f group 
differences, this study conceptualises religion further by looking at H-A differences as a 
result o f religious priming, religiosity, as well as religious group contact or integration. 
The findings o f Study 1 support the hypothesis that Buddhists are more holistic thinkers
15
than Christian and secular groups, although results for TC are mixed. While religious 
priming does not lead to more holistic cognition in that group, religiosity and integration 
affect holistic beliefs. Along with the H-A categorisation o f visual stimuli, those beliefs 
are also influenced by meditative practices.
Chapter 5 presents three follow-up studies that clarify the main experiment’s 
outcomes. The first, Study 2, is a shorter experiment with a pictorial priming 
manipulation. It shows that a Buddhist prime can induce holistic beliefs, albeit 
moderated by the strength o f Buddhist self-concepts. Study 3 investigates the role o f the 
religious self-concept further and illustrates its relationship to independent- 
interdependent self-construals as well as holistic grouping. Findings support both 
cognitive self-selection and learning hypotheses to account for holistic performance on 
this measure. Following Study 1 ’s strong religious differences on explicit measures, in 
addition to mixed findings for TC, the last experiment extends the range o f TC from 
reflective to intuition-based variables. Consistent with predictions, it shows Buddhists 
to hold beliefs with the highest level o f TC. Unlike their comparison groups, Buddhists 
are able to sustain such a tolerance even for highly counterintuitive cognitions.
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Chapter 2 -  Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: 
Cross-Cultural and Social Psychological Contexts
2.1 Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Empirical Dimensions
2.1.1 The Social Inference Level of Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Social 
Attribution and Prediction
H-A systems are evident in cognitions ranging from perceptual to reflective levels of 
thought, such as social attributions and predictions. Individuals' causal explanation o f 
their own and others' behaviour has been part o f a social psychological research 
tradition on social attribution. In Jones and Harris’ (1967) classic experiment, students' 
attribution o f others' pro or anti-Castro attitude showed correspondence to the position 
taken in an essay presented to the class, even if the target actors were clearly ordered to 
defend one or the other stance in the essay. Ross (1977; see also Gilbert & Malone,
1995) theorised that there is a Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE), referring to a 
universal tendency for people to underestimate the strength o f influence exerted by 
situational factors. Persons do this even when it is logically unwarranted. It was later 
shown that, in the attribution of behaviour, individuals from Asian cultures tend to give 
contextual explanations, whereas Americans prefer dispositional ones (e.g. Cha & Nam, 
1985; Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994)
Some studies, however, have provided evidence that Japanese and Chinese are just 
as likely to make the FAE (for a summary see Choi et al., 1999) as Westerners in the 
no-choice condition of the classic essay experiment (Krull et al. 1996, in Choi et al.,
1999) or are at best “equally insensitive to the difference in the target person's choice 
and the potential effects of situational constraints” (Kashima, Siegal, Tanaka, &
Kashima, 1992, p. 120). Choi and his colleagues (1999; Choi & Nisbett, 1998) 
demonstrate that this may only be the case when situational constraints are not salient.
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Choi and Nisbett's (1998) version o f the essay experiment manipulated salience by 
asking participants to write essays supporting or opposing capital punishment 
themselves, regardless o f their own attitudes. By exposing participants to the same 
situational constraints as the target person, differences clearly emerged. Koreans 
correspondence bias decreased significantly more than that o f the American sample in 
manipulation conditions. The same was true for the actor-observer bias.
Social inferences in the form o f predictions o f behaviour as studied by Norenzayan, 
Choi & Nisbett (2002) yield similar patterns. Asian subjects were influenced by 
situational information for the prediction o f the hypothetical actor's behaviour only 
significantly more than Americans when they engaged in the aggregate prediction task. 
Respondents, lacking dispositional information about hypothetical actors, were asked 
what proportion o f any 100 individuals would engage in a particular behaviour prior to 
reading about the individual actor and making a prediction. While Koreans were 
responsive to the increased salience o f situational information, Americans were not.
Norenzayan et al. (2002) maintain that folk theories o f the person differ across 
cultures, while dispositionist thinking may nonetheless be universal and intuitive under 
conditions that lack contextual information. A test o f Erdley and Dweck's (1993; also 
Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993) index measuring beliefs in the fixedness of personality 
traits (Entity Theory of Personality: e.g. ‘everyone has a certain personality and it is 
something that they can’t do much about’) supported the idea that Western European 
cultures may think o f traits more in global, abstract terms, driven by schemas in 
information processing, whereas the East Asian perspective may lead to specific, 
concrete or conditional inferences about behaviour. However, when Norenzayan et al. 
(2002a) directly measured actual beliefs, in the form o f abstractly formulated lay 
theories o f social behaviour, differences emerged for people’s endorsement o f 
situationist and interactionist arguments, but no cultural effect was found for a
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dispositionist theory. While dispositionist and situationist arguments stressed the power 
o f personality and context or situation, respectively, the interactionist theory argued for 
a joint determination of internal and external factors in influencing behaviour.
2.1.2 The Perceptual Level of Holistic versus Analytic Cognition
Patterns o f reasoning about the causes o f social behaviour are also reflected in (or in 
part arise out of) more basic perceptions o f causality. Nisbett and his colleagues have 
pointed to Aristotelian physics as a possible source for Western thinking about causality 
(Fiske et al., 1998; Nisbett et al., 2001; Choi et al., 1999; Ji, Peng & Nisbett, 2000; 
Norenzayan & Nisbett, 2000; Nisbett, 2003). Unlike the Chinese, for example, the 
Greeks explained causality in terms o f an object's inherent property, or essence, such as 
gravity. The Chinese had a concept o f wave-based rather than particle-based physics 
and understood the concept o f ‘action at a distance’ (Needham, 1962 in Nisbett, 2003; 
Nisbett et al., 2001; Choi et al., 1999; Ji et al., 2000). Although the historical origins o f 
contemporary differences in cognition are poorly substantiated in the literature, they 
may be reflective or illustrative of a cultural history that has left a ‘legacy o f thought’.
Accordingly, Peng and Knowles' (2003) found that Chinese students were more 
likely to explain physical events on the basis o f factors external to the object than 
Americans. In their samples, which were made up o f students with no formal physics 
education, Chinese students tended to perceive causality as originating externally to a 
target object (e.g. gravity, friction), whereas Americans referred to causes internal to the 
object (e.g. shape, weight, inertia). The authors argue that people from different cultures 
have access to different fo lk  theories about physical causality.
Related research by Ji et al. (2000) also found that Chinese have a greater capability 
than Americans o f detecting co-variation between stimuli pairs presented to them on a 
computer screen. The ability to detect co-variation must be both a determinant and a 
product of the stimuli individuals attend to in the environment. The same can be said for
causal inference: greater attention to the context or field in which an event occurs 
should be directly related to causal judgments and vice versa. To what degree do 
individuals from various cultures differentiate an object from the field in which it is 
embedded? Building on experimental research on field-dependence-independence, 
originally conducted by Witkin and his colleagues (Witkin, Lewis, Hertzman,
Machover, Meissner, & Karp, 1954; Witkin & Goodenough, 1981), Kitayama, Duffy, 
Kawamura and Larsen (2003; see also Ji et al., 2000; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001) used a 
newly devised perceptual task called the framed-line test. The test consisted o f 
presenting subjects with a picture o f a vertical line printed within a square frame. 
Participants were then shown another frame o f the same or different size and asked to 
draw a line identical to the first one in either it’s actual (absolute) length or in relative 
proportion to the dimension of the surrounding frame. Accuracy in the absolute task 
indicated decontextualisation (similar to field-independence), whereas relative accuracy 
was indicative o f sensitivity to context (field-dependence). The experiment showed 
expected differences between Americans and Japanese.
Chua, Boland, & Nisbett (2005) found significant differences in eye movement, 
revealed in a Western tendency to look at salient objects sooner and longer than East 
Asians. The latter group attended more to background factors o f the same naturalistic 
scenes. Chua et al. conclude that this is evidence for differences in encoding that occurs 
early in the cognitive process rather than at later stages when information is retrieved, 
mental comparisons are made, or biases in reporting may occur (for a summary on 
culture and H-A perception see Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005). Miyamoto, Nisbett and 
Masuda (2006) note that differences in perceptions may be in part reinforced by actual 
differences in perceptual environments. They report significant differences in both the 
number o f objects contained in comparable sceneries (hotels, schools and post offices) 
in the U.S. and Japan (Study IB) and their perceived ambiguity and complexity across
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cultures (Study 1 A). In another experiment (Study 2), both American and Japanese 
students who were first exposed to Japanese scenes showed a tendency to attend to 
contextual information in a follow-up task.
2.1.3 The Middle Range of Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Categorisation, 
Induction and Conceptual Structure
Ji, Zhang and Nisbett (2004) maintain that attention to the field, in holistic thought, 
also entails attention to relationships between objects and events. Analytic thinkers, by 
contrast, “de-contextualise an object from the field and attend to its properties so as to 
establish category membership, in an attempt to understand and predict the object’s 
behavior” (p. 58). H-A reasoning, then, is also manifested in aspects o f cognition that do 
not answer what information is attended to or where the causes o f events can be found, 
but how the world is carved up. Scholars interested in Eastern cultures have recognised 
that Asian thought appears to be dominated by part-whole rather than one-many 
relationships (e.g. Hansen, 1985, Nakamura, 1964; Noda, 2000; Ragsdale, 2003) and 
that Eastern thinkers seem to concentrate more on categories o f relationship than 
categories o f substance (e.g. Hughes, 1967; cf. Ragsdale, 2003). In an early study, Chiu 
(1972) found that Chinese children in his sample preferred to group human and 
inanimate objects in relational-contextual terms. American children chose categorical 
properties more often in this task. For example, if presented with pictures o f a woman, 
man and child, Chinese tended to group woman and child together (‘The mother takes 
care o f the child’), whereas Americans were more likely to match man and woman 
because they are both adults. Using similar visual stimuli, Unsworth, Sears and Pexman 
(2005) found that these differences occur at an implicit level o f cognitive processing. 
Upon being presented with a target object (e.g. car), Canadian, but not Chinese, 
students’ response times were significantly faster when followed by a similar object
(e.g. bus) than a relational one (e.g. tyre), indicating cross-cultural differences in the 
implicit activation o f semantic concepts.
Ji et al. (2004) used a similar forced-choice grouping task with words instead of 
pictures, and found the same to be true for a sample o f Chinese and American college 
students. The smaller importance o f categories among East Asians is also highlighted by 
Choi, Nisbett and Smith (1997), who found that Korean college students use categories 
less spontaneously for inductive inferences. Indeed, Gopnik and Choi (1990) argue that 
categorisation and naming is learned a few months later among Korean children than 
among English or French speakers. Linguistic development, particularly the fact that 
verbs are more salient and acquired earlier in Korean than nouns, may influence this 
cognitive development pattern (see also Nisbett, 2003, for a summary o f language and 
conceptual development).
Norenzayan, Smith, Kim and Nisbett (2002) administered a variety o f tasks to 
demonstrate that East Asians reason more intuitively than formally. Their experiments 
consisted o f student samples with similar demographic backgrounds and intellectual 
ability. Although East Asians were just as capable o f constructing rules governing the 
categorisation o f stimuli, this was not the case when the task was made deliberately 
ambiguous in a rule- vs family resemblance-based categorisation measure (Study 2). In 
this study, perceptual stimulus objects (such as drawings o f flowers) contained three out 
of four possible features, which together produced a strong family resemblance 
structure. Only one o f the four features was deterministic, i.e. shared among all objects 
and indicative o f a rule. In the classification condition, subjects were instructed to 
decide which group a given target object (e.g. flower) belongs to. In the similarity 
judgment condition, categorisation on the basis o f rule versus family-resemblance were 
put in conflict, as participants were asked to indicate the group to which a target object 
is most similar.
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In this condition, East Asians gave family-resemblance responses 59% of the time and 
Americans only did so for 31% o f target objects. Norenzayan et al. conclude that 
“intuitive [unlike formal] reasoning is experience-based, resists decontextualizing or 
separating form from content, relies on sense experience and concrete instances, and 
overlooks rules and logic when they are at odds with intuition” (my emphasis; p. 678).
2.1.4 Formal versus Dialectical Reasoning and Tolerance of Contradiction
While using rules or formal logic are defining features o f analytic cognition, Nisbett 
(2003) maintains that holistic thought brings about attention to the field which “would 
encourage recognition o f complexity and change, as well as o f contradiction among its 
many and varied elements” (p. 36). Peng (Peng, 1997; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; for 
summaries see Peng & Ames, 2001; Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett et al., 2001) has argued that 
East Asians are more tolerant o f contradictions and noted that East Asians, particularly 
Chinese, seem to put aside Western formal logic in favour o f so-called naive 
dialecticism. Formal logic excludes the possibility o f contradiction. More specifically, 
Peng and Nisbett (1999; Peng, 1997; Nisbett et al., 2001) argue that the formal law o f 
non-contradiction includes certain principles: an object is by definition identical to itself 
(the law o f identity); a statement cannot be both true and false (law o f noncontradiction) 
and it must be either true or false (law o f the excluded middle). Eastern naive 
dialecticism, by contrast, has principles seemingly opposed to Western formal logic: 
reality is dynamic and an object does not have to be identical to itself (the principle o f 
change); change is constant and hence things can coexist in the same object or event at a 
given time (principle o f contradiction); due to constant change and contradiction, 
everything is related and interdependent (principle o f relationship or holism). The 
psychological manifestation o f dialecticism lies in a greater acceptance o f apparent 
contradiction and the readiness to resolve them by finding a middle way.
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Peng and Nisbett's (1999) definitions o f contradiction and dialecticism have been 
subsequently criticised by some scholars (S. Chan, 2000; Ho, 2000; Lee, 2000; Ratner 
& Hui, 2003; Huss, 2004). Indeed, most o f Peng and Nisbett's studies are only loosely 
related to psychological contradictions. For example, differences were evident in a 
tendency for Chinese to rate dialectical arguments as far more persuasive or plausible 
than their American counterparts. In another study, participants from the U.S. and China 
rated dialectical and non-dialectical proverbs on the basis o f their understanding, liking 
and usage o f the expressions. Even for culturally unfamiliar (Yiddish) proverbs,
Chinese seemed to prefer dialectical ones significantly more than Americans did.
Finally, Peng studied individuals' resolutions o f social ‘contradictions’ (‘conflict’ may 
be a better term), where East Asians tended to address issues from both sides and 
attempted to reconcile conflicts through compromise.
In this thesis I will make three related assumptions about tolerance for contradiction 
(TC). First, I will accept Peng and Nisbett’s (2000) position that their research is about 
apparent and psychological rather than factual or logical contradictions. Second, I 
endorse the notion that this tolerance is a form o f acceptance, not a true belief that 
would violate basic logical principles (Huss, 2004). Third, I adopt D. Chan’s (2004) 
conceptualisation o f TC as related to ‘fuzzy’ rather than ‘bivalent’ logic, because 
empirical evidence on TC only establishes differences occurring on continua— TC, so 
far, has not been measured as a black-or-white phenomenon.
There is one finding in Peng and Nisbett’s cluster o f studies that captures these 
assumptions well. When presented with two seemingly contradictory scientific research 
findings (for example, one study pointing to smoking in relation to being skinny and 
another to nicotine and weight gain), American subjects tended to differentiate by rating 
one finding as more plausible than the other. Chinese participants, in comparison, 
resolved the apparent contradiction by expressing intermediate beliefs. More
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specifically, compared to a control condition in which ratings o f plausibility for 
individual findings were elicited, the more plausible one o f two statements presented to 
Americans was rated as slightly more plausible, while Chinese participants' ratings o f 
plausibility actually converged. This finding is supported by a comparable study of 
surprise about expectation violations conducted by Choi and Nisbett (2000; Study 4). In 
a rather complex experimental design, the researchers induced a belief in a proposition 
among participants and then informed them that the opposite was in fact true. 
Participants were asked to provide their opinions o f the proposition on the basis of this 
“corrected” evidence. Americans were far more surprised than Koreans by the less 
plausible proposition actually being true after initially being led to believe that it was 
the more plausible one.
Choi and Nisbett (2000) argue that East Asians’ greater TC, along with more 
complex theories of behaviour, would be reflected in lower ratings o f surprise about 
target actors’ behaviour that are in conflict with the behaviour one would normally 
expect. In one study, a ‘Bad Samaritan’ vignette was used to measure Korean and 
American subjects' surprise about a target's behaviour. A target seminary student, 
described as very helpful and religious, was late for a sermon course in which he was 
supposed to give a practice sermon. The student encountered another person in need, 
and faced the dilemma o f helping (consistent with the expectations we would have 
based on his personality) or being late and facing the consequences. Compared to U.S. 
subjects, Koreans were significantly less surprised upon learning that the seminary 
student did not help the person in need. The same pattern was found for surprise about 
an unhelpful individual actually helping another person (Study 2).
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2.2 Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: A Typology with Shortcomings
2.2.1 Tolerance of Contradictions—A Special Case of Holistic versus Analytic 
Thought
As mentioned previously, dialectical reasoning or degrees o f TC may be related to 
cross-cultural differences in attention, resulting in the recognition o f complexity, change 
and contradiction. On the basis of this logic, Nisbett et al. (2001) theorised that TC, in 
the form o f dialectical versus formal-logical cognition, is an aspect o f H-A thought. 
Perhaps partially as a result o f critical responses to these ideas, Nisbett and Masuda 
(2003) have implied that Asian dialectical versus Western European formal logical 
thinking may be a special case in H-A reasoning. They posit that the causal chain 
between culture and cognition bypasses attention and perception in a more direct flow 
from social practices (e.g. debate vs. harmony or reconciliation) to cognition (e.g. 
differentiation vs. compromise). Hence, while the recognition o f contradictions may be 
related to attention, ways o f dealing with it may be o f a more social origin.
2.2.2 Interrelations Between Dimensions of Holistic versus Analytic Cognition
As mentioned earlier, H-A reasoning represents styles o f thinking that have not been 
operationalised on the basis o f a priori theories, but systems of interrelated phenomena 
that seem to cluster together. H-A cognition, then, is at best a parsimonious concept to 
explain empirical findings and at worst ‘data in search o f a theory’. Empirical 
investigations o f how these measures are interconnected have not been conducted. 
Hence, while the common themes of analytic and holistic thinking are somewhat clear, 
the broad scope o f the elements making up these systems makes it difficult to 
empirically map relationships between relevant cognitive processes. If  H-A systems o f 
thought exist, research to find a higher-order measure would be useful.
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Only one study has attempted to devise a H-A scale, but it is not clear whether it 
truly represents a higher-order H-A measure. Choi, Dalai, Kim-Prieto and Park (2003) 
constructed a Holism Scale composed o f ten questions capturing individuals'
‘epistemological stances’ in the form o f abstract beliefs. Questions focused mainly on 
beliefs about causality and attention to relationships or contexts, including statements 
like ‘Nothing is unrelated’ or ‘The whole is greater than the sum of its parts’.
Interrelations between aspects o f H-A thought have been mapped out theoretically by 
Nisbett (2003), who has argued that, generally, differences in attention to the object 
versus field (which, as discussed later, have a social origin) have cognitive implications 
for metaphysics (beliefs about the nature o f the world and how its components interact) 
and “tacit epistemologies” or “beliefs about how to get new knowledge” (p. 37). 
Epistemology, in turn, fosters the development and use o f certain cognitive processes. 
Differences in attention and folk theories (in addition perhaps to interdependent 
orientations o f self, discussed later) also seem to affect a conceptual organisation o f the 
world in relational-contextual terms (Chiu, 1972; Ji et al., 2004) and social cognition in 
the form o f attribution or prediction o f behaviour. Furthermore, differences in attention 
can be related to intuitive versus analytic categorisation (Norenzayan et al., 2002b). 
Whereas holistic attention may facilitate stimulus-as-a-whole (i.e. family-resemblance, 
typicality and exemplar-based) categorisation, a focus on the object leads to an “attempt 
to categorize the object and derive rules about its behaviour based on its category 
memberships” (Choi et al., 1997: 29).
2.2.3 What Holistic versus Analytic Cognition Is Not
Not surprisingly, Nisbett et al. (2001) are unable to provide a succinct definition o f 
holistic versus analytic distinction. By calling them ‘systems o f thought’, the authors 
leave ample room for interpretation. The range o f cognitions involved and the lack of 
empirically substantiated interrelations between them should rule out a description of
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the H-A distinction as ‘cognitive styles’. In fact, a classic example o f cognitive styles 
comes from research on field-dependence/independence (Witkin et al., 1954; Witkin & 
Goodenough, 1981), variations o f which have been used as an illustration o f H-A 
perception. Other conceptualisations o f cognitive style seem to resemble relational- 
contextual versus category-based ways o f organising information, such as Kagan, Moss 
and Sigel's (1963) ‘styles of conceptualisation’ or ‘conceptual strategies’. Kagan et al.'s 
strategies show commonalities with the perceptual styles outlined by Witkin and his 
colleagues. They are made up o f analytic- descriptive (versus holistic), inferential- 
categorical and relational-contextual types. The first style refers to differences in 
responses to stimuli, whereas the latter two refer to their categorisation (see also Chiu, 
1972). Broadly speaking, then, a cognitive style can be defined as a certain way of 
processing information. A cognitive system, as in H-A thought, could be defined as a 
group o f conceptually (ideally also empirically) related or mutually supporting ways of 
processing information. These range from cognitions that determine those processes’ 
input or content (perception, attention), relevant beliefs that govern the organisation o f 
content or relationship between objects o f thought (metaphysics), and explanations o f 
how or why objects behave in certain ways (epistemology).
The use o f the term ‘versus’ in contrasting holistic and analytic processes by Nisbett 
et al. (2001) appears semantically clumsy, as the H-A distinction may be interpreted as 
discrete systems across individuals or cultural groups. H-A cognition is only a 
dichotomy in the sense that certain cognitive tasks can (or can be forced to) have only 
one solution or the other, not in the sense that they are exclusive to different cultural 
populations. Cross-cultural research can only produce differences in tendencies in the 
application o f H-A cognitive ‘tools’ to solve problems (Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett & 
Norenzayan, 2002; Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). Nisbett et al. agree with Resnick’s 
(1994) definition o f ‘situated cognition’ as thought with a cultural and intellectual
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history, composed o f tools that have built-in and (consciously or unconsciously) 
accepted theories. However, although Nisbett et al. reference psychologists who have 
contributed to the history o f a ‘tools o f thought’ view (e.g. Vygotsky, 1978; Cole,
1995), they do not further elaborate on the role o f culture and the individual in the 
selection process. Have H-A tools been selected for us primarily by culture, do 
individuals select certain tools more than others because o f cultural or contextual 
demands, or is it an interaction between those two processes? Although there are many 
unanswered and relevant questions that could be addressed along those lines, doing so 
would go beyond the scope o f this thesis.
2.3 Values and Self Traditions of Culture and Cognition
One important gap in the literature on H-A cognition is evident in the fact that actual 
mechanisms involved in the culture-cognition link have been explained theoretically 
rather than explored empirically (see Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett et al., 2001). Hence, the 
cultural psychology o f H-A reasoning would benefit from more research about how 
particular aspects o f culture or institutions in individuals’ everyday life affect cognitive 
processes. This requires greater sensitivity to institutions and meaning systems making 
up culture, as well as situations and contexts affecting individual cognition. As a 
component o f culture, religion has the potential to provide insights into mechanisms 
mediating between macro culture and the individual mind.
Moreover, studies in cross-cultural cognition have, on the whole, been quite static in 
the questions they have sought to answer empirically. They have often relied on 
investigations o f simple group differences without attention to subcultural or individual 
variation, contexts or change over time. Directing more attention to contexts in which 
thinking occurs and the possible coexistence o f different cognitive systems would be 
beneficial to the field. In the following sections, I shall bring some more focus to these 
issues by discussing the broader theoretical context in which H-A cognition is
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embedded, as well as subsequent advances in those areas. To this end, I will use Peng, 
Ames and Knowles (2001) distinction between the value, self and theory approaches to 
culture and human inference. The theory approach is best represented by the view of 
tacit or folk epistemologies (beliefs about causality, theories about the person, etc.) as a 
source o f individual inference patterns (e.g. Nisbett, 2003). The complementary ‘values’ 
and ‘self traditions, which I am about to discuss, represent historical antecedents to this 
view.
2.3.1 Individualism-Collectivism and Independence-lnterdependence
Individualism and collectivism have been identified as ideal-type sociocultural 
patterns with consequences for individual orientation and motivation by Triandis (1989, 
1995; for critiques see Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Hong & Chiu, 2001; Kitayama,
2002; Miller, 2002). Individualist societies imply a notion o f relatively loosely linked 
individuals who value their own needs, rights and self-fulfilment. A collectivist society 
entails closer interpersonal ties and leads individuals to emphasise collective goals, 
needs and in-group conformity. In Hofstede's (1980/1984) survey research o f work- 
related values, the United States and Britain are counted among the world's most 
individualist cultures, while countries o f Chinese cultural influence, such as Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, are on the other end o f the spectrum. The concepts of 
individualism and collectivism epitomise the value system tradition in psychology, as 
outlined in Peng et al. (2001). However, there is no direct evidence that the values 
associated with individualism-collectivism have any direct bearing on H-A thought.
Unlike the values tradition, another approach to cross-cultural differences 
emphasises the person as embedded in social structure—the self in relationship to others 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; see also Shweder & Bourne, 1982, for a more 
anthropological view). Peng et al. (2001) refer to this approach as the ‘self tradition. 
Markus and Kitayama (1991; see also Hernandez & Iyengar, 2001, Greenfield, Keller,
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Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003) integrate theories from psychology and anthropology and 
argue that self-and-other construals, as well as the relationship between self and others, 
may be even more powerful than previously suggested (p. 224). Independent construals 
o f the self refer to views o f the self as autonomous, evident in self-representations of 
individual desires, preferences, attributes or abilities. The interdependent self is more 
interconnected and less differentiated. It is about the recognition o f one's behaviour as 
determined by what one perceives to be others' thoughts, feelings and actions. 
Consequently,
[i]f one perceives oneself as embedded within a larger context of which one is an 
interdependent part, it is likely that other objects or events will be perceived in a similar 
way. For example, a given event involving a particular actor will be perceived as arising 
from the situational context of which this actor is an interdependent part, rather than as 
stemming solely from the attributes of the actor. (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 24)
Brewer and Gardner (1996) suggest that Markus and Kitayama’s view o f the self is 
mainly relational and should be contrasted with the collective self-construal implied by 
the ‘values’ tradition (see Triandis, 1989; Trafimow, Triandis & Goto, 1991). Kiihnen 
and Oyserman (2002; also Kiihnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001) test Markus & 
Kitayama’s implications that an interdependent or relational self-concept should lead to 
context-dependent processing style. They did so by first priming individuals in a word 
search task with either interdependence (e.g. we, our, us) or independence (e.g. I, me, 
mine). Participants were then presented with a letter (e.g. H) made up o f smaller letters 
(e.g. F) and had to identify either the small or large letter as quickly as possible. The 
researchers reasoned that identifying the small letters requires a focus on elements, 
while ignoring the larger letter (i.e. context) they form. It was found that a context- 
independent versus dependent processing style indeed led to response times in line with 
the priming manipulations. The same effect was replicated in a memory measure 
(Experiment 2) using an array o f 28 objects in a larger picture. Independence primed
31
participants performed better in recalling what they had seen and the location (on the 
overall picture) they had seen it in.
2.4 Biculturalism and Holistic versus Analytic Cognition
Research on the self-concept has shown that self-construals can be subject to priming 
(Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel & Lee, 1999; Trafimow, Triandis & Goto, 
1991; Triandis, 1989). Evoking different orientations of self in the laboratory can have 
an impact on values on the individualism-collectivism continuum (Gardner et al., 1999) 
as well as information processing styles (Kiihnen & Oyserman, 2002). A more dramatic 
illustration o f the priming o f cognition in the form o f knowledge or theories tied to 
particular cultures is evident in studies on people who have been socialised into more 
than one culture, often discussed under the heading o f ‘biculturalism’. While the 
concept o f acculturation has been considered at odds with a dynamic view o f culture 
that allows for diversity or the mutual influence o f cultures (e.g. Markus et al., 1997), 
the recognition o f a coexistence o f different cultures in individuals’ lives has probably 
been an important step towards a fuller appreciation o f culture in psychology. Research 
on individuals outside o f their native cultural environment, such as sojourners, students 
or immigrants, may illustrate the extent to which psychological patterns are maintained 
or changed. According to Fiske et al. (1998), some ways o f thinking can only be 
“maintained by the very nature o f the sociocultural surroundings” or changed when 
“immersed in the appropriate cultural context”(p. 943-944). Similarly, Nisbett et al. 
(2001) note that research on H-A cognition is indicative o f Asians moving “radically in 
an American direction after a generation or less in the United States,” yet “total 
immersion in [Western] culture” may be a requirement for such acculturation.
A degree o f persistence o f Eastern cognitive patterns among Asians in the U.S. has 
been found by Morris and Peng (1994), reviewed earlier, whose sample o f Chinese 
temporarily living in the U.S. exhibited sensitivity to a holistic field o f social acts
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similar to that o f Chinese living in their native culture. However, Choi et al. (2003) used 
a sample o f Koreans who were either bom in the U.S. or had lived there for at least two- 
thirds of their lives. They found that this group o f Asian-Americans did not differ from 
European-Americans in judgments about the causal relevance o f information for 
behavioural attributions. Similarly, Norenzayan et al. (2002b), reviewed earlier, used 
East Asian, Asian-American and European-American samples to investigate culturally 
patterned reasoning. The Asian-American sample, composed o f participants who were 
bom in the United States, demonstrated reasoning patterns similar to European 
Americans or in between that group and the East Asian one. Finally, Kitayama et al. 
(2003) for the first time also looked at Westerners who had lived in the East for some 
time. Their framed-line test showed that Americans who had been living in Japan for 
only a few months on average had become more sensitive to visual context than 
Americans in their native environment, whereas Japanese who have lived in the U.S. 
were no longer significantly different from Americans in their ability to 
decontextualise! However, the authors cannot rule out potential self-selection issues.
For example, it is conceivable that Westerners who chose to move to Japan were 
already cognitively inclined to holistic thought in general or contextual perception in 
particular.
So far, there is no evidence that degrees o f  acculturation have a bearing on H-A 
cognition. A potential effect o f social identification or acculturation levels on H-A 
reasoning was absent in a sample o f Taiwanese immigrants in the U.S. (Janxin Leu, 
personal communication, November 2002) as well as within Norenzayan et al.'s (2002b) 
Asian-American group, where language use and identification with Asian culture had no 
predictive effect (Ara Norenzayan, personal communication, November 2002). It is 
plausible that other measures, such as practices that are potentially central to 
individuals' lives (e.g. religion) or social integration in those groups, may be better able
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to account for intra-generational differences in cognition among immigrants or 
biculturals. Minoura (1992) investigated changes in cultural meaning systems by 
measuring degrees o f cognitive, cultural and affective acculturation among Japanese 
children and youth in the U.S. He found that Japanese children’s density o f interaction 
with Americans could explain the incorporation o f an American pattern of thinking to 
the same degree as age o f entry and length of stay in the host society. By the same 
token, my own research (Samson, 2000) has shown that objective indicators o f 
ethnicity, in the form of ethnic group contact, can have an independent effect o f the 
same magnitude as ethnic attitudes in determining beliefs related to ethnic identity. The 
same may well be the case for other forms o f cognition.
2.4.1 Biculturalism and Priming
Research on first-generation immigrants in the West points to the importance o f 
cultural content (as evident in acculturation, for example) and structure (such as ethnic 
group contact), signalling a need for a contextualisation o f sociocultural factors in 
determining behaviour. Both sociologists and psychologists have advanced ideas about 
second-culture acquisition that stress the situational nature o f culture and group 
membership in relation to the self. In sociology, situational ethnicity or identity theories 
have come to explain some o f the dynamics inherent in the lives of individuals with first 
or later generation immigrant status in multicultural societies, often determined on the 
basis of self-concepts (identity) or cultural practices (e.g. Gonzalez & McCommon, 
1989; Leets, Giles, & Clement, 1996; Noels, Pon, & Clement, 1996; Samson, 2000; 
Waters, 1990). In psychology, the mental and behavioural impact of biculturalism has 
been a popular focus o f study (see LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993, for a 
review), which has included the priming o f cultural identities (e.g. Oyserman, 
Sakamoto, & Lauffer, 1998). Identity priming may be a particularly useful illustration
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of an integration o f perspectives on culture and human inference, in this case between 
the se lf tradition and those of values or theories.
2.4.2 Priming and Holistic versus Analytic Reasoning
(Folk) theories-oriented research in the area of cultural knowledge activation has 
been done by Ying-yi Hong and fellow social psychologists (Hong, Wong & Lee, 1996; 
Hong, Chiu & Kung, 1997; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Hong &
Chiu, 2001; also Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee & Morris, 2002), who have conducted a 
series o f priming experiments on causal and social inference. Hong et al. (1997; also 
Hong & Chiu, 2001) propose a new research paradigm based on cultural meaning 
system theory (as discussed in Markus & Kitayama, 1991, and Shweder & Sullivan, 
1990), in conjunction with knowledge activation theory (e.g. Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & 
Tota, 1986; Higgins, 1996; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Shweder and Sullivan hold that 
cultural psychology should conceive o f individuals as “semiotic subjects,” rational 
intentional agents who respond to meaning systems. The authors contrast their view 
with what they take to be personality psychology and cognitive psychology. More 
specifically, they reject the stability and autonomy o f traits often assumed by 
personality psychology and any cognitive psychology that externalises culture by 
making it extrinsic to central processing structures.
Hong et al.’s experiments were conducted on a sample o f Hong Kong Chinese, who 
have historically been influenced by Anglo-Saxon (especially British) culture. Primes 
consisted of Chinese pictures, neutral pictures, as well as American pictures, 
symbolising those respective cultures (a picture o f Superman or the Great Wall o f 
China, for example). After being shown a vignette representing a given culture, subjects 
were asked to identify which country the picture symbolises and to use three adjectives 
to describe the character o f the depicted figure. Then Morris and Peng's (1994) measure 
o f attributional style was used, where a group o f fish is shown with one fish swimming
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ahead o f it, and subjects are asked to explain the reasons for the behaviour of this one 
fish. In a condition with an open-ended answer format, the American picture prime 
produced 84% responses representing internal attributions (e.g. fish is leading group), 
whereas the Chinese picture condition reduced this to 52%. (A replication o f these 
experiments using human instead o f animal actors is reported in Hong et al., 2000).
While the work done by Hong and her colleagues has focused mainly on cultural 
values and social cognition as a result o f cultural knowledge activation, Peng and 
Knowles (2003) used identity primes in a study of attributions o fphysical causality. 
Primes consisted o f a short questionnaire asking individuals to recall and reflect on an 
experience that made their identity as an American or Asian apparent to them. Among 
self-identified Asian-Americans, explanations o f physical causality were less 
dispositional for individuals who received an Asian identity prime and had little or no 
formal physics education. This finding is in step with surreptitious identity priming 
research related to stereotyping, which has found that bringing to mind one aspect o f a 
person's identity (e.g. gender or ethnicity) usually leads to behaviour commonly 
associated with that group of people (see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001, for a summary). 
The prime-behaviour link is probably the strongest if activated traits conform to both in­
group stereotypes and one's self-representation (ibid).
There has also been a host of psychological studies in which the language used by 
the instrument itself has proven to serve as an effective prime (see Krauss & Chiu,
1998, for a summary) triggering different cultural values, personality measures or self- 
concepts. Ji et al. (2004), discussed earlier, found an effect o f language on word 
grouping among bilingual Chinese from Mainland China and Taiwan tested both in the 
U.S. and at home. Use o f the English language evoked an analytic (feature or category 
membership based) categorisation style, whereas Chinese produced greater relationship- 
based grouping. This was not the case among Hong Kong and Singapore Chinese. The
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researchers explain these findings by pointing to the early age at which English is 
learned in H.K. and Singapore, and the cultural legacy o f British colonialist influence. 
Mainland or Taiwan Chinese, having learned English later in life, may be “coordinate 
bilinguals” (Weinreich, 1953) who have two representations for a verbal label, whereas 
Hong Kong and Singapore Chinese may be “compound bilinguals” who hold one 
representation for a label and its translation. Hence, language may provide a cultural cue 
for some bicultural groups and thereby evoke culturally-appropriate reasoning.
The priming o f culture by means of symbols or contextual cues, then, could have a 
permeating effect on cognition, which may extend to different cognitive levels o f H-A 
thinking. The successful priming o f patterns o f reasoning indicates that knowledge 
associated with different cultures is available but not permanently accessible for 
bicultural individuals. This is illustrated by Nisbett and Norenzayan (2002), who 
propose that cultural differences in H-A thought can be explained in three ways.
First, differences could arise in the way culture creates cognitive structures as a 
result o f innate or universal cognitive organisation. Let us use relational-contextual 
versus category-based grouping as an example. While humans may all have an innate 
capacity to make similarity-based (parallel) judgments about group membership in a 
process o f induction, the metaphysics o f Eastern culture seems to place greater 
emphasis on the early learning o f relationships or contexts (e.g. monkey and banana) 
than category or shared substance (e.g. monkey and panda).
Second, there may be differences in the cognitive process selected by a given 
problem , although cultures may largely possess similar tools available to individuals. 
For example, individuals from one culture may prefer to group people in relational- 
contextual terms (holistic choice), while assigning non-social objects to categories 
(analytic choice). They have generally learned to use both holistic and analytic 
approaches, but may vary their choice depending on the task at hand.
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Third, there may be more general differences in the accessibility o f such thought 
processes, depending on how the world is structured in a given culture. For example,
) individuals from Eastern culture may not favour holistic grouping because they have not 
learned a category-based logic, but because the way they relate to and conceive o f the 
world primes them to use one more than the other. In a society in which relationships 
are important, relationships are more salient and a corresponding logic more accessible.
Although the distinctions between Nisbett and Norenzayan’s points may not always 
be clear-cut, Hong et al.’s (2000) work seems to reinforce second and third points. They 
argue that their priming methodology represents an important move into a more 
dynamic and process oriented direction on culture and cognition, as cross-cultural 
variations are mediated by factors like the relative availability and accessibility of 
domain-specific implicit theories (Hong & Chiu, 2001, p. 188). Cultural knowledge 
often lays dormant unless activated by cultural cues. Hong et al. (2000) maintain that 
their cultural priming technique is a new method to “uncover content of cultural 
knowledge” and permits the study o f the “causal consequences of cultural knowledge” 
(Hong et al., 2000, p. 717). They stress that individuals can not only acquire more than 
one cultural meaning system, but culture itself must be viewed as “internalized in the 
form o f a loose network o f domain-specific knowledge structures, such as categories 
and implicit theories” {ibid, p. 710).
I believe that more can be done to demonstrate this proposition by studying cultural 
institutions, such as religion, as a potential source o f domain specific knowledge 
structures, and their relationship to cognition. Such an approach acknowledges the 
domain-dependent nature o f cognition across cultures (see e.g. Briley & Wyer, 2001; 
Conway et al., 2001; Hong & Chiu, 2001). In my empirical research, this will be done 
by examining H-A cognition among Western individuals with an Eastern religious 
identity, under conditions in which their religion is salient or non-salient.
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2.5 Cultural Differences in Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Theoretical
Considerations
Research on biculturalism and H-A cognition raises some interesting questions, 
including the potential role o f cultural institutions, such as religion, in producing 
cognitive change as well as the degree to which the practice o f a religion foreign to 
one’s own culture may constitute a ‘primeable cultural domain’ or even weak form of 
biculturalism. In order to address these questions, we need appropriate methods with the 
potential to activate knowledge, beliefs or theories tied to the religious domain. The 
priming method used in Study 1 (Chapter 4) assumes that religious values and self- 
concepts can bring to mind knowledge associated with the religious domain, which can 
then be applied to reasoning processes. According to Peng et al. (2001), cultural values 
and the self-concept are close allies in relation to relevant beliefs that inform human 
inference.
2.5.1 Models of Culture and Cognition in Psychology
Peng et al. (2001) conceive o f a dynamic feedback system explaining the relationship 
between culture and human inference by combining three different approaches that have 
emerged in the field: values, se lf and theories (Fig. 2.1). In their view, values and the 
self are closely aligned, because the individualism-collectivism continuum represents 
internalised cultural values that largely determine self-orientations as more independent 
or interdependent. Moreover, Peng et al. suggest that values and self have an indirect 
effect on actual inference, as they are mediated by folk theories (epistemologies). Views 
o f the self, for example, may influence beliefs we have about others, while values can 
direct our attention to what is considered important. Cultural values and selfhood also 
create a context for action that has the potential to shape inferences. Peng et al. illustrate 
this with the example o f a transgression. Western theories may focus on the individual 
as the cause o f a transgression, implying retributive justice directed at a person, while
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Eastern theories might emphasise situations or groups as a cause, prescribing collective 
responsibility as an effect.
Fig. 2.1: Three Traditions in ‘Culture and Human Inference’
P en g  et al. (2001):
“Three trad ition s in ‘culture and hum an in fe re n c e ’
Action
Values
Inference
Self
Theories
Nisbett and his collaborators (2003; cf. Nisbett et al., 2001) employ a simplified 
model to illustrate cross-cultural differences in inference patterns. In this model, 
cognitive processes are determined by a causal chain beginning with ecological and 
economic differences between ancient Greece and China. Early Chinese society was 
based on agriculture. Nisbett et al. reckon that this economic organisation was 
responsible for the development of cooperation with neighbours and a complex as well 
as hierarchical society. As a result, harmony and social order were at the core of 
Chinese culture, leading to the collectivist and interdependent orientations underpinning 
much of holistic thought. Greek ecology, the authors argue, was more suitable to 
hunting, herding and fishing. Trade flourished, which, along with greater
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decentralisation, freedom and personal agency, encouraged debate and shaped much of 
today’s Western worldview.
Thus, Nisbett et al’s model states that ecology determines economy (e.g. hunting and 
herding vs. agriculture), which in turn shapes social structure (e.g. individual pursuits 
vs. hierarchical interdependence) and social practices (e.g. debate vs. reconciliation). 
They theorise that social structure and practices affect perception, attention and finally 
folk metaphysics (beliefs about the nature o f the world), which have an impact on tacit 
epistemology (beliefs about how to obtain knowledge) and cognitive processes (Fig. 
2.2). For example, an East Asian focus on filial piety, hierarchy and group solidarity 
directs attention away from individuals toward contexts and relationships. This in turn 
influences a view o f the world as composed o f interdependent parts and beliefs about 
causality as determined by situations and relationships. Nisbett acknowledges that 
multiple and bi-directional causality is also possible and that some parts o f the causal 
chain may not be relevant for all cognitive processes. For example, dialectical thinking 
can be a cognitive tool to handle social conflict while also being directly derived from 
certain tacit epistemologies rooted in science or philosophy.
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Fig. 2.2: Social Origins of Mind
N isb ett (2003): “S o c ia l orig ins o f  m ind”
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Instead of focusing on layers of causality, we can also distinguish between easily
identifiable areas of culture, which may affect H-A cognition in complex ways. Nisbett 
and his colleagues (2003; Nisbett et al., 2001) have classified different areas of culture 
that may be playing a role in the construction of cognitive differences. These include 
not only economic organisation and social practices, but also manifestations of cultural 
history in the law, religion, language and philosophical traditions. With the exception of 
language perhaps, empirical answers to the question of how these cognitive differences 
are created through social and cultural institutions have not been sufficiently provided. 
Indeed, attempts to “isolate” aspects of culture and social organisation in relation to 
mental processes may be one of the next crucial steps in advancing culture and 
cognition research.
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2.5.2 Contributions from Sociological Social Psychology: House's Principles
Fiske et al (1998) called for an exploration of “which cultural practices, meanings, 
and institutions inform which psychological processes” (945). In line with this 
argument, though from the viewpoint o f a different research tradition, James House3 
(1977) has argued for a better integration of social psychological research paradigms in 
sociological and psychological subdisciplines. House (1981) has put forth a series o f 
principles for research linking aspects o f the social system to individual behaviour or 
mental states (see Fig. 2.3). His proximity principle raises the question o f how everyday 
social relationships or experiences help in establishing links between macro variables 
(such as social structure or culture) and the individual. Similarly, the components 
principle demands that greater attention is paid to aspects o f social systems in relation 
to individuals. Can individual thinking and behaviour simply be traced back to 
socialisation patterns or are there some facets o f everyday life in institutions or 
organisations that are helpful in explaining the results?
Being a member o f an organised religion, for example, is one o f many sociocultural 
roles an individual may have, such as being an employee, mother, citizen, etc. Religion 
is a component o f a culture’s social system, while the role o f a religious group member 
can be enacted by going to a place of worship. According to the proximity principle, 
understanding the effect o f culture on the individual may require a closer look at points 
o f intersection between larger institutions and the individual. Frequently attending a 
religious service, for example, provides the opportunity to both learn and reinforce what 
is expected of a religious person. If  the religion is representative o f larger cultural 
values, it may also be a relevant cultural component for the learning and reinforcement 
o f those values.
3 House comes from an American tradition in sociological social psychology that has been referred to as 
'Personality and Social Structure'. Research in that area deals with social determinants of individual 
behaviour, attitudes, etc. In many cases, studies are about relationships between social structure (e.g. 
social class, work, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, etc.) and psychological well-being, health, and other 
variables.
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For the purpose o f analysis, it may be helpful to conceptualise the sociocultural 
system in sociological terms as composed of social structure and culture or cultural 
content. Social structure consists of relationships and positions (including hierarchies 
and networks), whose meaning is given by culture. Cultural content, in turn, consists of 
values, language, practices, symbols, artefacts, etc. For example, in an organised 
religion, social structure may serve two purposes. First, an individual’s social 
integration in the religious community may provide the social contacts necessary for a 
person to view him/herself as part o f  a collective. At the same time, social integration 
simply provides opportunities for the enforcement o f religious values, beliefs and 
practices through others. In line with Blumer's (1969) symbolic interactionist ideas, 
social practices could be conceived o f as the intersection between culture and structure, 
which connect the individual to the larger sociocultural system through action and 
interaction.
Fig. 2.3: Individual and Social Structure
H ouse (1981): “Individual and social stru c tu re”
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2.6 Culture in Holistic versus Analytic Thought
In cultural psychology, House's ideas are mirrored in dynamic views o f social 
systems, which view culture as composed o f interconnected elements, such as 
meanings, practices, and related mental processes (D’Andrade, 2001; Hong & Chiu, 
2001; Kitayama, 2002; Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Markus, Kitayama & Heiman, 1997; 
Miller, 2002; Shweder, Goodnow, Hatano, LeVine, Markus, & Miller, 1998).
Consistent with House's (1981) components principle, D'Andrade (2001) stresses that 
culture should not be viewed as an entity or thing, because culture as a collection has no 
causal powers. Although cultural items are often causally interrelated, they should be 
considered separately in meaningful analyses.
The same should hold for historical explanations o f cognitive differences. Indeed, 
Nisbett et al.’s (2001; Nisbett, 2003) discussion o f historical sources o f H-A distinctions 
remains the most criticised aspect o f  their work (Ernst, 2004; Tunick, 2003; Ratner & 
Hui, 2003; Yan, 2004). Critics agree that an attribution o f contemporary individual-level 
cognitive differences to Greek or Chinese ecological, economic and philosophical 
traditions seems to bypass two thousand years o f history and the ecological realities of 
the present time. Ernst (2004), Tunick (2003) and Yan (2004) also point out that the 
entrenched cognitive differences implied by such a perspective contradict Nisbett’s 
(2003) own admission that H-A thought is affected by changes in context, including 
priming manipulations or life in a foreign culture. As a result, the potentially dynamic 
nature o f H-A is lost in attempts to explain cultural differences.
Norenzayan and Heine (2005) posit three levels o f cross-cultural differences that 
vary depending on the existence and use o f cognitive universals: a “true” nonuniversal, 
an existential universal and a functional universal. Nonuniversals denote psychological 
structures or processes that are truly unique to a particular culture in their existence and 
use. Most psychologists are probably hard-pressed to find evidence for such a
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psychological property. Functional universals are human psychological features that 
solve particular recurring problems across cultures. Hence, both their existence and use 
are the same cross-culturally.
Norenzayan and Heine take the example of rule versus family-resemblance 
categorisation (Norenzayan et al., 2002b) as an example o f an existential universal, 
where differences between cultural groups only emerged when one categorisation 
strategy competed against the other. When task requirements encouraged rule 
application, all cultural groups equally preferred rule-based strategies. To this we could 
add the example o f social attribution, reviewed earlier, which has shown that East 
Asians are dispositionist thinkers under conditions that lack situational information, but 
seem to adopt more complex theories o f behaviour when contextual information is 
available. In other words, there may be variation in function or context and frequency o f 
use, but not existence, o f H-A preferences across cultures. Clearly, H-A thought should 
not be taken as an expression o f  true nonuniversals.
Parallel to Norenzayan and Heine’s ideas, Tooby and Cosmides’ (1992) evolutionary 
psychological perspective provides definitions o f two ways in which cultures come to 
exist in particular locations in the first place: evoked and transmitted culture. Evoked 
culture is culture as a product o f the environment. The fact that our ancestors had to 
solve similar problems posed by the world around them, leading to similar cultural 
features, explains much of universal human psychology. For example, hunting and 
gathering activities were (and still are, in some cultures) based on a sexual division o f 
labour.
Transmitted culture, on the other hand, is about culture as the result o f social 
learning. Culture can be passed from individual to individual or generation to generation 
without necessarily being based in a solution o f problems in the environment. It goes 
hand-in-hand with most social scientists’ conception of the human mind as highly
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malleable. By suggesting that H-A thought is based on existential universals,
Norenzayan and Heine appear to take a middle ground between evoked and transmitted 
culture. The existence of holistic and analytic strategies or cognitive tools are universal 
across cultures, but the frequency or context in which one is preferred over the other is 
socially learned. H-A thought is neither a dichotomy nor does it represent true 
psychological nonuniversals.
Nisbett et al.’s explanations o f the historical origins o f H-A differences focus on 
evoked cultural differences due to distinct ecologies and resulting economic and social 
organisation. It is unclear to what degree continuously transmitted culture (e.g. o f 
metaphysics and epistemologies) has to be congruent with its evoked origins in order to 
remain successful and there is no explanations o f the interaction between universals that 
underlie H-A thought and the nonuniversal nature o f the H-A distinction. The next 
chapter will be an attempt to identify some o f  the universally intuitive aspects 
underlying H-A thought.
2.7 Summary and Implications
H-A cognition is composed o f two systems o f thought, manifested in areas stretching 
from perception to social cognition: holistic reasoning, which dominates East Asian 
cultures, and analytic reasoning prevalent in the West. The cultural origins of these 
cognitive patterns are complex. Explanations have made references to history, including 
ecological, economic and social factors. Ultimately, Nisbett (2003) theorises that H-A 
cognitive processes are a matter o f applying culturally-derived epistemologies. As a 
result, Peng et al. (2001) have located H-A research in a so-called theories tradition o f 
‘culture and human inference’. This tradition is contrasted with others focusing on 
values (individualism-collectivism) and the se lf (independence-interdependence).
I have argued that the H-A area o f research has suffered from an oversimplified and 
static view of culture in relation to the individual. What appears to be missing are
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approaches taking into account both mechanisms operating between culture and the 
individual, as well as contexts in which cognitive differences are created, manifested 
and changed. Research on biculturalism and cultural priming has begun to acknowledge 
the more dynamic nature of culture and the person experimentally. I have suggested 
that, consistent with House's (1981) proximity and components principles, studies in this 
thesis can add to the understanding o f culture’s effect on cognition by trying to isolate 
aspects o f culture. In this case, it is hypothesised that religion can shape the ways in 
which individuals think holistically or analytically across domains.
My discussion of values, se lf and theories oriented approaches to culture and
cognition acknowledged the complementary nature o f relevant research traditions, but I
think that this is not enough. Researchers also have to move beyond the simple East-
West dichotomies that dominate H-A research. Studying an Eastern religion in a
*
Western context can be a means to approximate culture’s more dynamic nature in 
relationship to the individual, by considering multiple sources o f cultural influence, 
their interaction as well as possible context-dependent divisions in individual thought.
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Chapter 3 -  Religion and Cognition
3.1 Religion as a Component of Culture and Psychology
A dynamic view o f culture, religion and the person is evident in Kitayama and 
Markus’ (1999; cf. Kitayama, 2002) discussion of the Japanese Self They conceptualise 
the culture/self dynamic as a bi-directional flow between cultural models o f the self and 
psychological structures, mediated by cultural practices. In Japan, cultural models o f the 
self include an “ethos o f agricultural community” (interpersonal connectedness), 
“mundane realism,” Confucianism (hierarchical social order), as well as Zen and Jodo 
Buddhism’s emphasis on compassion, other-reliance and self-transcendence (p. 268).
Religion may be a particularly worthwhile cultural institution to investigate, because 
it represents enduring systems o f values, beliefs, practices and social networks that can 
shape cognitive patterns. Weaver et al. (1998) have criticised the lack o f interest in 
religion among psychologists as evidenced by quantitative studies published in APA 
psychology journals. Although 5.8% of research between 1991-1994 in the Journal o f  
Personality and Social Psychology included a measure o f religion, the majority of 
studies (80%) employed one-item measures, such as religious identification. The 
authors urge psychologists to go beyond one-dimensional measures o f religion or 
spirituality. This sentiment is reaffirmed in Tarakeshwar et al. (2003), who have argued 
that religion has been an overlooked dimension even in cross-cultural psychology. 
According to those authors, religion's ideological, ritualistic, experiential, and social 
dimensions should be integrated into research that goes beyond the use o f religion as a 
control variable.
Walach and Reich (2005) argue that Nisbett et al.’s H-A distinctions map onto 
cognitions in the areas o f spirituality and science, two domains o f thought that should be 
seen as complementary rather than oppositional. Among Eastern religions, Buddhism
49
has been named as an institution endowed with some o f the cultural content that renders 
East Asian cognition different from the West (Bose, 2002; Hernandez & Iyengar, 2001; 
Nisbett, 2003; Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; cf. Ragsdale, 2003).
Before I discuss this in more detail, let me first briefly address the extent to which the 
psychology o f religion may inform research on H-A cognition.
3.1.1 The Psychology of Religion
In the psychology o f religion tradition (e.g. Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 
2003; Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Wulff, 1991), religion has been used as an 
independent variable mostly in studies about mental well-being, health, pro-social 
behaviour and other aspects o f individual functioning (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997), 
including the role o f religion in coping and psychopathology (e.g. Pargament, 1997; in 
Nielsen, 2000). Studies related to coping have also been interested in religious 
attribution processes (Loewenthal & Cornwall, 1993; Loewenthal et al., 2000; Lupfer, 
Brock & Depaola, 1992; Parsuram & Sharma, 1996; Spilka, Shaver, & Kirkpatrick, 
1985; Wikstrom, 1987), which may include causal attributions to God and the 
conditions under which individuals make secular/naturalistic versus religious 
attributions (Lupfer et al., 1992; Lupfer, Depaola, Brock & Clement, 1994; Lupfer & 
Layman, 1996).
Theories and research in this area acknowledge that religious and naturalistic 
meaning-belief systems are available to individuals depending on the contexts in which 
attributions are made and characteristics o f the event to be explained (e.g. Spilka et al., 
1985). However, attribution processes studied in the context o f H-A cognition are about 
differences in naturalistic explanations that people make mainly as observers o f others' 
behaviour. Spilka et al. emphasise individual motivation (e.g. self-esteem, the need for 
control, etc.) in their explanation o f attributions, but do not acknowledge that religions
50
may also espouse particular secular theories of personhood or causality in relation to 
social inference.
The emphasis on individual motivation rather than culturally-derived theories is 
evident in the fact that religious attributions have been examined mainly in order to 
understand how people deal with various life events, usually o f the kind that affect them 
personally. Using mixed Christian samples, Loewenthal and Cornwall (1993) found that 
health-related events (such as illness or death) are most likely to be attributed to God by 
religious individuals, while nonreligious people tended to perceive such events as 
produced by luck. Among religious individuals, however, greater perceived control o f 
God did not weaken attributions to other agents, such as powerful others or the self, 
suggesting room for secular theories o f behaviour in religious groups.
Parsuraam and Sharma (1996) showed that Indian Buddhists are more likely to 
attribute life events to something like fa te  than Roman Catholics, who are apt to 
attribute events to God. By contrast, Dubin (1994) found no significant differences in 
attributional style between advanced Buddhist meditators and a non-Buddhist religious 
control group. For both positive and negative life events, Buddhists did not seem to 
judge events as caused more by external or internal factors than non-Buddhists. There is 
no evidence to-date that answers questions about Buddhists’ secular internal versus 
external attributions made for other people’s behaviour.
Basic assumptions made in the area o f religious attribution are congruent with the 
theoretical underpinnings o f this thesis. More specifically, the religion as meaning- 
belief system (Spilka et al., 1985) or schema (McIntosh, 1995) perspective implies that 
religion can serve as a framework for the perception and interpretation o f events. In 
other words, just like culture, we can expect religion to be a knowledge structure or 
domain that shapes individual thought and may be activated in different contexts. One 
way o f making religious belief systems salient can be achieved by means o f identity
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priming. McIntosh (1995) argues that the relative centrality o f religious schemas to the 
self-concept (cf. Markus, 1977) may have implications for the accessibility and 
activation of religious knowledge. My own work is an attempt to prime religion (as 
religious beliefs, values and practices tied to an identity or role) and analyse the 
activation o f that knowledge in relationship to H-A cognition.
3.1.2 Buddhism and its Teachings
After this brief diversion, let me turn to the connection between Buddhism and 
holistic thought. Inherent in Buddhism are beliefs about multiple causes for events 
(Fung, 1983; Kalupahana, 1975; Rosch, 1994), dialectical thinking (Kalupahana, 1975; 
Lin, 1936; Puhakka, 2003; Spiro, 1982) and the ideal o f self-transcendence (Bose, 2002; 
de Bary, 1969; Ho, 1995; Noda, 2000; Phillips, 1962; Spiro, 1982; Watson, 2000). In 
Buddhist metaphysics, sometimes called the Three Marks o f impermanence, non-self 
and suffering, the concept o f ‘compassion’ is at the centre o f the religion’s values 
(Inada, 1988). While some Western psychologists have been interested in the 
implications o f Buddhism for the discipline o f psychology (e.g. Dockett, Dudley-Grant, 
& Bankart, 2003), it is perhaps the Buddhist doctrine o f non-selfhood that has most 
inspired writings about Buddhism in contrast to Western psychology (Ho, 1995; Noda, 
2000, Pickering, 2004a, 2004b; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; cf. Dubin, 1994).
Noda (2000), for example, stresses that a holistic understanding o f the human mind, 
including the denial o f intrapsychic conflict, is at the heart o f Buddhism. Unlike the 
‘elementism’ evident in some Western (e.g. Freudian) psychologies, Noda argues that 
Buddhism does not see the Self or Ego as a central component o f the psyche in a power 
struggle with other intrapsychic forces. There is no self at the core o f Buddhist 
psychology. Indeed, according to Pickering (2004a, 2004b), the Buddhist view o f 
(non)selfhood is one aspect in which the religion may be juxtaposed to psychology after
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the ‘postmodern’ turn. Other dimensions of Buddhism that seem compatible with 
‘postmodern’ thinking and theorising concern contextual/situated, holistic, as well as 
naturalistic views o f cognition, which consider reason and emotion as intertwined 
processes.
Morality and the Self: Buddhist Values and Metaphysics
Huebner and Garrod (1991) explain that the realisation that life is suffering, which is 
caused by desire, lies at the heart o f Buddhist moral reasoning. This realisation should 
bring about compassion towards other life forms. The goal in life is to give up desire 
and to understand that the Self does not exist. Hence, individuals should strive for 
detachment by letting go o f desires and, by association, the Self (see also Ho, 1995). 
Unlike Western morality, then, Huebner and Garrod argue that Buddhists’ “true 
compassion as self-concern of any type would compromise one's concern for the other 
person” (p.350). The result of the belief in compassion and detachment is that actions 
count for more than abstract moral qualities. (After a person has died, it is only the 
accumulated result o f his or her actions that remains and works out its effects on the 
lives of others [Ho, 1995]).
In sum, Buddhism considers the bounded and stable ego an illusion. Watson (2000) 
uses the Tibetan dGe lugs pa4 tradition as an illustration o f the Buddhist understanding 
of the self. In this view, a distinction can be made between the mere self, which 
functions in the world, and an absolute or fictitious self. The former is the self as a 
process o f experience, while the latter represents an “essential” self. Buddhism 
acknowledges the existence o f an experiential self only. This self, which is in flux and 
becoming, has to be transcended (Spiro, 1982, in Fiske et al., 1998, p. 922). Selfish 
striving is discouraged; one should attempt to overcome attachments and needs through
4 DGe lugs pa [pronounced gelukpa] means ‘virtuous way’ is a Buddhist tradition that started in 15th 
century Tibet.
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self-control (Spiro, 1982; Huebner & Garrod, 1991). Lebra’s (1992; in Markus et al., 
1997) Shinto Buddhist ‘submerged self maybe very reflective o f the Eastern self in 
contrast to the Western Cartesian, split self. The nature o f being is freedom from the 
Self, but not self-objectification by means of separation from others or the environment. 
If  we couple this with the ideal o f compassion, it is clear how Buddhism and other 
Eastern religions contribute to other-focused rather than ego-focused emotions (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991).
Causality and Dialecticism: The Buddhist Epistemology o f  Holism
According to Ragsdale (2003), Buddhism (particularly Mahayana Buddhism) entails 
an epistemology o f ‘relational interdependence’ of all phenomena. Similar to Gestalt 
psychology, Buddhist thought implies that the whole is not just the sum of its parts 
(ibid). The Dalai Lama (Biddulph, 1996) maintains that the Buddhist teaching o f 
‘dependent arising’ “shows that if you examine the nature o f reality, you arrive at a 
point where you realize that nothing comes into being with an independent intrinsic 
identity, but rather as a result o f a multitude o f causes and conditions” (p. 150). 
Buddhism, as discussed by Fung (1983), conceives o f a ‘wheel o f life’ or stream of 
existence, which goes on eternally. This view extends to Buddhist psychology, where 
consciousness is a stream of consciousness or “moments o f ‘knowing’ strung together 
over time” (Olendzki, 2003, p. 14). According to Fung, “everything is dependent upon a 
combination o f fluctuating conditions and factors for its seeming 'existence' at any given 
moment. This is the Buddhist theory o f causation” (p. 237), also known as the theory of 
dependent origination o rpa.ticcasamuppaada (e.g. Ho, 1995; Kalupahana, 1975; Inada, 
1988; Pickering, 2004; Ragsdale, 2003). In other words, everything is interrelated and 
constantly changing.
Aside from the belief in constant change (e.g. Fung, 1983; Inada, 1974), dialectical 
aspects of Buddhism are evident more explicitly or epistemologically in the ideal o f the
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transcendence o f  dualism and holism (Phillips, 1962, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv; p. 80; see also 
Ragsdale, 2003). According to Zen Buddhism, which is in the Mahayana tradition
Man's real Self., .is not to be sought in any dimension of himself, but only in that from 
which every dimension...is an abstraction. Man's real Self can only be his whole Self 
[...] The religions of the West are all dualistic, which means that they accept these 
oppositions as ultimate and always seek for truth in one direction as contrasted with its 
opposite. So Western religion elevates reason over passion, super-nature over nature, 
the ideal over the material [...] Integrity is wholeness, not halfhess. Holiness is holistic 
living, not self-conquest. (Lin, 1936, p. xxxiv)
The Buddhists metaphysical view o f transcendence or freedom from the self, then, 
translates into the religion's epistemology. Discriminating knowledge or the dividing 
form o f knowledge (maya) can be viewed as the cause o f a false conception o f the self 
and suffering, while unifying knowledge (nirvana) leads to freedom and enlightenment 
through a more relational self (Bose, 2002).
Buddhist epistemology as it relates to naive dialecticism is best reflected in 
Mahayana Buddhism, including the Middle Doctrine and Chinese Three-Treatise 
School o f Buddhism, which teaches that the ultimate truth is reached through a 
dialectical process known as the Middle Path of Eightfold Negations (de Bary, 1969, pp. 
143-144; also Ragsdale, 2003). The belief in being, nonbeing or neither being nor 
nonbeing has to be transcended in a synthesis until the Absolute Middle is reached (ibid, 
p. 144). These ideas originate in the teachings of Nagaijuna, which have profoundly 
influenced Tibetan and East Asian Mahayana Buddhism, and may come close to the 
dialecticism described by Peng and Nisbett (1999). Nagaijuna’s philosophy, according 
to Puhakka (2003), is essentially a ‘dialectic of the middle way’. Unlike the dialectic of 
Marx and Hegel, however, which leads to a synthesis o f contradictions, the aim o f 
Nagaijuna’s dialectic is “liberating the mind from attachment to any new view or 
position,” an approach that neither affirms nor denies (p. 132). Letting P  represent any
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given proposition and not-P its opposite, Nagarjuna’s ‘four-cornered negation’, as 
described by Puhakka (2003), is as follows:
1 .P
2. not-P
3. both P  and not-P
4. neither P  nor not-P
Madhyamikan Buddhist logic is derived from Nagarjuna’s dialectic. It also specifies a 
complex model o f causality that may appear tautological: an outcome may arise from 
itself (P), something other (not-P), self and other (both P  and not-P), or have no cause 
at all (neither P  nor not-P) (Puhakka, 2003; Rosch, 1994).
3.1.3 Buddhism and Holistic versus Analytic Cognition
Buddhists’ other-focused rather than ego-focused outlook, a self determined by 
experience, the ideal o f transcendence o f self and dualism, as well as views o f multiple 
causality, dialecticism and constant change indicate that the religion contain many o f 
the elements of holistic metaphysics and ‘tacit epistemologies’. (Although it may appear 
as though 'experience-based thought1 and 'denial o f self cannot be reconciled, it can be 
argued that experiential knowledge involves a recognition o f the inherently complex 
nature o f the world and causality, which also leads to the recognition that there is no 
'self as a cross-situationally stable entity.) In addition, the social integration of 
Buddhists in the religious community may add a structural dimension to holistic 
thinking, as implied by the concept o f interdependence.
Apparent Paradoxes in the Buddhism-Holism Connection
Despite its parallels with holism, a closer look at the religion also points to elements 
that are, at least on the surface, paradoxical or potentially inconsistent with the 
prerequisites o f holistic thought. More specifically, the apparent conflict concerns the 
individual in relationship to East Asian religious doctrine (e.g. Chan, 1967; Ho, 1995).
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Self-realisation, in Buddhism, is strived for in manner that is less organised and more 
personal or direct than in other (especially some Western) religions (Chan, 1967). It 
relies on the individuals' own will and self-direction (e.g. Chan, 1967; Huebner & 
Garrod, 1991), yet, perhaps paradoxically, holds on to the idea that the individual has no 
agency (Ho, 1995). Buddhism, then, is clearly a salvation rather than congregational 
religion (to use Max Weber's, 1978, distinction), but salvation could be “thought o f as a 
phenomenon o f change in the cosmic scheme o f things—not in terms o f personal 
redemption, as in Christianity” (Ho, 1995: 122). A core practice for its attainment is 
meditation (e.g. Spiro, 1982). Yet, while the focus o f meditation is in a sense on the 
individual, it could also be seen as a process o f self-transcendence by means o f a fusing 
o f the subject-object distinction o f Self (Ho, 1995). Similarly, Buddhism stands for the 
disappearance o f individuality in the after-life and the recognition that ‘the one and the 
many’ mutually involve one another (Chan, 1967) by virtue o f a part-whole relationship 
(Hansen, 1985, Nakamura, 1964; Noda, 2000).
Degrees o f an individual versus other-focus may also depend on different Buddhist 
doctrines (Fung, 1983: p. 238). In Hinayana Buddhism, which is dominant in Southeast 
Asia, salvation is a personal matter in the sense that individuals cannot do much to help 
others to achieve theirs (ibid). Mahayana Buddhism (of which the popular Zen 
Buddhism is a part), prominent in East Asia, contains teachings about enlightenment 
that can be sought more altruistically through self-sacrifice in order to enlighten others 
(Chen, 1964; Fung, 1983; Ho, 1995).
Another apparent inconsistency in relating Buddhism to holism pertains to the 
psychological consequences of meditation. As indicated already, meditation can be 
construed as self-centred, inward-focused or an ‘introvertive mystical experience’
(Smart in Newberg and d ’Aquili, 1998). On the other hand, it can also be viewed as 
holistic in the sense o f self-transcendence and achieving clarity or ‘oneness with the
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universe’. Omstein (1972) proposes that the right half o f the brain, which is active 
during religious experience and meditation, is a parallel (holistic and relational) 
processor, while the left is linear or sequential. He uses the example o f Zen to illustrate 
this point. One Zen practice, koan, is an exercise that is about discarding the left 
hemisphere by meditating on questions that have no logical answer (e.g. “What is the 
sound o f one hand clapping?”). The literature on meditation’s effects on perception and 
attention is less clear. Experimental evidence seems to point to increased field- 
independence, located on the analytic perceptual pole o f the H-A continuum, among 
practitioners o f meditation, although some research has also found no change produced 
by the practice (see Murphy & Donovan, 1997, for a summary). This phenomenon may 
be due to increased concentration and focus among meditators. However, while 
meditation may lead to a greater perceptual acuity, the increased mental focus achieved 
by meditation, often on an external object or mental image, tends to produce an 
activation o f the ‘holistic operator’ or right posterior superior parietal lobule (Right 
PSPL) in the brain during meditation (Newberg & d’Aquili, 1998, 2000). Thus, 
although meditation may lead to more analytic visual perception, it is conceivable that 
actual information processing is affected differently, possibly in a more holistic 
direction.
Buddhism, Western Religion and H-A Reasoning
As mentioned, Buddhism is a salvation religion, but unlike Protestant salvation, it 
occurs through self-transcendence. Buddhism also has varying levels o f ‘other­
worldliness’. The religion shed some o f the ‘other-worldly’ flavour from its Indian 
origins when it became absorbed into Chinese culture (Fung, 1983; Chen 1964; Hughes, 
1967). While Indian Yoga, for example, is about disengaging oneself from the 
phenomenal world, Zen meditation seeks less of a withdrawal from surrounding objects 
as to see objects rightly (WulfF, 1991). However, even though Buddhism is a salvation
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religion with otherworldly elements in some cultural areas, its core values and beliefs 
are down-to-earth. Buddhist salvation occurs by virtue o f a right state o f mind and 
moral conduct towards others, perhaps unlike some forms of Protestantism (e.g. Weber, 
1976/1958). Indeed, Buddhism rejects asceticism as “painful, unworthy, and 
unprofitable” (Spiro, 1982: p. 64).
Another important contrast between Christianity and Buddhism is the latter’s 
nontheism—the absence o f a ‘God’ external to the individual. According to Lin (1936), 
the humanist ethic of Buddhism make it human-centred, not God-centred (p. 101; see 
also Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Pyysiainen, 2003). In the West, morality seems to exist 
abstractly or by reference to a supreme being, while in Buddhism, it exists in reference 
to the outcome o f actions towards the world. What all schools o f Buddhism have in 
common, then, is that they “seek the loss o f self, while Christians seek union with God” 
(Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997: p. 83). Nonetheless, the Judeo-Christian belief in the 
individual soul has been mentioned as one o f many influences on Western individualism 
(e.g. Lukes, 1973, Bellah et al., 1985, in Hernandez & Iyengar, 2001). Protestantism is 
probably the most individualist religion in the West. Sampson (2000) argues that 
Western individualism and its emphasis on independence has been influenced by strong 
self-other demarcations evident in Protestant Christianity. Similarly, as Kitayama and 
Markus (1999, p. 260) maintain, the Protestant Ethic (as described by Weber) has 
contributed to Western perceptions o f  the person as having fixed dispositions 
(predestination) and coherence, in contrast to the Asian balanced view o f personality. 
Different beliefs about the nature o f personhood or the self are reflected in associated 
values.
Potential differences between Protestantism and Buddhism with respect to 
conceptions of the person should not be equated with values evident in the Protestant 
Work Ethic (PWE). Indeed, a comparison o f Christian (Australian) versus Buddhist (Sri
59
Lankan) attitudes toward work by Niles (1999) indicated that his Eastern Buddhist 
sample did not have lower beliefs in the primacy of hard work and self-reliance than 
Westerners. Niles attributes this to the Buddhist emphasis on individual responsibility. 
However, this does not imply that Buddhists also hold individualist values that drive the 
desire to work hard, as suggested by Niles’ finding that Sri Lankan Buddhists endorse 
the link between work and success to a lesser degree than Australians.
As mentioned, the potential influence o f religion on holistic or analytic cognition is 
also interesting with respect to “lower” types of cognition, such as perception and 
attention. Religious group membership can also have the opposite effect o f meditation, 
namely field-dependence, as found among Orthodox Jews in contrast to secular Jews 
and Protestants (Adevai, Silverman & McGough, 1970, Dershowitz, 1971, Meizlik, 
1973, in Nisbett et al., 2001). In Dershowitz (1971), a group o f Eastern European 
traditional (Orthodox) Jews turns out to be most field dependent, whereas American 
WASPs (White Anglo Saxon Protestants) were the least, with a group o f American 
acculturated Jews intermediary in their scores. According to Dershowitz, this could be 
due to traditional Jews' life in tight-knit communities with an emphasis on following 
strict social rules. Thus, variations in perception can be seen as the result o f structural 
(social) and ideological or doctrinal (cultural) aspect o f religion in tandem. (My use of 
the term ‘structural’ refers to social integration as pioneered by Durkheim (1951/1966) 
who studied its effect on suicide rates among different religious groups.) In the case of 
Buddhism, it is conceivable that sociocultural influences, such as the degree of 
integration or contact with other Buddhists, would render individuals more oriented 
towards others and the field. Unlike specific cultural beliefs and practices, then, religion 
in the structural sense may have a more universal connection with paying attention to 
the field among highly integrated members, and, by extension, also other cognitive 
aspects o f H-A thinking.
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By investigating Western Buddhists, my first study (Chapter 4) is one possible 
approach to examine the yet untested assumption that Buddhist ideas and practices are 
related to holistic thought. In order to separate out, as far as it is possible, the unique 
effect o f Buddhism, I will investigate the religious group differences in comparison to a 
Western religion, in this case Anglicanism, as well as Secular-Humanism.
3.1.4 Implications
It has been theorised that Eastern religion, such as Buddhism, among other cultural 
factors, has played a role in shaping a metaphysical and epistemological backdrop o f 
holistic cognition. Indeed, Buddhism’s teachings do contain values and beliefs that are 
reflective o f holism, such as other-directedness, compassion and the ideal of self­
transcendence, as well as complex causal reasoning and dialectical thinking. Although 
practices like mediation are an individual pursuit, the aim o f Buddhism is 
connectedness—not only metaphysically, but also individually, by means of an 
experience o f the world, as well as socially, in the practice o f compassion.
In the light of existing research and theories, I believe that investigating Buddhism’s 
effect on H-A cognition can make contributions to the fields o f social psychology and 
cross-cultural psychology in several meaningful ways. I hope to have demonstrated that 
my research question is not only interesting because of the assumed yet untested 
influence o f Eastern religion on holistic thinking, but also because it represents an 
aspect o f cultural diffusion and subcultural differences in cognition. Consistent with 
House's (1981) proximity and components principles, studies in this thesis can add to the 
understanding o f culture’s effect on cognition by trying to better isolate aspects of 
culture. In this case, it is hypothesised that religion can shape the ways in which 
individuals think holistically or analytically across domains, as suggested by research 
and theories on both bicultural knowledge activation and ‘religion as schema’. I have 
argued that a complete analysis, in this framework, requires the inclusion of not only
beliefs and practices, but also structural factors, such as religious integration, as aspects 
o f religious group membership.
While cross-cultural psychologists welcome the idea o f treating religion as a 
variable (e.g. Tarakeshwar et al., 2003), more dynamically oriented cultural 
psychologists maintain that this is not desirable or even impossible (e.g. Shweder,
1990). I do not agree with this radical position. I believe that a more integrative 
approach to relevant theories along with a differentiating approach to the concept of 
‘culture’ can improve our understanding o f culture’s complexity. However, I am doing 
this within the bounds o f an experimental, quantitative methodology.
In sum, the questions that Studies 1 and 2 in this thesis are trying to answer are based 
on the proposal that differences in H-A thought should exist not only across cultures but 
also subcultures. Hence, the central research question could be phrased as T o  what 
extent does Buddhism shape aspects o f a H-A cognition?' In addition, it is hypothesised 
that religious knowledge— in the form o f beliefs or theories as well as values— can be 
activated just like more general cultural knowledge, depending on the context in which 
responses to problems are elicited. The question o f domain-dependence or generality o f 
religion is expanded by asking how structural (i.e. social integration), ideological 
(values, beliefs) and behavioural aspects o f religion contribute to potential religious 
differences in cognition.
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3.2 A Bottom-Up Perspective: Intuition in Holistic versus Analytic Thought and
Counter-intuitiveness in the Domain of Religion
Chapter 2 outlined the concepts of holistic and analytic (H-A) thought, including 
naive dialecticism, which imply a tolerance o f apparent contradictions (TC). In the 
previous section, Buddhist metaphysics and epistemologies consistent with TC and 
dialectical thinking were introduced. What is particularly interesting about Buddhism is 
the possibility that it may act as the source o f two types o f ‘tolerances’. The first o f 
these involves the recognition and reconciliation of apparent contradiction, which seems 
to be unique to some Eastern religions and Asian culture as a whole. The second occurs 
on the basis o f more implicit contradictions evident in non-naturalness or counter­
intuitiveness, a relatively universal aspect o f religious representation.
Having established possible associations between Buddhism and holistic thought, the 
aim of this section is to adopt a complementary bottom-up perspective o f cognition and 
culture by outlining intuitive cognitions that are universal aspects o f some processes 
considered in H-A reasoning. I will demonstrate that the concepts o f theory o f mind, 
essentialism and dispositionism can be viewed as the intuitive foundation for many o f 
the empirical H-A phenomena. Contradictions evident in non-natural representations, by 
contrast, violate those basic intuitions.
3.2.1 The Intuitive Dimension of Holistic versus Analytic Cognition
Peng et al. (2001) argue that H-A cognitive processes can be explained by the folk 
theories espoused by a given culture. Unlike research interested in the top-down 
influence o f culture on cognitive processes, modular or evolutionary perspectives on 
cognition (e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Fodor, 1983; Sperber, 1996) have been 
concerned with identifying innate knowledge in the form o f structures that handle 
specific input (or content) as a result o f natural and sexual selection. The social
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sciences, by contrast, have traditionally viewed humans' capacity to learn and apparent 
cognitive flexibility as evidence o f a domain general mind, in the sense that cognitive 
processes can be applied to any empirical domain (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 1999). This 
contrasts a modular, domain-specific view of the mind accepted by some scholars using 
an evolutionary approach (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). According to Sperber (1996), 
the “actual domain o f a conceptual module is all the information in an organism's 
environment that may ... satisfy the module's input conditions. Its proper domain is all 
the information that it is the module's biological function to process” (p. 136; emphasis 
added). If information that activates a cognitive module is culturally produced, it could 
be termed part o f a cultural domain o f the module.
Domain-specificity—which implies constraints on the knowledge that humans can 
use (Keil, 1981)—is at the core o f another folk theories or naive theories perspective of 
cognition. Unlike Peng, Nisbett and colleagues’ cross-cultural view o f folk theories, the 
theories-as-intuitive-constraints view focuses on knowledge that is universal, yet open 
to restructuring due to cultural input and learning (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). 
According to this position, humans hold intuitive naive theories consisting o f ‘organised 
systems o f knowledge and belief, such as those in the domains o f biology and 
psychology (Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Among those, 
there are two kinds o f intuitive beliefs that seem particularly relevant to H-A reasoning. 
The first, theory o f mind (ToM) stands for an intuitive naive psychology. The second, 
psychological essentialism, pertains mainly to the domain of folk biology, but is 
possibly relevant to folk psychology and folk sociology as well. Let me discuss these 
types o f intuitive knowledge in turn.
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Naive Psychology or Theory o f  Mind
According to Sperber (1996), reflective beliefs are rooted in something that is 
universally intuitive and in turn enables us to communicate: the ability to hold beliefs 
about others' beliefs. His concept o f the meta-representational module shows this more 
clearly. Humans have the “ability to form mental representations o f mental 
representations” (p. 146). This is based on a capacity to understand intentionality and 
predict behaviour in terms of underlying mental states, such as beliefs or desires, which 
is an important adaptation for an organism who is involved in both cooperative and 
competitive activity (p. 147). Theory o f mind or ToM (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) is 
the most commonly used term to describe this faculty.
The ability to see oneself as both subject and object, as well as understanding 
intentionality, according to Brown (1991), are key universal features at the root of 
“mind reading” or the understanding of people as having desires, intentions and beliefs 
that may be different from one's own. ToM is usually tested by means of false belief 
experiments (e.g. Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). Experiments are set up to see whether child 
subjects are able to accurately predict an agent's behaviour by virtue o f that target actor 
holding a false belief, i.e. not knowing what the subject knows. In the standard false 
belief experiment, a child witnesses a story (e.g. played by puppets) in which the target 
Person A is made aware o f an Object O (e.g. sweets) in Location Li (e.g. box). In the 
absence of Person A, Person B is introduced, who then places O in a new Location L2 . 
Person A comes back to the scene. After presented with the story, the subject is asked a 
question like Where will A be looking for O?' The ability to understand beliefs is 
denoted by answering L] (a false belief) rather than L2 (reality).
The key finding among humans is that children around the age o f four seem no 
longer to impute their own beliefs or knowledge about reality on others' minds.
Children perceive others as 'mental agents'. They realise that "other persons have not
65
just intentions [or desires] and attention as manifest in their behaviour, but also thoughts 
and beliefs, which may or may not be expressed in behaviour—and which may differ 
from the ’real' situation" (Tomasello, 1999, p. 179; my emphasis; see also Wellman & 
Bartsch, 1988). This finding appears to hold cross-culturally. Avis and Harris (1991), 
for example, find that among the Baka, a hunter-gatherer tribe, 4-6 year old children are 
able to pass a false belief task, whereas younger children generally do not.
Lillard's (1998) account o f cultural variations in theories o f mind illustrates that 
many aspects of folk psychological models contain optional features or variations in the 
degree to which they are manifested in everyday life. One relatively undisputed 
universal may be humans’ ability to understand that minds represent the world, as 
indicated in cross-cultural findings about false-belief tasks or the fact that both Chinese 
and American children seem to develop the capacity to distinguish appearance from 
reality at about the same age (Flavell, Zhang, Zou, Dong, & Qi, 1983). If  we conceive 
o f theory o f mind more broadly as folk psychology, there may be additional core 
universals, such as a division o f internal states into thoughts, feelings, and desires (e.g. 
D'Andrade, 1987).
Psychological Essentialism
Another intuition that has been related to our understanding o f other people is 
essentialism. Humans appear to be psychological essentialists in the inferences they 
make about natural kinds. According to Gelman and Hirschfeld (1999; see also Atran, 
1990; Barrett, 2001; Keil, 1989; Medin, 1989; Sperber, 1996), essences apply to a naive 
understanding o f the natural world in the form o f a so-called folkbiology (see 
Hirschfeld, 1995/1998 for essences as folksociology, or Gil-White, 2001, on 
essentialism and ethnicity). They are perceived invisible, identity-determining qualities 
o f an organism that remain constant over growth, morphological transformation and
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reproduction. Essences can be considered invisible causes o f  living kinds’ identity or 
physical features.
Gelman and Markman (1986) find that even preschool children use more than just 
superficial appearances in their inductions of natural kind categories. In an experiment, 
they set category membership against perceptual similarity and discovered that category 
information was used more often for such judgments than perceptual information. For 
example, children had to decide whether a triceratops is more likely to have cold blood, 
as a brontosaurus does, or warm blood, because the triceratops also resembles a grey 
rhinoceros. By matching the triceratops with the brontosaurus, 68% of children's 
choices in the experimental condition were made on the basis o f category information 
rather than perceptual similarity. Gelman and Wellman (1991; also Gelman, Coley & 
Gottfried, 1994) suggest that children seem to have an early understanding o f the non- 
obvious, essences inside living things in the form o f ‘innate potential’, which may 
facilitate the acquisition o f knowledge and more complex theories, although the 
development o f domain specific inference may occur with an accumulation o f 
knowledge.
Gelman, Coley and Gottfried (1994) discuss research on the acquisition of 
essentialist thinking about causality in children. For example, Gelman & Gottfried 
(1993; in Gelman et al., 1994) studied four-year-old children's reasoning about 
behaviour. After viewing taped events o f animals and objects moving across a surface 
(with or without the visible aid o f a person's hand), participants were asked to make 
judgments about causal mechanisms. Possible judgments were o f an External Cause 
("Did a person make this move?") or Internal Cause ("Did something inside this make it 
move?"). In the condition in which a hand carrying or pushing an artefact was visible, 
children were likely to attribute the cause o f movement to a person; however, in the 
same condition, children frequently denied that a person made the object move if the
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object was an animal. When objects appeared to move by themselves, children attributed 
causality to something inherent in the object, regardless o f whether it was an artefact or 
animal, and despite the fact that they were unaware o f the specific mechanisms 
involved.
Essentialism in Categorisation
Consistent with Gelman and colleagues’ work, Keil (1989) has argued that 
conceptual development in children does not simply follow a universal perceptual-to- 
conceptual, characteristic-to-defining or holistic-to-analytic path. He maintains that 
categorisation may be based on theoretical relations very early in human development, 
but that this causal thinking may become more differentiated with age. Psychological 
essentialism, then, can be viewed as a propensity to learn or use theory-based 
categorisation (Medin, 1989). Theories, in turn, constrain concepts (Murphy & Medin, 
1985). The importance of this is evident in Gelman's work (e.g. Gelman 1988; Gelman 
& Markman, 1986; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Gelman & Hirschfeld 1999), which 
indicates that even young children's categorisation may be based on theories rather than 
just perceptual similarity.
Essentialist thinking is also relevant for rule-based categorisation about natural 
kinds. For example, according to Atran (1990), our folkbiology does not allow for 
overlap between basic taxa, and every life-form taxon has at least one phenomenal 
property characteristic and diagnostic o f that taxon in the sense that it is not 
characteristic o f other taxa (p. 56). From a more domain-independent perspective, it can 
be said that rule-based categorisation, like psychological essentialism, leads to 
constraints and a determination o f category membership on the grounds o f necessary 
and sufficient features. Rule-based categorisation is the analytic (Smith & Sloman, 1994, 
pp 377-378) extension o f the causal or theory-based thinking evident in essentialism. As
68
a result, essentialism can be interpreted as an intuitive ally to analytic or rule-based 
categorisation.
As reviewed earlier, categorisation determined by rules has been pitted against 
family-resemblance based categorisation by Norenzayan et al. (2002b). The authors of 
this study found that, when faced with a conflict between rules and family resemblance, 
East Asians tend to resolve in favour o f the latter, a holistic or experiential choice. 
Americans, by contrast, tend to choose categorisation determined by defining features 
that may not be immediately apparent. Unlike theory or rule-based categorisation, 
family-resemblance based categorisation is necessarily one o f degree, not an all-or-none 
decision (Medin, 1989; Rosch, 1975; Smith & Sloman, 1994).
Reasoning on the basis o f shared properties is also evident in category-based 
grouping, which has been studied in contrast to relational-contextual classification. 
When considering the concepts PANDA, BANANA and MONKEY, BANANA and 
MONKEY go together, because they are related experientially or relational- 
contextually, whereas MONKEY and PANDA both belong to the category 
PRIMATES—they share the element o f ‘primateness’. Similarly, NOTEBOOK and 
PEN can be grouped together because they complement or ‘go together’ in practice; 
NOTEBOOK and MAGAZINE, by contrast, are related because they share the 
substance o f paper. For both categorisation and grouping tasks, then, holistic and 
analytic preferences draw on different kinds o f intuitions, which may be best described 
as experience versus essence-based.
Dispositionism in Social Inference: A Form of Essentialism?
The psychological notion o f essence has both sortal and causal components. Hence, 
essentialism not only speaks to ways o f organising the world but also the social 
attribution area o f H-A cognition. Psychological essentialism may be one intuitive 
component of the often functional “human tendency to go beyond the information
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given” evident in dispositionism (Aronson, 1999, p. 312). The possibility that 
essentialism is related to dispositionist thinking has been raised by Norenzayan et al. 
(2002a; cf. Choi et al., 1999). Gelman (1992) first came up with this hypothesis by 
maintaining that the relationship between a biological feature or process and the 
inherent essence that causes it is similar to the link between a person's behaviour and the 
personality trait as its source. In both cases, people assume a hidden and underlying 
nature that causes outward properties (however, see Gelman et al., 1994, for a critical 
discussion5). Barrett (2001) points out that, from an evolutionary perspective, 
behavioural dispositions may have been “one o f the most important whole-body 
properties to generalise from member to member o f a particular living kind” for human- 
decision makers in ancestral environment (p. 11).
Haslam, Bastian and Bissett (2004) argue that personality characteristics are often 
understood as underlying essences. In their research (Study 2), essentialised 
characteristics were judged as especially important in determining people's identity and 
impression formation. Cross-cultural work on social inference, reviewed earlier, 
supports the possibility o f dispositional thinking as relatively universal and possibly a 
form o f essentialism (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Choi et al., 1999; Norenzayan et al., 2002a). 
Dispositionist thinking appears to be universal when limited information is available 
about actors and their behavioural contexts.
If  dispositionist thinking about behaviour is indeed intuitive and universal under 
some conditions, the term ‘contradiction' may be used to describe an actor's behaviour
5 Gelman et al. (1994) propose that the psychological domain of essentialism may be borrowing from a 
'base domain' from which essentialism springs naturally, such as biology. However, Gelman et al. 
maintain that traits are less immutable and deterministic than biological essences. More importantly, 
while biological essences concern category identity (i.e. apply to members of a category), traits are about 
the distinction of individual people. A second possibility is that children, in contrast to adults, have an 
undifferentiated broad domain that lumps together social and biological things or that essentialism is 
domain specific in a broader sense. Another explanation could be that of multiple domain-specific 
essences. However, Gelman et al. argue that its plausibility would diminish if  we were to discover 
separate essences for nai ve theories of physics, biology, psychology and sociology, because it would be 
unparsimonious. The authors propose that a fourth possibility may be most reasonable. Essentialism may 
be a domain general phenomenon with domain-specific instantiations, (pp. 358-359).
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that seems to violate what is expected as result of his or her dispositions, as investigated 
by Choi and Nisbett (2000) in their ‘Bad Samaritan’ study. Not surprisingly, a religious 
and helpful person not helping a person in need has been equated with a form of 
counter-intuitiveness due to the incongruity between assumed disposition and actual 
behaviour (Pietromonaco & Nisbett, 1982). However, knowledge o f situational 
constraints that may have influenced disposition-violating acts, along with culturally- 
derived theories stressing the complexity of social behaviour and a general tolerance o f 
contradictions, led to lower surprise levels among Asian participants in Nisbett and 
Choi’s study.
3.2.2 Cognitive Anthropology Meets Cross-Cultural Psychology
Counter-Intuitive Beliefs
My discussion of dispositionism, and more broadly essentialism, illustrates people’s 
innate understanding of ontology. Counter-intuitiveness can arise when intuitive 
“essence properties” are violated in the combination o f concepts (Franks, 2003). 
According to some theorists (Sperber, 1996; Boyer 1994, 2000; see also Sperber and 
Hirschfeld, 1999; Lawson, 2001), counterintuitive concepts in the domain o f religion or 
the supernatural—a being who is all-knowing or can walk through solid matter, for 
example—may be relatively universal and robust. Religious beliefs are “a recurring 
cultural by-product” of innate cognitive mechanisms (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004, p. 
713). Pyysiainen (2004) reasons that counter-intuitiveness must be understood as an 
interaction between intuitive and explicit processes. “Counterintuitiveness is based on 
explicit modification o f intuitive concepts” to the extent that “theological thinking is 
characterized by both counterintuitiveness and a tendency to rationalize” (p. 143). 
Similarly, according to Sperber (1996), counter-intuitive concepts—beliefs that violate 
basic ontological expectations—may be culturally successful because they are relevant
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mysteries. For example, Sperber mentions that a person may believe with total faith in 
the Holy Trinity, and at the same time be aware o f the intuitive force that a father and 
son cannot be one and the same. In addition, many religious or supernatural concepts 
may be robust because they also entail intuitive expectations that are not violated 
(Boyer, 1994, 2000). For instance, while gods who are all-knowing may violate our 
intuitive theory o f mind, they can also be tacitly represented as a “cognitively standard 
agents,” believed to have desires and intentions, which again conforms to basic 
psychological expectations we have about persons (Boyer & Ramble, 2001, p. 537; also 
Barrett & Keil, 1996). Non-natural representations in the domain o f religion are not 
restricted to religions that tend to personify the supernatural, but may also have a place 
in nondeistic theologies, such as Buddhism (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Pyysiainen, 
2003).
Boyer and Sperber imply that non-natural beliefs have a cultural transmission 
advantage, due to their attention-grabbing nature and memorability. These ideas have 
recently been tested empirically (Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; 
Lisdorf, 2004; Norenzayan & Atran, 2003). Barrett and Nyhof (2001) designed 
experiments on a sample o f American college students in order to test the transmission 
advantage o f expectation-violating items in stories. They did so by measuring 
immediate and delayed recall as well as retelling o f items in several domains. Results 
showed that counter-intuitive items were transmitted better than common or bizarre 
items (e.g. exaggerated or extreme, but not violating basic ontology on a category level) 
in a social reproduction task (Experiment 2).
Similarly, Boyer and Ramble (2001) studied samples in France, Gabon and Nepal by 
using a story telling format, and found comparable advantages o f counterintuitive 
concepts. They found that Tibetan monks remembered counter-intuitive concepts at a
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similar rate as French university students. More comparisons between religious groups 
are needed to provide support to the universality o f counter-intuitive thinking.
Parallels Between Counter-intuitiveness and Naive Dialecticism
Upon closer examination it seems that some counter-intuitive beliefs in the religious 
domain violate the Western law o f noncontradiction and law o f identity outlined in Peng 
and Nisbett (1999). Hence, they may be closely allied with Eastern dialectical reasoning 
and TC. The Holy Trinity, for example, is similar to the Yin and Yang principle 
(representing the Principle o f Relationship or Holism), in that the entities they comprise 
(father, son and holy ghost in the former; opposing entities in the latter) become one. 
The laws o f identity and non-contradiction are also violated by the Middle Doctrine 
school o f Buddhism (discussed in section 3.1.2).
The potential connection between religious representations and H-A thought has 
been brought up by Franks (2003) and further developed by Samson (2004). Research 
discussed earlier indicates that East Asians are more tolerant o f contradictions, because 
their culture promotes the recognition o f complexity (in its metaphysics or 
epistemology) and harmony (in social practice). This culturally specific acceptance o f 
contradictions may interact with a more cross-culturally universal “tolerance o f the 
unexpected” evident in the domain o f the supernatural or religious (Franks, 2003; 
Samson, 2004). According to Franks, cross-cultural research implies that holding 
contradictory beliefs may only be special in cultures dominated by linear logic. Given 
that the tolerance for non-contradiction in dialectical thinking appears to be more 
context-independent, Franks notes that we may need to look more closely at specific 
contents o f religious representations in the future and investigate religious 
representations held under linear as opposed to dialectical logic.
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I have argued (Samson, 2004) that tolerance o f counter-intuitiveness and TC may be 
related, but should not be equated with each other. Apparent contradiction, in dialectical 
reasoning, has been defined as occurring “when two pieces o f information [appear to 
be] inconsistent with each other in such a way that if one o f them is true, then it is likely 
that the other is false” (Choi & Nisbett, 2000). Peng and Nisbett's (1999) method o f 
measuring TC in the form o f differentiation versus compromise used plausibility 
ratings, indicating a willingness to compromise, rather than cognitive processes like 
memory or recall. Moreover, Boyer's idea of non-natural concepts is about the violation 
o f intuitive expectations from ontological categories (e.g. persons, animals, artefacts); in 
Nisbett and Peng, TC stems mainly from the social (e.g. practices favouring social 
harmony, as argued by Nisbett & Masuda, 2003) and epistemological implications o f 
Eastern religion and philosophy (e.g. Yin and Yang or Middle Doctrine school o f 
Buddhism). Finally, the counter-intuitiveness o f religious and similar representations is 
about contradictions that occur in the combination o f concepts, while contradictions in 
naive dialecticism are often about conflicts between ideas or positions. As a result, 
tolerance o f non-naturalness should be most similar to TC if contradictions implicit in 
the concepts are made explicit. Psychological contradictions occur if people have to 
grapple with the actual or possible existence o f concepts they thought o f as impossible, 
unlikely or unexpected. For example, most people would consider the existence o f a 
thinking and speaking toaster highly unlikely. If  we brought this fact to a person’s mind 
and then five minutes later presented her with a speaking toaster, the contradiction 
would be made explicit. Having some kind of measure o f her ability to “cope” with this 
surprise would allow us to get an idea o f her tolerance o f contradictions arising from the 
counter-intuitive (or unexpected) nature o f that entity.
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Modes o f  Religiosity
The previous section implies that naive dialecticism may well provide a culturally- 
derived belief structure that supports adherence to minimally counter-intuitive 
(cognitively optimal) concepts. Harvey Whitehouse’s (2000, 2004, 2005) account o f 
religiosity complements Boyer’s theory by explaining conditions for the transmission of 
more complex or ‘cognitively costly’ religious beliefs and practices, o f which the 
holistic teachings o f Buddhism, discussed previously, may be a perfect example. 
According to Whitehouse, the transmission advantage o f cognitively optimal 
representations does not explain why more complex aspects o f religious experience, in 
the form o f both practices and beliefs, are successfully transmitted. The answers, in his 
theory, lie in the cognitive consequences o f two main types o f religiosity, the doctrinal 
and imagistic modes.
Whitehouse’s emphasis in the modes theory is religious ritual, which, along with 
supernatural agents and myths, is one o f three cross-culturally universal areas of 
religion. The doctrinal mode involves religions with frequent repetition o f rituals, such 
as mass in Christian faiths. Doctrinal religions often employ experts, for example 
ordained priests, and usually rely on ‘revelation’ through rhetoric, narrative and logical 
integration. The mnemonic devices necessary for the persistence o f religiosity resulting 
from the doctrinal mode are the cognitive schemas and scripts learned through the 
religion’s rituals and scriptures. Hence, the memory system in charge is termed 
‘semantic’. However, the frequent repetition o f religious practices, in the form o f a 
routinisation o f ritual, accounts for a relatively low level o f arousal in the audience, who 
may succumb to a ‘tedium effect’.
The imagistic mode o f religion generally does not have this potential for low morale 
or boredom. Evangelical movements that draw on charismatic preachers (who seek to 
make religion relevant to individual or social problems) and emotionally charged
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congregations, including healing rituals, may be better examples o f a Christian imagistic 
religious experience. Imagistic religions are characterised by infrequent, sometimes 
shocking (but always arousing), rituals that emphasise individual experience. Initiation 
rituals that induce very high levels o f arousal, such as extreme pain, are examples 
frequently used by Whitehouse. Unlike doctrinal religions, the meaning o f practices in 
imagistic religiosity is generated rather than acquired by the individual. Revelation may 
be more open, ambiguous or idiosyncratic (multivalent/multivocal). The principal 
memory system that provides mnemonic support for its transmission is episodic 
memory, where individuals recall unique experiences in which they were situated. Due 
to the high level o f arousal, recall o f a ritual episode can take the form o f a ‘flashbulb’ 
memory (e.g. the what-did-you-do-on-911 effect), where unusual amounts o f detail are 
remembered.
Despite the fact that Buddhism does not thrive on “shocking rituals,” Western
converts to Buddhism may in many cases be motivated by the kind o f self-actualisation
that cannot be provided by largely non-imagistic Christian or secular practices and
beliefs. As such, the conversion process itself may reflect something like an imagistic
step. Whitehouse writes (2005, p. 210):
In the case of the more shocking rituals... we find a far greater emphasis on the mystical 
revelations of individual participants. Instead of teachings being transmitted by word of 
mouth, from experts to laity, the pattern is more like a private esoteric journey—often a 
slow journey taking many years to complete—whereby adherents try to investigate religious 
riddles independently through personal contemplation (Whitehouse, 2005, p. 210; emphasis 
added)
Buddhism does not entirely conform to these imagistic features, but for the purpose 
o f this thesis I will adopt a view o f the imagistic-doctrinal distinction as ‘ideal types’. In 
other words, the inclusion o f a religion in the imagistic-doctrinal typology is based on 
family resemblance rather than finding necessary and sufficient characteristics that
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allow it to be assigned to either one of two exhaustive categories. Buddhism diverges 
from one of the imagistic characteristics in the sense that its practices are generally not 
centred on infrequent collective rituals with high emotional arousal, particularly perhaps 
among Westerns. Nevertheless, if we move away from religious practice as an 
interaction between the individual and other members of the religious community, 
towards a focus on internal religious experience, we can draw parallels between 
seemingly different practices. More precisely, collective ritual and meditation may share 
a sense o f ‘unitary experience’, a decreased perception o f division between the self and 
the world external to the individual that comes with the activation o f the same region in 
the brain (Newberg & d’Aquili, 2000). Thus, meditation, like ceremonial ritual, is a 
practice based on sensory experience and altered states o f consciousness, albeit 
frequently repeated in order to achieve mastery. Whether its aim is described as inner 
peace, enlightenment, egolessness or heightened sensory awareness, Buddhist 
meditation has highly idiosyncratic undertones, as it is clearly internally generated. 
Meditation is a tool for achieving change from within rather than uniformity from 
without, even though it usually involves expert teachers. Unlike the less reflective 
learning among audiences in the doctrinal mode, Buddhist experience is often about 
cognitive clarity or mindfulness by raising awareness o f (or learning to live in) the 
present moment. In other words, it can be about trying to achieve a constant state of 
‘episodic’ perception or cognition. Similar to the imagistic mode, Buddhist practitioners 
may one day achieve a moment o f internally generated meaning, an awareness in which 
the religion’s holistic metaphysical teachings appear to become aligned with actual 
sensory or reflective experience.
Even though its imagistic character may not be adequately captured by the episodic 
memory o f individual “life changing” episodes (Whitehouse, 2000, p. 12), Buddhism 
seems to promote episodic cognition both in its teachings and practices. In doctrinal
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religion, learning occurs in a top-down approach or by the derivation o f rules from 
repeated practice, while Buddhism espouses a bottom-up process in which the 
individual, through practice, may come to connect with the metaphysical content o f the 
religion by interpreting or “understanding” abstract ideas for him/herself. For example, 
the cognitively costly idea o f a self-transcendence, egolessness or ‘transcendence o f 
suffering’ (Whitehouse, 2004, p. 26) may be “understood” by individual practices like 
transcendental meditation or simply the exercise o f compassion. In more general 
cognitive terms, episodic memory is instance-based and thus contextual, and as such in 
line with the holistic cognition supported by Buddhist ideas. The doctrines, semantic 
schemas and script-based practices o f Christian religions are comparable to linear logic 
or rules-based cognition. Semantic memory is general rather than contextual.
3.2.3 Summary and Implications
This chapter started with a brief review o f the psychology o f religion and ended with 
a discussion o f religion in cognitive anthropology, two very different approaches to 
culture and cognition. In the case o f the former tradition, religion can be seen as a 
cultural source o f schemas, in the form o f beliefs or theories, which often vary across 
religious traditions. In the cognitive anthropological tradition, the ‘modes theory’ o f 
religion has been concerned with two cross-culturally universal ideal types that can 
explain how complex or ‘cognitively costly’ religious traditions persist over time and 
space. Other research has focused on violations o f universally held intuitive beliefs that 
may lead to transmission advantages o f those ‘cognitively optimal’ ideas. Along with 
the context-sensitivity o f some ‘top-down’ approaches to culture and cognition, the 
addition o f a ‘bottom-up’ perspective o f religion has the potential to ftirther contribute 
to a fuller and more dynamic study o f religion and individual thought.
In order to provide a foundation for the understanding o f counter-intuitiveness, I 
have discussed intuitions that are argued to represent a universal base for H-A cognitive
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processes, namely theory o f mind (ToM) and psychological essentialism. These 
intuitions may feed into so-called dispositionism or the natural tendency to make 
internal social attributions under conditions o f limited information. From this 
perspective, disposition-violating behaviour can be counter-intuitive. When concepts 
violate intuitive expectations, such as the ability have false beliefs, they are often 
referred to as counter-intuitive beliefs, representations that are particularly prevalent in 
the domain o f religion.
Both o f the disciplines in the field o f cognition and culture outlined above have been 
interested in the study o f cognitions about expectation-violations. In cross-cultural 
psychology, TC has been investigated partly as the result o f culturally-derived 
epistemological beliefs and social practices. In cognitive anthropology, counter­
intuitiveness has been discussed as an example o f the violation o f intuitively held 
beliefs. Apparent similarities between naive dialecticism in Eastern religious thought 
and non-natural beliefs make the study o f tolerance o f contradictions among religious 
groups a compelling endeavour to advance the interdisciplinary field o f culture and 
cognition. Study 4 in this thesis will look at counter-intuitiveness and tolerance o f 
contradictions across religious groups.
While cognitively optimal non-natural concepts appear to be compatible with 
cognitively costly belief systems like Eastern dialecticism (evident in the Middle 
Doctrine school o f Buddhism, for example), the cognitive implications o f the modes o f 
religiosity theory provide another potential touch-point between cognitive anthropology 
and the cultural psychology o f religion. However, the theory does so by taking into 
account religious experience as a whole, especially practices, not merely the values or 
beliefs espoused by religions. More specifically, the psychological features o f doctrinal 
religions like Christianity, including low arousal in ritual performance, semantic 
memory and logical integration in revelational techniques overlap with analytic
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cognition. Imagistic religion, on the other hand, which I argued is more descriptive o f 
Buddhism, is associated with holism, as evident in greater sensory experience in 
religious practice, episodic memory and multivocality or multivalence rather than 
logical integration. One of the hypotheses tested in Study 1 in the next chapter looks at 
the effect o f Buddhist meditative practices on H-A cognition.
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Chapter 4 -  Holistic versus Analytic Cognition 
among Religious Groups in the West: A 
Comparison of British Buddhists, Anglicans and 
Secular-Humanists
4.1 Introduction
Buddhism has been widely identified as a source o f holistic reasoning in Asian 
culture, yet has not found any empirical attention in relation to H-A cognition. Both 
cross-cultural psychological and cognitive anthropological views indicate that 
Buddhism may be a particularly interesting variable in the study o f culture and 
cognition. If the religion does indeed foster holistic thought, we should find within- 
cultural variation o f H-A cognition in the West, where its practitioners can be expected 
to think more holistically than non-Buddhists. With this question in mind, the first 
empirical study o f this thesis aims to test the hypothesis that Western Buddhists are 
significantly more holistic thinkers than other populations in the UK. Research on 
biculturalism and acculturation, together with ‘religion as schema’ theories, indicate that 
religion has the potential to induce context effects similar to individuals’ cultural 
backgrounds. Hence, this study also investigates religious contexts o f H-A cognition, 
including hypotheses about the effect o f priming, the role o f religiosity and religious 
integration in moderating H-A thought, as well as the impact of meditation on holistic 
thinking.
These hypotheses are tested in an online quasi-experiment administered to members 
o f Buddhist, Anglican and Secular-Humanist groups and organisations. H-A thought is 
operationalised by using six H-A indicators from past research, ranging from relatively 
implicit to more explicit measures. Among religious groups, detailed information about 
individuals attitudes, beliefs, practices and social contacts are collected. All participants
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also provide demographic information about their cultural background, ethnicity, 
gender, education and age. The data are analysed using factor analysis, analysis o f 
variance and co-variance, t-tests, regressions, as well as simple correlations. They 
produce good evidence for the expected H-A group differences, but more mixed results 
for religious context effects among Buddhists. Although findings include a Buddhist 
priming effect, it is not in the expected holistic direction and is evident only on certain 
variables.
4.1.1 Theoretical Background
In Chapter 2 ,1 discussed past research that has compared Western European (mainly 
American) with East Asian populations on several empirical dimensions o f holistic vs 
analytic (H-A) thinking. I noted that the H-A area o f enquiry has been primarily 
interested in folk theories as determinants of thought, compared to spheres o f cross- 
cultural psychology concerned with the role o f values or self. However, as indicated by 
Peng et al. (2001), these three traditions must be considered together in order to 
understand the complex nature of human inference (see Fig. 2.1 adapted from Peng et 
al., 2001). According to Nisbett (2003), who largely represents the theories tradition of 
‘culture and human inference’, cognitive processes are the result o f a causal chain from 
social systems to attention, metaphysics and epistemologies (see Fig. 2.2). Nisbett’s 
model lacks not only the more integrative psychological approach outlined in Peng et al, 
but also some o f the granularity necessary in explaining sources o f culturally-dependent 
cognition on the macro level. One area in which it could be improved applies to the 
conceptual oversimplification of culture. Hence, I proposed the inclusion of House’s 
(1981) theoretical separation o f structural and cultural dimensions as determinants o f 
individual-level outcomes (see Fig. 2.3).
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4.1.2 Towards a Religion and Cognition Model
The model used in this thesis corresponds to a combination o f these three conceptual 
approaches and is based on the introduction o f the subcultural variable o f religion (Fig. 
4.1). As such, it is a mid-level model that does not purport to address more historical, 
collective or creative anthropological views o f culture, nor does it venture into the 
territory o f evolutionary psychology.
Since Buddhism can be considered a subculture, this model acknowledges that 
religion should be more than simply self-identified group membership. It is also about 
people’s integration in the religious group, as a structural aspect o f religion, alongside 
with religiosity, representing an individual-level measure o f religion’s ‘cultural 
content’. More dynamic research on biculturalism and cognition shows that cognitive 
patterns can sometimes be activated by means o f cultural priming. Hence, the se lf 
depicted in the religion-cognition model represents a possible switch for cognitive 
preferences. On a broader individual-level o f analysis, the self is tied to cultural values, 
beliefs and behaviour through which individuals express their religiosity.
Nisbett’s (2003) model depicts an ecology->economy->social structure-^attention 
->metaphysics-^epistemology-^cognition causal chain. The religion-cognition model 
presented in this thesis excludes cultures’ historical backgrounds evident in ‘ecology’ 
and ‘economy’ and also splits the connection between the sociocultural system and 
cognition into two strands: social structure and cultural content. Instead o f Nisbett’s 
‘social structure’ -> cultural content ( ‘metaphysics’, ‘epistemology’) -> ‘cognition’ 
order o f causality, ‘metaphysics’ and ‘epistemology’ are treated as an aspect o f cultural 
content, alongside a more direct link between ‘social structure’ and ‘attention’. Through 
the application o f a more sociological definition o f ‘social structure’, group membership 
and integration comes to stand for the individual in relation to social group. However, in 
correspondence with Nisbett’s theory, variations in attention are still depicted as the
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main effect o f social structural differences (also indicated by Markus and Kitayama,
1991, distinction between independent and interdependent self-orientations). Despite a 
greater emphasis on this relationship, the model does not negate Nisbett’s original 
connection between ‘metaphysics’ and ‘attention’. Moreover, the religion-cognition 
model presented in this thesis does not operationalise ‘metaphysics’, ‘epistemology’ or 
‘attention’.
This conceptual separation is a matter of emphasis only and does not mean that there 
is no interaction between attention and metaphysics or that these pathways are 
independent o f each other. For example, cross-cultural differences in social attribution 
may be the result o f collectivist cultural values, manifested in a culture’s metaphysics of 
interdependence and an epistemology identifying contexts or situations as sources of 
causality. At the same time, individuals’ integration in social groups directs attention 
away from individuals and towards collectives or contexts. Ultimately, social attribution 
is the outcome o f the information that is attended to and the cultural values or beliefs 
that are applied to the reasoning process.
In the graphic depiction o f this model, grey regions symbolise conceptual areas of 
interest that are operationalised in this thesis. The cultural content and social structure of 
religion are the main independent variables. They are represented and operationalised 
on an individual level by the religious self-concept, values, beliefs, practices and 
religious group contact. For example, a Buddhist view o f the person originates from the 
religion’s teachings (part o f its ‘cultural content’) and is manifested in individual values 
and beliefs about compassion, interdependence, etc., or practices, such as reading 
Buddhist texts or meditation. At the same time, Buddhists’ integration in the religious 
community ( ‘social structure’) should be a component o f most people’s Buddhist 
identification, manifested in practices like involvement in Buddhist groups or 
organisations. Structural integration influences or reinforces religious values and
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beliefs, especially interdependence. Finally, H-A cognition, the dependent variable in 
this research, is indicated by the endorsement of certain theories or beliefs and their 
application to cognitive processes.
Fig. 4.1: Religion and Cognition: Towards an Integrated Model
Fig. 4.1
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4.1.3 W ithin-Cultural Differences in Culture and Human Inference
In the 1990’s, researchers in the values tradition of culture and human inference, 
namely individualism-collectivism, began to appreciate possible within-cultural 
variations on the basis of ethnicity. Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier (2002) identify 
about 30 studies that have been done between 1994 and 2001 using an American 
population and ethnic subdivisions of Latino, Asian, African and European-American
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groups. However, the authors’ meta-analysis o f past studies yields no clear-cut picture 
about ethnic group differences and overall find only small variations across European- 
American and non-white ethnic groups. There is no empirical research in this area that 
has analysed religious-group differences within cultures. However, Sampson (2000), 
examines the religious roots o f individualism and independence by discussing 
influences o f Protestantism on Western individualism. He argues Christianity is 
dominated by both mind-body and self-other dualisms that have contributed to Western 
conceptions o f human nature. Sampson contrasts this view with Rabbinic Judaism, 
which he claims espouses a more ‘dialogic’ person-other conception. In a response to 
the author, M. Lynch (2001) points out that there are examples o f cultures in which 
collectivism has become linked with Christianity, while Burston (2001) and C. Lynch 
(2001) criticise Sampson’s homogenisation o f Christianity and confounding o f 
Christianity with Protestantism and individualism. For example, it is argued that 
Catholicism is far more collectivist than Protestantism. While this discussion points to 
variations in individualism-collectivism and independence-interdependence on the basis 
o f religion, no empirical research has yet been devoted to these questions.
The same is true for the more cognitively oriented tradition of culture and thought, 
exemplified by H-A reasoning, which has been largely devoid o f attempts to look at 
within-cultural differences with two exceptions. Miyamoto et al. (2006) primed 
European-American students with complex Japanese sceneries and found a significant 
increase in contextual attention among European-Americans. More importantly, from 
Peng et al’s theories perspective o f culture and human inference, Koo and Choi (2005) 
recently found that Koreans who study holistic medicine acquire more complex causal 
beliefs than other Korean comparison groups. These beliefs are applied in cyclical 
thinking about change and the amount of information discounted in causal attributions. 
When presented with graphs presenting the change o f a variable over time (upward or
86
downward trends) and asked to predict the following year’s value, students o f oriental 
medicine were more likely to expect a change in direction, whereas psychology students 
preferred a linear continuation o f the trend. In another study, this group was less likely 
to discount items o f information to explain a particular behaviour, indicating greater 
complexity in thought about causality.
4.1.4 W estern ‘W hite’ Buddhism
The most obvious place to look for within-cultural differences in the West is among 
people who have adopted aspects o f Eastern culture or lifestyles, such as Buddhism. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that a complete analysis o f H-A cognitive differences 
across religious groups also requires a cross-cultural dimension. I believe that the 
interpretation o f a culture-by-religion interaction would be extremely difficult, as 
religions necessarily have different characters or meanings in different cultural contexts. 
We can expect a well-represented religion (especially if it has had sufficient time to 
grow and adapt) to be far more endemic to a given country’s culture than a minority 
religion. For example, Christianity is as well-represented in Korea as Buddhism, hence 
the recruiting o f participants would have to focus on people who converted to 
Christianity. Still, Christianity would not have a minority religion status in such a 
cultural context the way Buddhism does in the West. On an individual level, we can 
expect this to lead not only to cross-cultural differences in values, beliefs or practices 
associated with the same religion, but also differences in the meaning o f religious 
conversion. This would be complicated by issues about the age at which socialisation 
into the religion occurs. Finally, those theoretical matters also lead to practical 
difficulties o f recruiting large samples o f East Asians who are sufficiently similar and 
comparable to samples obtained in the UK. Hence, the study presented in this chapter is 
concerned with religion in a Western context only.
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Transformations have undoubtedly occurred with the importation o f Eastern religion 
to the West. In some cases Buddhism may have become a feature of New Age religion, 
a recent development that can be characterised as a privatisation of religion—religion 
“repackaged” for individual consumption or religion as an “individual option” 
(Luckmann, 1999). Stark and Bainbridge (1985) call the most private form o f this 
phenomenon the audience cult o f new religious movements, defined by individuals who 
are interested in a religion, but may only read the occasional book or listen to the 
occasional lecture. Participation in client cults, by contrast, does involve some contact 
to other practitioners, but this may only entail the learning o f certain techniques, such as 
completing a meditation course. Only the category o f cult movement implies conversion 
and the genuine involvement in a religious lifestyle.
Unlike Buddhism in its native setting, Western Buddhism may be dominated by 
white middle class elite Buddhists (Nattier, 1998; Prebish, 1999; also Kay 2004). In 
some cases, this means Buddhism has become a “meditation subculture” pursuing a 
onefold path o f spiritual practice, rather than the ideal threefold training that also entails 
ethical guidance and the wisdom emerging from it (Prebish, 1999). It becomes clear, 
then, that a one-dimensional variable, such as religious self-identification, may be an 
insufficient measure in understanding H-A cognition among Western Buddhists. While 
sampling from Buddhist organisations can weed out private or audience cult Buddhists 
to some degree, asking more specific questions about spiritual practices, values and 
beliefs may help to account for variations in the extent to which religion actually affects 
lifestyles.
4.1.5 Comparison Groups
An analysis o f H-A cognition affected by Buddhism as a guest religion among 
Westerners calls for the inclusion o f a comparison population representing a religion 
endemic to the Western cultural setting. As a result, better generalisations with respect
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to the effect o f Buddhism on H-A cognition can be made. The sampling o f Christians, in 
this case Anglicans, permits an expansion o f the religious scope of my inquiry. In terms 
o f Whitehouse’s ‘modes’ theory o f religion, Anglicans are representatives par 
excellence o f the doctrinal mode, compared to the more imagistic Buddhist religion.
The inclusion of Christians also allows us to hold a possible net effect o f religion 
constant, which, as I have argued, may lie in the structural aspect (social integration, 
networks, etc.) o f religiousness and perhaps in universal religious values. Individuals 
who belong to secular or humanist organisations may provide good non-religious 
comparison data by virtue o f not only their non-religious nature, but also because they 
may share some o f the characteristics of Buddhists without the religious/spiritual 
component. They both belong to some form of organisation based on common beliefs 
and values, which allows us to compare individuals who share organisational 
membership and a certain degree o f engagement.
Moreover, both organised religion and non-religion can be viewed as sharing a 
pursuit o f truth, wisdom and ethics (British Humanist Association, 1972; Gilbert, 1980; 
Norman, 2004; Watts, 1871). However, Secularism and Humanism, in contrast to 
Christianity, believe that ethics derive from people, natural laws or reason rather than an 
external objective source or divine laws. In the Secular Humanist view, values become 
shared human values, but also more subjective and relativistic (e.g. Norman, 2004, pp. 
90-96).
Secularism, like Buddhism, is more this-worldly than otherworldly—it is the 
“religion o f the present life” (Watts, 1871, p. 2). Moreover, in Britain, both belief 
systems have modernist, freethinking and perhaps even anti-traditionalist roots. The 
source o f Buddhism’s appeal in the UK has been identified as a “rational-scientific 
system encouraging ‘personal investigation o f the truth’ rather than ‘blind faith’” 
(Waterhouse, 1997, in Kay, 2004, p. 21). Indeed, becoming a Secularist or Humanist
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may be similarly motivated as becoming a Buddhist. The Dalai Lama (Biddulph, 1996), 
in an address to the Buddhist Society, has noted that
people with a basic scientific mental outlook seem to be losing interest in their own 
traditional religion, in place sometimes becoming what I call a radical atheist. 
Buddhism is also a kind of atheism, so those people who have no interest in any 
religion might then be attracted to the Buddha’s way as a form of humanism, (p. 147).
4.1.6 Research Questions and Variables
The main question that this study is trying to answer is simply whether there is 
variation in H-A thought among Westerners on the basis o f religion. A second question 
rests on the hypothesis that, just like more general cultural knowledge, religious 
knowledge— in the form o f beliefs or theories as well as values— can be activated 
depending on the context in which responses to problems are elicited. Hence, while my 
central research question could be phrased as To what extent can Buddhism shape 
aspects o f a H-A cognitive system among British practitioners?', I am also interested in 
investigating whether these cognitive patterns are domain or context-dependent or 
general, and how structural (i.e. social integration), ideological (values, beliefs) and 
behavioural/practical (e.g. meditation) aspects o f religion contribute to those potential 
differences. In short, this study is concerned with the relationship between a subculture 
and H-A cognition, taking into account the structural (i.e. integration) and cultural (i.e. 
religiosity) aspects o f religious group membership as well as the potential dependence 
o f variations in cognitive “style” on context (i.e. primed salience o f religion). The 
dependent variable, H-A cognition, consists o f several indicators that have been used in 
the past, including items measuring categorisation, grouping and tolerance of 
contradictions, as well as more abstract items measuring 'theories o f personality' and 
holistic thinking.
4.1.7 Measures and Hypotheses
Religious Group Membership, Religiosity and Religious Integration
90
The independent (or intervening) variables of religiosity and religious social 
integration can be operationalised by measuring both objective and subjective aspects of 
religiousness, including the strength and importance o f religious beliefs and values, the 
frequency o f religious practices, such as meditation or prayer, the centrality o f the 
religious self-concept, as well as degrees of social involvement or integration in the 
religious community. To this end, I wrote questions consisting o f standard items used to 
measure religiosity, including religious identification, as well as items in the European 
Religious and Moral Pluralism Survey (e.g. Piedmont & Moberg, 2003) or the World 
Values Survey (e.g. Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004).
These measure self-reported religiosity, attendance o f religious services and frequency 
o f prayer. The wording o f the questions was adapted to suit Christian and Buddhist 
populations. While Christians were asked about their frequency o f prayer, frequency o f 
meditation is included as a practice among Buddhists. Attending religious services 
(which is rare in Buddhism) was replaced with the more generic wording of “visiting 
one's church [temple]”. In addition, cross-culturally meaningful questions about the 
frequency of reading religious texts and having felt ‘close to the divine’ (DeJong, 
Faulkner, & Warland, 1978 [1999]) were included, along with a question about the 
centrality o f religion as part o f the self-concept. For the purposes o f creating a religious 
context further, I added a final question asking respondents to identify three core values 
o f their religion. This is similar to Hong et al. (1997) who requested that respondents fist 
three adjectives representing the culture associated with a cultural symbol presented to 
them. Priming religion by combining religious identity—on the basis o f religious 
identification and religiosity measures— and religious values has the potential to be 
more effective than either one of these used by itself.
The religiosity (religious prime) questions were piloted on a sample o f 48 voluntary 
respondents from Western Anglo-Saxon Buddhist (n=28) and Protestant (n=20)
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communities.6 Overall, there was some inter-item correlation for the indicators o f 
religiosity used. However, differences between religious groups emerged. While 
subjective religiosity (‘Whether or not you go to a church [temple], to what extent 
would you say that you are a [spiritual or] religious person?’) showed a correlation with 
other subjective religious variables among Protestants', the pattern among Buddhists 
was different, where religious practice was far more indicative o f self-reported 
religiosity. More specifically, frequency of meditation and the influence o f religion on 
decisions in individuals' lives (‘My spiritual or religious beliefs have a great deal o f 
influence on the decisions I make in my life’) were the best predictors among 
Buddhists. Having felt close to a divine being was most strongly correlated with 
religiosity among Christians. Among Buddhists, this finding may in part be indicative o f 
a more practice-oriented religion.
Exploratory factor analysis using a principle component extraction method 
performed separately for each religious group showed that having felt close to a divine 
being [divine state o f being] may not measure the same aspect o f religiosity as other 
variables. Among Buddhists, furthermore, agreement with the statement ‘My spirituality 
or religion is an important part o f who I am’ also stood apart from other questions. 
Hence, results warranted a removal o f these two variables from a future religiosity 
index. Although the frequency o f church visits has been used as an indicator o f 
(Western) religiosity in the past, it became clear that it should not be included in a 
religiosity index. Another factor analysis o f the five remaining religiosity variables 
yielded one single factor among Protestants, but separated out temple visits among 
Buddhists. This may be evidence o f a different meaning o f such visits in the religions in 
question. In other words, church visits may be more central to the more congregational
6 Australians were chosen in order to minimize contamination (and maximize the available respondent 
pool) of a future UK population. The samples were obtained by contacting individuals working for 
religious organizations that were listed on the Internet. Respondents then completed an electronic survey 
online.
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character o f Christian religion in contrast to that o f Buddhism. (While going to mass is 
an integral part o f being a practicing Christian, the Buddhist practice o f meditation can 
be done alone.) Instead, it makes more sense to use the ‘church or temple visits’ 
variable as a measure of integration in the religious community.
As a result, we are left with a cross-culturally meaningful religiosity index composed 
o f four variables, namely frequency o f prayer/meditation (‘About how often do you 
pray [meditate]?’; 7-point scale from ‘less than once a year’ to ‘every day’) and reading 
religious texts (‘About how often do you read texts or scriptures related to Christianity 
[Buddhism]?’; 7-point scale as previous item) as objective measures o f religiosity, along 
with two subjective ones, self-reported religiosity (‘Whether or not you go to a church 
[temple], to what extent would you say that you are a spiritual or religious person?’; 7- 
point scale from ‘not at all...’ to ‘very...’) and the influence o f religion on decision 
making (‘My Christian [Buddhist] beliefs have a great deal o f influence on the decisions 
I make in my life’; 7-point scale from ‘definitely no’ to ‘definitely yes’). A scale 
reliability analysis o f these four items across religious populations yielded a Cronbach's 
alpha o f .76. According to Nunnaly (1978) values above .7 indicate an acceptable level 
o f reliability. (In this case we also have to keep in mind that the scale is designed to 
measure the religiosity o f quite different religious groups.)
I constructed a simple index to quantify the frequency of contact individuals have to 
other individuals of their religion. Social integration indexes have been frequently used 
in the psychology o f health (see e.g. House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Cohen, 1988 
for summaries). House and Kahn (1985; in Cohen, 1988) distinguish between three 
categories o f social support measures: social networks, social supports and social 
relationships. Cohen and Syme (1985; in Cohen, 1988) suggest two main categories o f 
either structural or functional social integration. The religious contact measures in my 
studies include structural or social relationship based aspects o f social integration
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(Cohen, 1988), loosely adapted from previous social integration studies (e.g. Berkman 
& Syme, 1979; Berkman, Melchior, Chastang, Niedhammer, Leclerc, & Goldberg,
2004; House et al., 1988) and Moberg's (1982 [1965]) social integration in churches 
index.
Individual items measuring religious social integration include: the proportion of 
close friends who share one's religion and the frequency o f meeting any one o f those 
friends; the frequency of church or temple visits; the frequency o f meeting people o f the 
same religion through religious groups or organisations other than a church or temple; 
and finally, whether one’s spouse as well as one, both or none o f one’s parents share the 
same religion as the respondent’s.
Measures o f  H-A Cognition
Indicators o f H-A cognition consisted of an adaptation o f previously constructed 
measures that reflect H-A thinking on different levels and are suitable for a survey 
design (see Appendix). They range from relatively explicit, direct or folk theories 
oriented questions down to more implicit or “applied” H-A measures. With respect to 
the latter, most measures o f perception (e.g. field-dependence/independence) seem 
unsuitable for a questionnaire design due to control issues. I believe that the most basic 
type o f cognition that can be safely adapted to a less controlled design is Norenzayan et 
al.’s (2002b) rule versus family-resemblance categorisation task, in which respondents 
are asked to categorise abstract perceptual stimuli on the basis o f their relative features. 
This task pits perceptual (family-resemblance) against conceptual (rule-based) 
categorisation and may be particularly representative o f holistic versus analytic 
processing (cf. Kemler-Nelson, 1984; also Smith & Sloman, 1994). The following is an 
example o f a target stimulus:
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Participants are asked which o f the following groups (1 or 2) the object is most 
similar to:
Group 2Group 1
TUTTZJ
TZJ
The target object’s buttons, sleeves and neckline resemble most o f the objects in Group 
1, the family resemblance or holistic choice, but the straight-line pattern (as opposed to 
the zigzag in Group 1) defines Group 2, which is the rule-based or analytic choice.
This task has produced robust cross-cultural differences. The majority o f stimuli (about 
68%) were categorised on the basis o f a rule by Americans, whereas East Asians mainly 
used family resemblance (about 59%).
As another measure of the way in which information is organised, Ji et al.'s (2004; Ji, 
2001) grouping task relies on the forced grouping o f concepts in the form o f words. This 
category-based versus relational-contextual grouping may be a good representative o f 
relationship-based thinking as indicated by Markus & Kitayama (1991). For example, 
one o f the tasks includes the words POSTMAN, POLICEMAN and UNIFORM. 
Participants are asked which two o f the three things are most closely related. In this 
case, choosing UNIFORM and either POLICEMAN or POSTMAN is a relational- 
contextual or holistic choice, whereas POLICEMAN and POSTMAN is a category-
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based choice. As a further contrast to the family-resemblance based categorisation of 
abstract visual stimuli, it could be argued that relational-contextual grouping o f concepts 
also has an experience-derived aspect. For example, when presented with SEAGULL, 
WATER and SQUIRREL it is the association between the SEAGULL and WATER that 
is derived from the experience of contexts in which we may have seen a SEAGULL -  
contexts bringing together those two animals are probably more rare and putting them 
together relies on their classification o f them both belonging to the category of 
ANIMAL. Using this instrument, consisting o f ten groups o f three items and ten filler 
items, Ji et al. found that Chinese participants favoured relational-contextual groupings 
for approximately two-thirds of all items. European Americans, on the other hand, 
grouped about the same proportion o f items in category-based terms.
The main instrument measuring tolerance o f contradictions in naive (or ‘folk’) 
dialecticism are ratings o f plausibility about seemingly contradictory research findings 
consisting o f ten 9-point scale items ranging from 1 (strongly disbelieve) to 9 (strongly 
believe). These are taken from Peng & Nisbett's (1999) differentiation versus 
compromise study. For example, participants may be asked to rate the believability of 
the following:
A: A sociologist who surveyed college students from 100 universities claimed that there is a high 
correlation among college female students between smoking and being skinny.
B: A biologist who studied nicotine addiction asserted that heavy doses of nicotine often lead to 
becoming overweight.
Peng and Nisbett found that, when asked to rate the believability o f two superficially 
contradictory research findings, East Asians’ answers converged, while this was not the 
case among Americans who had a tendency to favour one at the expense o f the other. In 
the original study, it was found that for each statement pair, a particular one o f two 
statements was consistently rated as more plausible regardless o f culture. Differentiation
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was indicated by the difference in believability ratings between the two statements 
compared to a baseline rating o f each statement. Among Americans, the less plausible 
statement remained equally believable while the more plausible statement gained in 
believability somewhat, whereas Koreans’ believability ratings o f the more plausible 
statement declined and that o f the less plausible one increased. As a result, there was a 
significant difference in the cultural groups magnitude o f differentiation between the 
believability o f the two statements.
My adaptation o f Peng and Nisbett’s study focuses on this differentiation vs 
compromise by taking into account possible variations in the baseline plausibility of 
each research finding across individuals and groups. This is achieved by computing the 
mean of the absolute values o f Peng and Nisbett’s five statement pairs’ believability 
ratings, which is the same as taking the means o f values obtained by subtracting the 
rating o f the less plausible from the more plausible one. The order o f presentation o f the 
first and second statements is counter-balanced.
Choi and Nisbett’s (2000) Bad Samaritan (and its opposite, the Busy Levite) vignette 
can be used as another measure o f tolerance for contradictions. In one vignette, 
respondents are presented with a story o f a seemingly helpful (honest, loyal, etc.) 
religious seminary student who does not help a person in need due to time constraints in 
order to get to deliver his (religiously informed) speech. They are then instructed to 
indicate how surprised they were about the outcome. A second vignette uses the 
opposite scenario: a seemingly unhelpful (ambitious, selfish, etc.) student actually 
helping. Due to the expectation-violating nature of the stories, Choi and Nisbett argue 
that lower ratings o f surprise are indicative o f greater tolerance o f contradictions along 
with endorsing more complex theories o f behaviour. In the context o f this study, the 
task also pits explicit aspects o f religious beliefs (i.e. compassion, helping, etc.) against 
more implicit aspects o f H-A causal thinking (i.e. internal vs external attributions).
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Unlike Peng and Nisbett’s study, this task is rooted in social attribution theory and as 
such has a strong social psychological dimension. Moreover, in the differentiation vs 
compromise task, apparent contradictions arise from two seemingly opposed outcomes 
originating from the same cause or two seemingly opposed causes leading to the same 
outcome. Choi and Nisbett’s study, on the other hand, is about the intuition-based 
expectations o f actors behaving according to their dispositions and the contradiction that 
may arise if they do not Both variations of the vignette are about an actor with certain 
dispositions (helpful vs selfish) in a context with to opposed “pulls” (compassion 
dictated by the religious setting vs a selfish act dictated by the constraints of the 
situation). In short, tolerance for contradictions here is not about the possibility o f both 
A and B being true at the same time, but Z leading to B instead o f the expected A.
In order to avoid the possibility o f differential group attribution biases in rating 
religious actors, more ambiguous words that could refer to either Buddhists or 
Christians were added or substituted. For example, ‘religious person’ was replaced with 
‘spiritual person’, ‘God’ with ‘divine power’, the ‘Good Samaritan’ (as topic for a 
religious speech) with one about ‘sympathy’, etc. The parts o f the adapted stories that 
had religious references (excluding the helpful/non-helpful personality descriptions and 
helpful/non-helpful behavioural outcomes) were then piloted on a sample of 31 British 
students. For each vignette, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that the actor 
is a ‘British Buddhist’ or ‘British Christian’ on a 7-point scale. One-sample t tests 
indicated no significant bias in favour o f interpreting the actor as a British Buddhist 
versus Christian [f(30)=317, ns, and t(30)=-278, «j].
In the original research, Choi and Nisbett's Bad Samaritan and Busy Levite 
instruments produced comparably quite robust results indicated by a mean difference o f 
about 3 points (on an 11-point scale) in surprise ratings between Americans and 
Koreans. Since the vignettes tap into a certain tolerance o f contradictions and the
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relative complexity o f thinking about social behaviour, it can also be used as a proxy for 
social inference used alongside a measure of'lay theories' about social behaviour. As a 
measure o f the latter, I included three items asking individuals to indicate their 
agreement with dispositionist, situationist and interactionist lay theories discussed 
previously (Norenzayan et al., 2002a). For example, the dispositionist theory read as 
follows (rated on a 9-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree):
How people behave is mostly determined by their personality. One's personality predisposes and 
guides an individual to behave in one way, not in another way, no matter what circumstances the 
person is in. In a sense, behaviour is an unfolding of personality. One's behaviour is remarkably 
stable across time and consistent across situations because it is guided by personality. Therefore, 
if  we know the personality of one person, we can easily predict how the person will behave in the 
future and explain why that person behaved in a particular way in the past.
Finally, as a direct or explicit indicator of beliefs or folk theories pertaining to H- 
A reasoning in general, I used selected items of Choi et al.'s (2003) holism scale. The 
authors o f this study found that individuals' holism scores differed across cultures and 
correlated in the expected direction with a social attribution related variable. However, 
because these items were taken out o f scholarly texts describing holistic cognition, 
many of the original items were formulated very abstractly. I chose to include four 
items from each factor identified in the original study with some minor alteration in 
wording in order to make them more understandable. One o f these factors is most 
indicative of beliefs about the complexity o f causality and interrelatedness (e.g. ‘every 
event has [numerous] causes although some of the causes are not known’ or ‘nothing [in 
the universe] is unrelated’); the second factor seems to measure attention to the field or 
context (e.g. ‘a marker of good architecture is how harmoniously it blends with other 
buildings around it’ or ‘the whole is [always] greater than the sum of its parts’).
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In sum, H-A measures in this study are made up of:
H-A Organisation o f  Information [perceptual and conceptual]:
a) Rule- vs Family-Resemblance based Categorisation (Norenzayan et al., 2002b)
b) Category-based vs Relational-Contextual Grouping (Ji et al., 2004)
H-A Beliefs/Theories relating to Holism and Social Inference
c) Holism [holistic beliefs] Scale (Choi et al., 2003)
d) Folk Theories of Social Behaviour (Norenzayan et al., 2002a)
Tolerance fo r  Contradictions: Social Behaviour and Differentiation vs Compromise
e) Surprise about Expectation Violating Behaviour (Choi & Nisbett, 2000)
I) Differentiation vs Compromise (Peng & Nisbett, 1999)
Hypotheses
We may expect that, to a Western European individual, Buddhism would be closely 
tied to a role in a religious subculture with a potential to change patterns o f reasoning. A 
certain degree o f integration in such a subculture may be necessary to alter the way 
people think. In the acculturation and biculturalism literature, Minoura (1992) found 
that Japanese immigrants’ cognitive, cultural and affective acculturation in the U.S. was 
equally determined by degrees o f social interaction with Americans as age o f entry 
together with length o f stay in the host society. This view is also endorsed by Fiske et al. 
(1998), who argue that culturally-based differences in reasoning can only be 
“maintained by the very nature of the sociocultural surroundings” an individual finds 
herself in (p. 943), and Nisbett et al. (2001), who predict a radical cognitive shift after a 
generation or less given “total immersion” in the new culture. Such a cultural immersion 
perspective, then, would hold that full participation in a new culture will lead to 
cognitive change relatively quickly and implies that religion alone (as merely one 
cultural institution or subculture) may not make a difference.
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Interestingly, while Nisbett et al. seem to endorse a cultural immersion view, they 
also advocate a toolkit or dual processing perspective, which may lead to a different 
conclusion with respect to Eastern religious beliefs and practices among Western 
Europeans. If we assume that individuals have both holistic and analytic reasoning tools 
available to them in either culture, the question simply becomes under what conditions 
these are also accessible. Research on bicultural individuals seems to support the 
possibility that holistic tools can be made accessible (through cultural priming) perhaps 
even to Buddhists in the West. The fact that Hong Kong Chinese who do not actually 
live in a Western country can be primed to think more like Americans (Hong et al., 
1997; Hong & Chiu, 2001) backs this argument and seems to challenge the cultural 
immersion perspective. Hence, the Western Buddhist group may be most susceptible to 
religious context (i.e. religious identity is salient) in having an effect on H-A cognitive 
preferences. In sum, compared to baseline data from a secular and Christian Western 
groups, I expect Western Buddhists to think more like Asians when primed with their 
religion or spirituality.
Although the main hypotheses tested in this study are simply about overall 
differences in H-A thought, some predictions about more specific indicators o f  H-A 
cognition can be made.
Categorisation and Grouping: If  Buddhists are more holistic thinkers, they should 
categorise objects more on the basis o f family resemblance than rules, while also being 
more likely to group concepts by using relational-contextual rather than category-based 
logic. Nisbett's (2003) adopted framework for the causes o f H-A thinking suggests that 
social structure directly affects attention. Hence, religious social integration may 
moderate cognitive differences. Nisbett's framework implies that social integration may 
potentially play a greater role than the strength o f religious beliefs and values in 
determining less reflective types o f cognition, such as categorisation. A similar
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prediction can be made for H-A cognition as indicated by grouping, where 
interdependent orientations may foster a relational-contextual grouping style.
The categorisation of perceptual stimuli may also be affected by meditation 
practices. Following Omstein’s (1972) neurophilosophy, the part o f the brain that is 
most active during religious experience and meditation should be its parallel 
(holistic/relational) processor in the right hemisphere. Neuropsychologists have pinned 
down the area o f the brain involved in religious experience more precisely as the right 
PSPL o f the brain or ‘holistic operator’ (Newberg & d’Aquili, 1998, 2000). Both 
ceremonial rituals and meditation seem to produce a ‘sense of unity’. Meditative states, 
however, are at an advantage in sustaining unitary states due to a lack o f reliance on 
external forces or rhythmic activity (ibid). Murphy and Donovan (1997) report evidence 
in line with holistic perception, more precisely a holistic shift in the interpretation of 
visual stimuli (Rorschach images) among advanced meditators. My interpretation of 
Buddhism and its practice o f meditation as an instance o f Whitehouse’s imagistic mode 
o f religiosity are consistent with those findings. In terms o f  this theory, the emphasis on 
episodic cognition from imagistic practices should give rise to more holistic perception 
along with intuitive rather than formal or rules-based logic. As Norenzayan et al.
(2002b) have noted, family-resemblance versus rule-based categorisation is an instance 
o f intuitive cognition, which is “experience-based, resists ‘decontextualizing’ or 
separating form from content, relies on sense experience and concrete instances, and 
overlooks rules and logic when they are at odds with intuition” (p. 678). Taken together, 
the literature suggests that we should find a learning effect through meditation in 
holistic categorisation.
Lay/Folk Theories o f  Behaviour: The Buddhist doctrine o f non-selfhood as well as 
values (e.g. compassion) leading to other-orientation should make Buddhists endorse
102
dispositionist theories to a lesser extent than situationist theories. In addition, Markus 
and Kitayama (1991; also Peng et al., 2001) propose that interdependent orientations o f 
the Self affect reasoning about causality in social inference. By contrast, beliefs about 
people having more fixed dispositions are evident in Anglo-Saxon individualism, which 
has gone hand-in-hand with post-Reformation Christianity (e.g. Kitayama & Markus, 
1999, Sampson, 2000).
Holism Score: Since holism is evident throughout Buddhist teachings, we would expect 
a relatively clear difference between groups on this direct measure o f holistic beliefs. 
Hence, I expect cognition among Western Buddhists to be most holistic in its agreement 
with items on the Holism scale, which may be taken as normative beliefs relevant to 
Buddhism. If, as Nisbett (2003) and Peng et al. (2001) suggest, learned culturally- 
contingent theories or beliefs most directly affect cognitive inferences, we would expect 
religiosity, as an explicit or perhaps idealised cultural content (beliefs, values, etc.), to 
be more predictive o f directly measured holistic attitudes and beliefs (holism score) than 
other H-A items.
Whitehouse’s theory implies that religious practices in the imagistic mode have 
memory consequences that aid the survival/transmission o f cognitively costly aspects o f 
religiosity, such as the complex ideas espoused by Buddhism. The highly reflective and 
complex beliefs evident in the holism score, then, should be subject to the same 
meditative learning effect as the perception-based categorisation variable.
Differentiation vs Compromise: Buddhists, especially in the Mahayana tradition, are 
more tolerant o f contradictions and hence more willing to compromise, based on beliefs 
like the Middle Doctrine. (Eastern social practices that foster harmony rather than 
conflict, as discussed in Nisbett & Masuda, 2003, may have a similar effect.)
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Surprise about expectation violating behaviour: Choi and Nisbett (2000) theorise that 
having a greater tolerance of contradictions and endorsing more complex theories o f the 
person should lead to lower surprise levels about persons behaving contrary to their 
dispositions. We would expect interactionist and situationist theories o f behaviour and 
‘differentiation vs compromise’ to correlate accordingly with surprise levels. Among 
Buddhists, we can expect lower surprise levels compared to Christians, who should 
endorse a more stable view of the self.
A drawback in my research is a potential self-selection among Western Buddhists. 
Individuals who become Buddhists may think more holistically than other Western 
Europeans in the first place. However, while I may not have a baseline o f individuals- 
about-to-become-Buddhists to compare to more advanced Western Buddhist 
practitioners, asking individuals about their age and the amount o f time (i.e. number o f 
years) they have been practicing or identified with the religion may be the best 
approximation of a longitudinal study. Moreover, priming can make up for self­
selection issues to some degree by allowing me to investigate cognition in religious 
versus non-religious contexts. We would expect a religious prime to have a smaller 
effect on individuals who already were relatively holistic thinkers prior to becoming 
Buddhists (with the opposite possibly true for converted Christians).
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Research participants were members of religious and secular organisations in 
England. More specifically, they were affiliated with 10 different Buddhist centres and 
16 Anglican churches as well as the nation’s largest Secular-Humanist organisations, 
the National Secular Society and the British Humanist Association. Gatekeepers at the
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organisations were contacted by mail and email. They were asked whether they would 
forward a recruiting text to their members/congregation via email or post it in 
newsletters and on Web sites. Due to this convenience sampling technique, it is not 
possible to ascertain response rates. To compensate participants, both a prize draw entry 
and a small donation (£2.50) to their organisation on behalf o f each completed survey 
were offered.
4.2.2 Design
The majority o f past research on H-A cognition has been administered in classrooms 
or psychology labs. An Internet-based experiment in the form o f a standardised 
questionnaire seemed to be the most feasible way to collect data from the specialised 
and large sample required by this study. Online research has a ten-year history in 
psychology. Over the course o f the last few years, psychologists have come to 
acknowledge its status as a viable way of collecting data (Bimbaum 2000, 2004;
Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Kraut, Olson, Banaji, Bruckman, Cohen, & 
Couper, 2004; Reips, 2002a). With the increasingly more widespread use o f the Internet 
in industrialised nations, early assumptions about Internet users as a population with 
specific personality characteristics (e.g. social maladjustment) or particular 
demographics have lost some o f their applicability (Gosling et al., 2004). Nevertheless, 
researchers seem to agree that the disadvantages o f online research are evident in a 
potential lack o f experimental control, including the setting in which surveys or 
experiments are completed and multiple submissions, self-selection as well as potential 
dropout rates. Most o f these disadvantages, however, represent the flip side of a coin.
For example, while the anonymity o f the Internet may be responsible for some o f these 
potential problems, it also has the advantage o f possibly reducing experimenter effects.
Experimental control may be o f greatest concern to studies with perceptual measures 
if visual or auditory stimuli have to be accurately perceived. Studies where responses to
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relative differences across stimuli are elicited are probably less affected. Indeed, Pagani 
and Lombardi (2000) found no significant effect o f hardware (e.g. monitor size, screen 
resolution, computer used) and software (e.g. browser used) differences in cross-cultural 
research studying facial features communicating surprise. In general, experimental 
control is also less o f an issue in between-subjects designs with random distribution of 
participants to experimental conditions, as potential errors become randomised rather 
than systematic (Reips, 2000, 2002a). In my own design, hardware differences are 
nonetheless controlled for by an automatic detection o f participants screen resolution, 
while setting is taken into account by asking participants about the location in which 
they completed the survey (home, work, school/university or other). In any event, 
although Internet research lacks experimental control, it is more likely to have 
ecological advantages than shortcomings. Assuming for the sake of argument that 
specific physical or social contexts do have an impact on more general reasoning 
processes, settings in which Internet studies are completed are more likely to be 
representative o f environments in which people think and interact than psychology labs.
Multiple submissions can be minimised by explicitly asking participants to complete 
the survey/experiment only once, deleting multiple submissions from the same IP 
address, as well as checking internal consistency of data. Generally speaking, the issue 
o f self-selection, furthermore, may be a greater problem for sociologists or political 
scientists trying to infer the attitudes, beliefs or behaviours o f the general population 
from an Internet sample than for a comparative design in psychology with specialised 
populations (Bimbaum, 2004; Kraut et al., 2004). However, this only holds if we 
assume that self-selection works similarly across comparison groups. It is still possible, 
o f course, that self-selected participants in one religion tend to be more analytic or 
holistic compared to other groups. This risk, which is unavoidable in a sample o f
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voluntary participants, can be minimised but not completely eliminated by standardising 
recruiting procedures and incentives.
Incentives for the completion o f the survey or experiment, such as immediate 
feedback or financial rewards, more importantly serve to reduce potential dropout rates 
(Reips, 2000). Other technical procedures to reduce dropout can also be adopted. In my 
study, these consist o f the ‘high hurdle’ technique, as suggested by Reips (2000), 
including
a) a deliberate increase in the loading time of the introductory page (to test the patience of potential 
respondents),
b) giving an estimate of how long participation will take (in the experiment’s introduction),
c) asking personal (demographic) questions before the experimental measures,
d) keeping participants informed of their progress (on the top of each page, e.g. ‘Section 2 of 5’), as 
well as
e) asking for participants’ email address to enter the prize draw at the end rather than the beginning 
of the experiment.
Gosling et al. (2004) have empirically examined some o f the potential pitfalls o f 
Internet-based research by comparing a Web-sample (N=361,703) to traditional ones. 
Their conclusion is that most negative preconceptions o f Internet research do not turn 
out to be a problem. For example, they indicate that Internet findings generalise across 
presentation formats and are not adversely affected by repeat responders. Gosling and 
colleagues successfully replicated the Big Five Inventory among Internet samples.
Krantz and Dalai (2000) find a surprising match between laboratory and Web versions 
o f surveys, scales, and experimental variables.
The advantages o f Internet-based research are evident in the ability to either recruit 
large heterogeneous samples or target specialised populations. Unfortunately, the main 
weakness o f student samples in some social science research, namely the lack o f 
generalisability due to limited variation in education and age, etc., may also be its main 
strength in comparative experimental research. In a pilot that I conducted on an 
American sample (n=50), age, gender and education produced no significant differences
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for Peng & Nisbett’s (1999) differentiation vs compromise scores. However, Ji et al.'s 
(2004) grouping task yielded a statistically significant interaction effect o f age and 
education (F=5.409; p<.05) Hence, it became clear that it would be necessary to get 
samples that are large enough to control for gender, education and age, which is greatly 
aided by Internet-based research.
In order to restrict the participant pool, recruitment through organisations is one of 
the more viable means available to researchers conducting online studies (Bimbaum, 
2004). In addition to enabling the recruitment o f a large, specialised sample, an Internet- 
based survey/experiment has several technological advantages over other survey
n
methods and allows one to meet basic demands o f experimental designs. First,
JavaScript allows researchers to randomly assign participants to conditions. Moreover, 
it is possible to ensure the completion o f questions or tasks in the intended order (e.g. 
Reips, 2002b), which is crucial for priming methodology. Finally, the content of 
questions can be guided depending on information provided in previous questions. In 
my experiment, participants are presented with religiosity measures appropriately 
worded to match their religion (e.g. asking Buddhists about their frequency of 
meditation rather than prayer) on the basis o f their answer to a preceding religious 
identification question.
Several additional features were designed to protect the integrity o f my data. These 
included:
a) Code that prevents search engines (“robots”) from finding and indexing the experimental pages, 
which protects the online survey from becoming accessible to the “general public” by means of 
Web searches, etc.
b) Sub-directory (folder) and file names that are non-predictable (e.g. /120cf/, expl4c.html, etc.) 
and the blocking of directory listings when access to a directory (e.g. 120cf7) is attempted
7 The domain psychologysurvey.com was registered exclusively for my own research purposes. 
Administering my own domain allowed me to have access to the server’s log file, which recorded all site 
visits and stored the data submitted by participants. The basic design of my experiments was done with 
the help of WEXTOR, an online experiment generation engine developed by psychologists at the 
University of Zurich. The HTML and JavaScript code produced by the online generator was modified to 
suit my own needs.
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c) ID numbers assigned to participants (in order to ensure that each response recorded in the log file 
is assigned to the right respondent)
d) Automatic recording of response times
e) Detection of screen resolutions
4.2.3 Procedure
The study was introduced to participants as research recruiting individuals from 
various groups and organisations in the UK in order to investigate the way people 
organise information, make judgments about others as well as think about scientific 
research findings. As compensation, participants were given the option o f entering their 
email address in a prize draw for book/music vouchers from an online retailer in 
addition to having a small donation (£2.50) for each participant made to the organisation 
from which they were recruited. In the religious prime condition, subjects provided their 
religious identification as the last item in the demographics form administered at the 
beginning o f the experiment. Depending on their answer, e.g. ‘Buddhist: Mahayana’, 
they were then directed to a page consisting of the religious prime (religiosity) questions 
tailored to their religion.
Items in the questionnaire were presented in a between-subjects counter-balanced 
order. Consequently, participants in Study 1 were randomly assigned to one o f four 
conditions:
la) Religious prime -> Question order 1
lb) Religious prime -> Question order 2
2a) No prime -> Question order 1
2b) No prime -> Question order 2
In order to control for possible context effects, the more conceptual tasks, grouping and 
categorisation, were completed in counter-balanced order. In addition, these relatively 
abstract categorisation and grouping questions were presented before the remaining 
questions in order to minimise respondents awareness of having been primed (which is
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likely to be greater if religious questions were followed by reflective, i.e. belief-based, 
measures).
Categorisation/grouping tasks were followed by the differentiation versus 
compromise and surprise about expectation violations in behaviour measures. The H-A 
measure on the last page consisted o f questions about actual beliefs or theories (folk 
theories o f personality, holism scale). They represented the last section o f the survey 
because o f their potential to make salient or activate different beliefs or folk theories 
and hence could have contaminated the intended function o f priming. For these reasons, 
explicit (i.e. attitudes or beliefs) measures usually are the last ones presented to subjects 
in priming research (see e.g. Lido, Calitri, Samson, & Brown, in preparation).
At the end o f the questionnaire, participants were queried about the location at which 
they completed the experiment, were given the opportunity to enter their email address 
for the prize draw and then were directed to a debriefing page.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Descriptives
Samples from the National Secular Society and British Humanist Association were 
combined to represent a Secular-Humanist baseline in this study. This could safely be 
done, as they are not only both devoted to forms o f secularism, but also have
Q
overlapping membership and, in my sample, did not significantly differ on the 
dependent measures. In total, 120 Buddhists and 121 Anglicans (in prime and no-prime 
conditions) and 62 Secular-Humanists (no-prime condition only) met the criteria o f 
being British-born and resident as well as being o f European (white) cultural heritage.
The Buddhist sample was composed o f roughly half non-sectarian Buddhists (n=66), 
while the rest identified with Mahayana Buddhism (n=37) and Theravada or Vajrayana
8 Marylin Mason (BHA administrator), personal correspondence, December 3, 2004.
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(n=17). Among Anglicans, half o f all respondents considered themselves Broad Church 
Anglicans, while the rest was split between High Church (more strongly influenced by 
Catholicism) and Low Church (more Protestant-Evangelical) identifiers.
The mean age was about the same for Secular Humanists and Buddhists (41.9 and 
42.2, respectively), but was somewhat higher for Anglicans (44.7), probably reflective 
o f England’s ageing churchgoing population. Among Buddhists, the mean age at which 
individuals began to practice their religion was 31 and they were Buddhists for an 
average o f 11 years. The modal response for educational attainment was a First 
(Bachelor’s) degree, which was similar across samples. The proportion o f individuals 
with postgraduate degrees, however, was greater among Secular Humanists and 
Buddhists (about 28% each) than Anglicans (about 19%). Finally, males were more 
dominant in the sample, accounting for about 53% o f Anglicans, 58% of Buddhists and 
66% of Secular Humanists.
4.3.2 Secular and Religious Group Differences in Holistic versus Analytic 
Cognition
Buddhists and Christians in the no-prime condition (n=60 and n=61, respectively) 
were analysed alongside the Secular-Humanists sample (n=62). In order to identify 
meaningful dimensions of H-A cognition that could be analysed together, exploratory 
factor analysis with Varimax rotation9 (Table 4.1) was conducted on seven dependent 
measures, resulting in three latent variables (to be discussed in more detail later). Since 
the probability o f incurring Type I errors increases if separate analyses o f variance are 
conducted for each dependent variable, multivariate analyses o f covariance 
(MANCOVA) were performed by grouping H-A variables into three clusters. A 
multivariate analysis of variance approach also takes possible correlations between
9 Oblique rotation methods, commonly used if there are theoretical grounds to expect latent factors to be 
correlated, produced the same results as Varimax, which is an orthogonal rotation method.
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variables into account. Unlike past research on H-A cognition that was conducted on 
student samples, variations in age, educational levels and gender had to be accounted 
for as control variables.
Table 4.1: Rotated Com ponent Matrix (Factor Loadings) for H-A M easures
Variables Dim ensions of Holistic v s  Analytic Thought
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Categorisation
.074 .630 -.291
Grouping .793 -.267 .067
Holism Score .774 .288 -.046
Situationism-Dispositionism -.012 .541 .489
Interaction ism -.044 .727 .105
Surprise about Behavioural .042 -.149 .550
Expectation Violations
Differentiation v s -.025 .125 .758
Comprom ise
N ote : Extraction Method: Principal Com ponent Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax.
Relational-Contextual vs Category-Based Grouping
The grouping task measured preferences in the organisation o f information in ten 
pairs o f concepts that could be grouped on the basis o f either category membership or 
relationships/contexts. Ji et al. (2004) calculated a net grouping score by subtracting the 
number o f categorical groupings from the number o f relational-contextual ones, 
resulting in positive scores as an indication of mostly holistic and negative scores as 
mostly category-based groupings.
In this study the order in which the grouping and categorisation tasks were 
completed were counter-balanced, hence the version o f the instrument (categorisation 
first versus grouping first) was included as a factor. The resulting 3 [religious group] by 
2 [version] MANCOVA controlling for age, educational level and gender shows a main 
effect o f religious group, F{2, 140) = 7.01, p  = .001. As expected, higher educational 
attainment also leads to somewhat more analytic (category-based) groupings, F ( l, 140) 
= 4.24, p  = .041. However, both Buddhists and Anglicans were more holistic
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(relational-contextual) in their responses than Secular Humanists (means o f-1.3, -.6 and 
-3.3, respectively) in this task (Fig. 4.2).
Fig. 4.2: Religious Differences in Grouping
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Holism Score
The holism score (adapted from Choi et al., 2003) more directly measured holistic 
beliefs and was based on individuals’ mean agreement with eight statements. The initial 
factor analysis indicated that this score is part o f an underlying dimension along with 
the grouping measure. Similar to relational-contextual versus category-based grouping, 
the holism score taps into the way people think about the world, but does so by 
measuring more abstract beliefs. Confirmatory factor analysis of holism score items also 
revealed the same two underlying factors found in Choi et al., one providing a better 
measure of part-whole relationships (e.g. ‘It’s not possible to understand the pieces 
without considering the whole picture’ or ‘The whole is always greater than the sum of 
its parts’) and the other causality (e.g. ‘Every event has numerous causes, although 
some of the causes are not known’ or ‘Nothing in the universe is unrelated’). The 
holism score is positively correlated with holistic grouping, driven primarily by the
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factor measuring beliefs about part-whole relationships. On the whole, then, the holism 
scale is akin to the more applied relational-contextual thinking quantified by the 
grouping task.
The holism score yields dramatic differences between all three groups, F(2, 140) = 
22.11 ,p  = .000 [model], p = .000 [Sec. vs Buddh. contrast], p = .000 [Anglic, vs Buddh. 
contrast], with Secular-Humanists scoring the lowest, Anglicans intermediately and 
Buddhists the highest (means of 4.53, 5.0 and 5.63, respectively). No other main or 
interaction effects were present. It appears as though religion has an “additive” effect on 
holistic beliefs (Fig. 4.3).
Fig. 4.3: Religious Differences on Holism Score
Secular-Humanist Anglican Buddhist
Group
Family Resemblance vs Rule-Based Categorisation
A second cluster of H-A cognition included the categorisation measure adapted from 
Norenzayan et al. (2002b), which was the only task that used visual stimuli in this 
experiment. It consisted of eight category judgments and could be either based on the 
overall family-resemblance of target objects with one of the target groups or a defining 
feature (rule), which the target object shared with objects in one o f the target groups. In
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order to make the data as comparable as possible to those obtained under laboratory- 
conditions, response times (in milliseconds) and screen resolutions were recorded for 
each participant. Screen resolutions were coded as either low (800 x 600 and below) or 
high (1024 x 768 and above). There was no correlation between response time and 
categorisation, r(177)=.12, ns. However, screen resolution seemed to have a small effect 
on categorisation, with larger resolutions (which make objects appear smaller) leading 
to somewhat more family-resemblance based responses [/(176) = -2.04, p  = .043; 
r(177)=-.20, p  = .008]. In the 3x2x2 MANCOVA of religion [Secular Humanist vs 
Anglican vs Buddhist] by version [categorisation first versus grouping first] by screen 
resolution [low vs high], controlling for gender, education and age shows main a effect 
of religion, F(2, 147) = 3.63, p  = .029 [model],/? = .014 [Sec. vs Buddh. contrast],/?
= .039 [Anglic, vs Buddh. contrast]. Secular-Humanists categorised objects most 
analytically (mean = 4.6) and Buddhists most holistically (mean = 5.5), with Anglicans 
intermediate (mean = 4.8; see Fig. 4.4). In addition, there was a main effect of age, F (l, 
147) = 6.27,/? =.013, with higher age leading to more holistic responses.
Fig. 4.4: Religious Differences in Categorisation
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Theories o f  Social Behaviour
The exploratory factor analysis presented earlier suggests that family-resemblance 
versus rule-based categorisation and situational vs dispositionist theories of behaviour 
have something in common. One possible explanation o f  this commonality would point 
to rule based categorisation and dispositionist attributions as sharing deterministic 
thinking on the basis of features that are constant across contexts. In the case o f 
categorisation, rules are deterministic by virtue o f being a necessary and sufficient 
feature that determines category membership. In dispositionist social inference, 
causality is reduced to features that remain stable across contexts.
In this study, participants’ agreements with statements describing dispositionist, 
situationist and interactionist folk theories o f behaviour (adapted from Norenzayan et 
al., 2002a) were measured. In order to make these variables comparable to other 
variables which were reflective o f a H-A continuum, a net score for situationist versus 
dispositionist explanations o f behaviour was computed by simply subtracting the 
dispositionist rating from the situationist one (as done by Ji et al. to obtain a single 
grouping score). Among Buddhists situationism outweighed dispositionist thinking 
(mean = 1.30; sit. = 5.19; disp. = 3.89) more than among both Anglicans (mean = -0.34; 
sit. = 4.83; disp. = 5.17) and Secular Humanists (mean = -0.03; sit. = 4.73; disp. = 4.70), 
F(2, 147) = 6.34, p  =.002 [model],/? = .001 [Sec. vs Buddh. contrast],/? = .007 [Anglic, 
vs Buddh. contrast] (Fig. 4.5). Interestingly, there was also a main effect o f age, where 
higher age was associated with more dispositionist thinking, F(2, 147) = 4.19,/? =.042. 
Differences were non-significant for ratings o f the interactionist theory, F(2, 147)= 1.88, 
ns, with only a marginal contrast effect between Buddhist (mean = 7.49) and Secular- 
Humanist (mean = 7.08) Groups, p  = .055, (Fig. 4.6). This may be due to the fact that 
respondents were asked to rate theories of behaviour after having already read examples 
illustrating the complexity o f behaviour (the ‘surprise about expectation violations in
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behaviour’ measure, i.e. individuals behaving contrary to their personality by helping or 
not helping a person in need; see Section 4.3.2.6).
Fig. 4.5: Religious Differences in Situationist-Dispositionist Theories
S ecu lar-H um an is t Anglican B uddhist
G ro u p
. 4.6: Religious Differences in Interactionist Theory
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An additional item, not included in the original holism scale, measured agreement 
with the statement that, in order to understand an object’s behaviour, it is more 
important to focus on the properties of the object than the conditions under which the 
behaviour occurs. Group differences in the mean rating o f this belief about causality 
were directly reflected in endorsements o f an actor-centred theory of social behaviour. 
Overall, attributing causality to an object correlated positively with dispositionism (r 
= .18, p < .05) and negatively with interactionism (r = -.16, p < .05).
Tolerance o f  Contradictions: Differentiation vs Compromise
The results o f the previously outlined exploratory factor analysis indicated that one 
o f the latent variables evident among the H-A tasks might indeed measure a certain 
‘tolerance for contradictions’. In the ‘differentiation vs compromise’ task, the mean 
absolute value o f differences between two seemingly contradictory statements’ 
plausibility ratings (for five statement pairs) is computed. Differentiation is indicated by 
higher values (i.e. relative divergence), whereas compromise is reflected by lower 
values (relative convergence).
The MANCOVA on ‘tolerance for contradictions’ variables yields no significant 
difference between groups for the ‘differentiation versus compromise’ measure (means 
o f 2.21 for Secular Humanists, 2.56 for Anglicans and 2.43 for Buddhists), F(2, 151) =
1.26, ns, and none o f the demographic variables affect differentiation significantly.
Since Mahayana Buddhism has been cited as promoting greater tolerance of 
contradictions, however, it is useful to compare this group to Anglicans and the secular 
sample. Despite the small subsample of Mahayana Buddhists, the data suggest those 
Buddhists to be less differentiating (mean = 1.93) than Anglicans (mean = 2.56), F(2,
118)=2.48,p = .088 [model], p  = .043 [Anglic, vs Buddh. Contrast] but not compared to 
Secular-Humanists (mean = 2.21) (Fig. 4.7).
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Fig. 4.7: Religious Differences in Differentiation vs Compromise
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This finding illustrates Chan’s (2004) argument that tolerance of contradictions is 
related to endorsing fuzzy rather than bivalent logic. In addition to differences between 
statement ratings being closer to zero, then, we would also expect to see that Mahayana 
Buddhists are more likely to choose the neutral point of the believability scale (neither 
agree nor disagree). This is indeed the case and directly mirrors differentiation scores. 
Among the total of 10 ratings obtained, 27.2% of Mahayana Buddhists’ answers are 
neutral, whereas only 17.7% of Anglicans’ ratings and 22.2% of Secular-Humanists are 
on that point.
Ratings o f  Surprise about Expectation Violating Behaviour
The second measure related to tolerance of contradictions was based on ratings of 
surprise about actors who seem to behave contrary to their dispositions. Mean surprise 
about expectation violating behaviour was computed by taking the mean of surprise 
ratings from two scenarios (presented in counterbalanced order): a potentially helpful 
religious person not helping a person in need and a potentially non-helpful religious
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person actually helping. The ratings were based on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 
(not surprised at all) to 10 (very surprised). The Bad Samaritan scenario pitted central 
religious values, such as helping or altruism, against stronger recognition o f the power 
o f the situation (being late, expectation of sanctions, etc.). There was no significant 
difference across religious groups in mean surprise ratings (means o f 5.17 for Secular 
Humanists, 5.70 for Anglicans and 5.15 for Buddhists), F(2, 151)=.92, ns.
A separate MANCOVA for the ‘helpful not helping’ and ‘non-helpful helping’ 
vignettes uncovers a strong order effect as a result o f counterbalancing the two 
scenarios, F (l, 155) = 13.074, p  = .000, for helpful not helping, F (l, 155) = 19.986./?
= .000, for non-helpful helping, with a tendency for higher surprise ratings for the 
second vignette presented (means o f 4.98 and 5.67, for ‘helpful not helping’ followed 
by ‘non-helpful helping’; 3.81 and 6.79 for the counter-balanced version). However, 
this was largely due to Buddhists’ being consistently and significantly more surprised 
about the story that was presented to them second, regardless o f whether it was about 
helping or non-helping, F (l, 50) = 10.621,/? = .002, for helpful not helping (means of 
4.18, followed by 6.04), F (l, 50) = 12.027,/? = .001, for non-helpful helping (means of 
3.24, followed by 7.14).10 The most convincing explanation o f this phenomenon would 
point to an inadvertent priming effect in the no-prime condition. In other words, the 
religious content o f the first vignette may have led to a priming effect in Buddhists’ 
judgment o f the second story’s outcome (see section 4.3.3 on the results o f religious 
priming).
In order to account for this effect among Buddhists and the strong overall order 
effect, mean surprise ratings were computed only for the behaviours presented first, 
with the type of behaviour (either non-helpful helping or helpful not helping) as a
10 In addition, a paired-samples t-test for the difference between the first and second surprise rating 
indicated that only Buddhists are significantly more surprised about the outcome presented to them 
second, t = -3.647, p < .001. This was not the case among Anglicans (t -  -1.608, ns) and Secular- 
Humanists (t = -1.869, ns).
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between subjects factor and age, education and gender as control variables. This yielded 
a significant contrast between Anglicans (mean = 5.1) and Buddhists (mean = 3.7), F(2, 
151) = 2.27,p  = .11 [model],/? = .035 [Anglic, vs Buddh. contrast], but not for the 
overall model or an Anglican-Secular contrast,/? = .330 (Fig. 4.8). A separate analysis 
of only Anglican and Buddhist groups reveals strong differences between the religious 
groups F( 1, 99)=6.81, p  = .01.
Due to the religious context of the vignettes an objection could be made: perhaps 
participants’ levels o f religiosity across the two groups may have accounted for the 
observed differences. Taking into account the variation in surprise levels that can be 
explained by religiosity does not significantly detract from religious group differences 
between Buddhists and Anglicans, F (l, 95)=5.30,/? = .024. By the same token, religious 
group differences are further accentuated by the fact that about 90% of Buddhists listed 
compassion and related values as being central to their religion, whereas only 74% of 
Anglicans mentioned pro-social values, such as love or caring (Fig. 4 .9 ).11 Mean scores 
in surprise ratings among non-Mahayana Buddhists (3.85) and the Mahayana subsample 
(3.50), thought to be more tolerant o f contradictions, suggests that the Mahayana group 
may have helped disproportionately in creating this contrast, although the subsamples 
are too small to confirm this statistically.
11 Since group differences are computed for the no-prime condition only, it would be problematic here to 
juxtapose surprise ratings to the values listed in the same condition, hence values given by participants in 
the religious prime condition were used.
Fig. 4.8: Surprise about Expectation Violating Behaviour: Helping vs Non 
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Choi and Nisbett point out that more complex (or less dispositionist) theories of 
behaviour should have a negative influence on surprise ratings. In order to put this
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theory to the test, I correlated surprise ratings with differentiation (tolerance o f 
contradictions) and theories of behaviour variables. Due to the strong order effect 
observed among Buddhists, this group was excluded from the analysis. Results were 
inconsistent. In the version of the experiment that presented the helpful not helping 
vignette first, differentiation was not related to surprise. In addition, individuals who 
were more situationist thinkers tended to be more surprised overall in this condition, 
which is contrary to what we would expect. Results for the version in which the non- 
helpful-helping vignette was presented first, on the other hand, provided some support 
for the theoretical assumptions made by Choi and Nisbett (Table 4.2). There was a 
negative relationship between the situationism-dispositionism net score and surprise 
ratings on the ‘non-helpful helping’ vignette, while greater differentiation was 
positively associated with surprise about the ‘helpful not helping’ story.
Table 4.2: Pearson Correlation C oefficients for Correlations Betw een Surprise about 
Expectation Violating Behaviour Ratings and Selected Independent Variables
Version 1 
(helpful not helping first)
Version 2 
(non-helpful helping first)
Helpful
not
helping
(first)
Non-
helpful
helping
(second)
Mean
Helpful
not
helping
(second)
Non-
helpful
helping
(first)
Mean
Theories of Behaviour
Situationism-Dispositionism .139 .173 .254** .045 -.292** -.158
(87) (87) (89) (87) (87) (88)
Interactionism .022 .003 .024 .119 -.064 .048
(88) (88) (90) (87) (87) (88)
Tolerance of Contradictions
Differentiation v s  Compromise .071 -.023 .071 .234* -.001 .164
(86) (86) (86) (89) (89) (89)
N ote : * p < .05 ** p < .01
Numbers in parentheses are number of c a se s
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4.3.3 Religious Contexts and Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Effects of 
Religious Priming
A central hypothesis tested in this study was that practicing an Eastern religion may 
represent a separate schema or knowledge system for Western individuals and may be 
subject to priming. I expected Buddhists primed with religion to think more holistically 
than individuals in a no-prime condition. Using 2x2 MANCOVAs with the same 
variable combinations as in the previous analyses, this hypothesis could not be 
supported.
Instead, a main effect of priming across the two religious samples emerged for the 
grouping variable, with religious priming leading to overall more analytic (category- 
based) responses, F (l, 188) = 4.97,/? = .027. Considering that both religious groups 
were significantly more relational-contextual than Secular Humanists in the no-prime 
condition, this finding suggest either a contrast effect or an unforeseen context effect 
induced by the religious prime.
Fig. 4.10: Effect of Religious Prime on Grouping
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However, Buddhists were susceptible to priming on the surprise about expectation 
violating behaviour variable adapted from Choi and Nisbett (Fig. 4.11). This was 
evident in a significant interaction effect between religion and priming condition on 
surprise ratings, F( 1, 199)=6.86,p  = .010. In other words, when a religious context was 
invoked, Buddhists, but not Christians, tended to be more surprised about a religious 
actor behaving seemingly contrary to his dispositions.
Fig. 4.11: Effect of Religious Prime on Surprise about Expectation 
Violating Behaviour
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4.3.4 Religious Contexts and Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Religiosity and 
Social Integration
I argued that a better understanding of the effect of religion as culture or subculture 
must take into account both its structure and content. Hence, in addition to the
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differences in H-A thought across religious groups, there may be within-group variation 
determined by individuals’ religious integration and religiosity. In this section, I will 
examine the effect o f these variables on H-A thought in two ways: first, by considering 
social integration and religiosity as moderating variables that may influence the effect of 
religious priming, and second, by analysing the influence o f these variables on H-A 
cognition in general in a hierarchical regression model.
Index Construction
The religiosity index was constructed from the four variables that, in a pilot test, 
emerged as equally meaningful indicators of religiousness across religious groups and 
included self-reported religiosity, frequency o f reading religious texts, frequency of 
meditation or prayer, as well as the rated importance o f religion on everyday decision 
making. Religiosity scores were remarkably similar across religious groups, with a 
mean o f 20.9 among Anglicans (sd = 3.65) and 19.8 among Buddhists (sd = 3.95). 
Controlling for age, gender and education, Anglicans turn out marginally more religious 
than Buddhists, F (l, 207)=3.69,/? = .056.
Social integration was evident in several measures: frequency of church or temple 
visits, contact to people o f the same religion in religious groups or organisations other 
than one’s church or temple, the proportion o f close friends who have the same religion 
as well as the frequency o f contact to those friends, parents’ religion and spouse’s 
religion. An exploratory factor analysis (principal components) produced two 
dimensions o f religious integration among Buddhists. Factor 2 included parents’ and 
spouse’s religion (Family), while Factor 2 was composed o f the other variables. Among 
Anglicans, however, an additional dimension made up religious integration, with a 
separation of more organised social contact (church visits and contact to religious 
organisations) making up its own latent variable. As a result, religious integration scores 
were calculated separately for each group.
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Table 4.3: R eligious Social Integration Factor Loadings: B uddhists
Variable Dim ensions of Religious Social Integration 
“Organised Rel. & Friends” “Family”
Buddh. Friends Ratio .672 _
Friends Frequency .700 ~
T em ple Frequency .631 -
Rel. Org. Frequency .775 -
Parent’s  Religion - - .610
S p o u se’s  Religion — .743
N o te : Extraction Method: Principal Com ponent Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax.
Table 4.4: R eligious Social Integration Factor Loadings: A nglicans
Variable Dim ensions of Religious Social Integration
“Organised Rel.” “Friends” “Family”
Anglic. Friends Ratio _ .806 _
Friends Frequency ~ .850 -
Church Frequency .795 - - -
Rel. Org. Frequency .725 - - -
Parent’s  Religion — - .554
S p o u se ’s  Religion — — .819
N ote : Extraction Method: Principal Com ponent Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax.
Interaction Between Religious Priming and Religiosity/Integration
In order to assess the influence o f religiosity and religious integration on religious 
priming, a one-factor religious integration regression score was calculated. Moderation 
analyses were done as first suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). In their influential 
article, the authors noted that whenever we seek to establish specification effects 
between variables X and Y on the basis o f a third variable Z, it is important to 
distinguish between moderation and mediation effects. In such analyses, moderating 
variables are characteristics o f participants brought into the experiment that are causally 
prior and may affect the outcome o f experimental manipulations. Moderation was 
computed as suggested by Brown, Croizet, Bohner, Foumet, and Payne (2003). Using
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this procedure, no moderating effect o f religiosity or religious integration on religious 
priming was found.
Religiosity and Religious Integration and their Effect on H-A Cognition
For the purposes of examining the effect o f religious social integration and 
religiosity on H-A thinking, hierarchical linear regression models were constructed for 
each religious group, with demographic variables as a first block, followed by priming 
condition, religiosity and religious integration, religious self, years o f religious practice 
and age o f conversion. As expected, religiosity and integration had no effect on H-A 
thought among Anglicans. In the Buddhist sample, both religiosity and religious 
integration were predictive o f different dimensions o f H-A beliefs in which this group 
scored distinctively more holistic than Anglicans and Secular-Humanists.
The religiosity index significantly contributed to predicting the holism score, made 
up o f holistic belief ratings (Holism Score: Model 1; Table 4.5). Moreover, the 
‘religious self variable, which was not included in the religiosity index, proved to be an 
equally useful predictor of holism (Holism Score: Model 2). Religious integration, on 
the other hand, influenced beliefs related to social cognition. More social integration in 
the Buddhist group led to lower endorsement of a net situationist-dispositionist folk 
theory o f behaviour (Situationism-Dispositionism: Model 1). No such effect was found 
among Anglicans, which suggests that it is not simply due to a net effect o f social 
integration.
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Table 4.5: Standardised C oefficients for Hierarchical R egression  o f Holism Score and 
Situationism -D ispositionism  on Selected  Independent Variables (Buddhists)
Holism Score: 
Model 1
Holism Score: 
Model 2
Situationism- 
Dispositionism: 
Model 1
Situationism- 
Dispositionism: 
Model 2
Independent Variable Beta t Beta t Beta t Beta t
Block 1 
Age 
Gender 
Education
-.051
.064
-.019
-.426
.540
-.163
7.830
.029
.027
.998
.246
.232
-.077
.030
.056
-.662
.258
.481
-1.683
.034
.064
-.208
.283
.525
Block 2
Priming Condition .052 .452 .041 .365 -.058 -.516 -.054 -.467
Block 3
R eligiosity Index 
Relig. Integration 
Score
.304*
-.004
2.143
-.031
.223
.084
.669
.111
.254
-.413**
1.840
-2.987
.310
-.236
.908
-.305
Block 4
Religiosity*lntegration -.194 -.208 -.228 -.238
Block 5
R eligious ‘Self’ .338* 2.478 .037 .267
Block 6
Years of Practice 
Age of “C onversion”
-5.011
-7 .217
-.981
-1.017
1.125
1.406
.211
.192
R2 .087 .202 .112 .123
N ote : * p < .05  ** p < .01
4.3.5 Religious Contexts and Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: The Effect of 
Meditative Learning
My hypothesis on meditation and holism derived from various theorists and 
researchers, namely Omstein (1972), Newberg and d ’Aquili (1998, 2000), Murphy and 
Donovan (1997) and Whitehouse (2000, 2004, 2005), holds that the categorisation o f 
perceptual stimuli should become more holistic with higher levels of meditative 
learning. In other words, individuals who learn practices that foster episodic (rather than 
semantic) cognition should change their perception and organisation o f the world in 
favour o f a more intuitive way—one that “resists ‘decontextualizing’ or separating form 
from content,” and “relies on sense experience and concrete instances” (Norenzayan et
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al., 2002b, p. 678). As a result, meditation should lead to a disinclination to use rules in 
favour o f the more contextualised family-resemblance based strategy in assigning 
stimuli to groups. A second hypothesis derived from Whitehouse’s ‘modes of religion’ 
holds that meditation also helps Buddhists to absorb more cognitively costly aspects o f 
religiosity, leading to a similar effect of meditation on complex system of thinking 
evident in reflective holistic beliefs.
Support for both o f these hypotheses would be provided by a significant effect of 
meditative learning, computed as an interaction between the frequency of meditation 
and years o f Buddhist practice, controlling for age and other relevant variables. Table 
4.6 shows the results for a regression o f categorisation and holism score. Results are 
consistent with the hypotheses, with greater meditative learning leading to more holistic 
responses. For the holism score, this effect remains even when the strong influence of 
degrees o f Buddhist identification (‘Religious self reported in the previous section 
4.3.4) was entered as a control variable (Holism Score: Model 2). There was no effect of 
meditation on other H-A variables.
Table 4.6: Standardised C oefficients for R egression  of Rule v s  Fam ily-Resem blance  
Categorisation and Holism Score on Meditative Learning (Buddhists)
Rule v s  Family- 
R esem blance Based  
Categorisation
Holism Score  
Model 1
Holism Score  
Model 2
Independent Variable Beta t Beta t Beta t
A ge -.049 -.395 -.177 -1.456 -.207 -1.775
Gender .040 .376 .069 .642 .031 .295
Education .058 .549 -.030 -.291 .051 .502
Priming Condition .011 .111 .074 .726 .037 .373
Version (variable order) .140 1.327 .009 .083 .003 .026
Screen  resolution .103 1.007 — — — —
M editative learning
(frequ. of medit. * yrs of practice) .253* 2.022 .266* 2.171 .246* 2.047
‘R e lig io u s  s e l f . . . - - - .300** 2.977
R2 .09 .06 .15
N ote : * p < .05  ** p < .01
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4.4 Summary and Discussion
Before summarising and discussing this study’s outcomes, I would like to note 
potential limitations of this research, particularly those arising out o f Internet-based 
methodology. Although the demographics of Intemet-users have undoubtedly become 
more representative of the general population in recent years, conducting online 
experiments necessarily leads to some sampling constraints. This study did not directly 
target Buddhists living in monasteries. Hence the sample came to include mainly lay 
practitioners and may not be representative of some sections o f organised religion. The 
possibility that self-selection has different implications across groups also remains. For 
example, it is conceivable that this Internet-based research led to the participation of 
more analytic thinkers in one o f the groups investigated, whereas it may have attracted 
more holistic thinkers from another. Standardisation in recruiting and the incentives 
given for participation sought to minimise this possibility as much as possible. Finally, 
unlike research in a laboratory, some o f the controls of traditional experimental research 
were not present. Consequently, Internet-based research always operates under the 
assumption that differences attributable to hardware and environment, if present and not 
controlled for, are randomised across conditions rather than systematic. The non- 
perceptual nature o f most H-A tasks investigated reduced potential problems to some 
extent, but could not eliminate them entirely.
4.4.1 Observed Group Differences in Holistic versus Analytic Cognition
My analysis o f Secular-Humanist, Anglican and Buddhist group differences in H-A 
cognition generated good results in support o f this study’s main hypothesis. Six 
dependent variables indicating H-A thought were included in the experiment. Four of 
these were core H-A measures and two were tolerance o f contradictions variables.
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Buddhist scores were significantly more holistic than those o f Secular-Humanists on 
four o f the six variables under investigation. Vis-a-vis the Anglican sample, Buddhists 
differed in the expected direction on five out o f six indicators, although results were 
mixed for the differentiation versus compromise variable. The most convincing 
evidence for overall group differences emerged for categorisation, theories o f behaviour 
and above all the holism score. Buddhists were more holistic than both the religious and 
secular comparison groups for those variables. They were more likely to categorise 
objects on the basis o f family-resemblance than rules, while also scoring closer to the 
holistic end of the situationist-dispositionist theories o f behaviour continuum and 
exhibiting higher agreement with holistic beliefs. Relational-contextual versus 
categorical grouping was the only one of the main H-A variables for which no 
difference was found between the Buddhist and Anglican samples.
On the grouping task, both religions scored more holistically than their secular 
counterparts. Religious priming also had similar effects on this task among Buddhists 
and Anglicans, as it led to a more categorical than contextual grouping o f words. Given 
that Secular-Humanists were more analytic in this task than both religious groups 
together, the priming-induced shift toward more analytic grouping suggests the 
possibility o f a contrast effect. Such effects often occur as a response to blatant priming 
(Higgins, 1996). However, although the religious prime itself was not subtle, a contrast 
effect usually requires an awareness o f the manipulation by making a connection 
between the prime and the actual experimental task. It is not immediately clear whether 
participants in this experiment associated the rather abstract grouping measure with the 
priming manipulation. Another way o f producing contrast effects is evident in Benet- 
Martinez, Leu, Lee and Morris (2002), who found that primed Asian-American 
biculturals with cultural identities perceived as incompatible or oppositional tend to
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exhibit contrast effects in internal vs external attributions o f behaviour. (A similar 
explanation has been given in stereotypes priming research where a self-vs-stereotype 
discrepancy can lead to contrast effects, see Wheeler & Petty, 2001, p. 816). However, 
it is not clear how incompatible identities could explain the effect of religious priming 
on grouping. If  people were to generally deem category-based grouping as the more 
“scientific” choice, it could be speculated that the contrast effect among religious 
respondents occurred due to a perceived incompatibility between ‘science’ (what the 
experiment itself purports to be) and ‘religion’.
Another explanation would suggest that the analytic shift in grouping following the 
prime is not a contrast effect, but a natural result o f the mindset induced by a religious 
priming manipulation. This is compatible with Whitehouse’s modes theory, which 
suggests that serious engagement with religious doctrine—necessitating degrees of 
sense-making and hence logical integration—is one o f the determinants o f semantic or 
analytic cognition. The lack o f a similar analytic shift in categorisation may be due to 
the fact that the categorisation task used visual stimuli rather than concepts.
Following up on either one o f those explanations would be beyond the scope o f this 
thesis. However, future research could test these alternative hypotheses by using a 
subcultural identity prime on different religious and non-religious groups with various 
levels o f adherence to doctrine. In addition, data about individual levels o f doctrinal 
Teamedness’ (e.g. history and frequency o f reading relevant texts, participation in 
doctrinal discussion groups, etc.), along with other religiosity variables, could be 
collected. A main effect o f priming on analytic grouping only among religious groups 
would most clearly favour a contrast effect explanation. A moderation effect of 
Teamedness’ on analytic grouping among both religious and other ‘doctrinal’ groups 
would most clearly support a ‘semantic’ hypothesis.
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What may explain the overall grouping differences between religious and non­
religious samples in the no-prime condition? Thinking o f the world in terms of 
relationships is indicated by Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) theory that perceiving 
oneself as “embedded within a larger context o f which one is an interdependent part,” is 
likely to lead to a similar perception o f objects or events (p. 24). If  perceived 
interdependence (though not necessarily actual social integration) is more characteristic 
o f organised religion than organised secular-humanism, we might find differences 
between religious and non-religious groups. Holistic belief ratings obtained in this study 
support the possibility that religious groups share a certain orientation to relationships. 
The holism score included beliefs reflective of relational thinking and was correlated 
with grouping scores. Both Anglicans and Buddhists scored significantly higher than 
Secular-Humanists on this variable, although Buddhists’ scores were also significantly 
more ho fistic than those of the Christian sample.
An alternative explanation for the grouping results may single out Secular- 
Humanists rather than religious groups. It is possible that Anglicans and Buddhists are 
representative o f the general population, while Secular-Humanists have a strong 
tendency to organise information on the basis o f categories. Although Buddhists and 
Secular-Humanists had similar mean levels of education, the fact that there was a 
positive relationship between educational achievement and analytic grouping may point 
to a factor that underlies both Secular-Humanist and highly educated ways o f thinking. 
Supplementary research on a sample from the general population would be necessary to 
rule out one o f these two explanations.
Results with respect to tolerance o f contradictions were mixed. As expected, and 
consistent with differences in ratings o f folk theories o f behaviour, Anglicans were 
significantly more surprised than Buddhists about an actor who appears to behave 
contrary to his personality. This finding is especially interesting if we consider the
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marked difference attributable to ratings o f surprise about a religious and helpful 
individual not helping, despite the fact that more Buddhists than Anglicans mentioned 
compassion, love and related pro-social values as being central to their religion.
There were no differences between Buddhists, Anglicans and Secular-Humanists on 
the differentiation vs compromise variable. However, the data suggest Mahayana 
Buddhists to have a higher acceptance o f contradictions, as indicated by lower 
differentiation between the plausibility of superficially contradictory research findings. 
Compared to the Anglican religious group, this subgroup was significantly more 
compromising than differentiating in their mean ratings.
4.4.2 Religious Contexts and Holistic versus Analytic Cognition
The sample o f 120 British Buddhists did not produce the expected shift toward more 
holistic responses when their religion was made salient first. In the religious prime 
condition, Buddhist respondents became significantly more surprised about a religious 
individual acting contrary to his dispositions. This was not the case among Anglican 
Christians and may be due to an invocation o f the central Buddhist value o f compassion 
by the religious prime. However, as the order effect in the no-prime condition of this 
measure implied, a religious context may also lead to greater surprise about a non­
helpful person actually helping. Hence, perhaps primed Buddhists do become more 
dispositionist rather than sensitized to a religion-helping link. If so, I think that there are 
two possible explanations. Firstly, the modes theory of religion implies that the 
imagistic characteristic o f Buddhism, in the form of generating religious or spiritual 
meaning for oneself, may lead people to see strong links between psychological states 
and behaviour or vice versa. In doctrinal religions, by contrast, the emphasis on 
orthodoxy and repetition o f rituals could lead to a disjunction between true beliefs (or 
personality) and behaviour. Secondly, a related argument might be that having 
experienced a quest for meaning, either before or after conversion to Buddhism, may
account for perceptions o f religiosity as an unfolding o f one’s “true” self. Regardless of 
its interpretations, findings provide general support to the religion as meaning-belief 
system (Spilka et al., 1985) or schema (e.g. McIntosh, 1995) perspectives, implying that 
religion can serve as a framework for the perception and interpretation o f events.
Religiosity and religious integration were examined as possible moderators of 
priming and contributors to overall H-A results. Although no moderation effects 
occurred, Buddhists’ religiosity, captured by both the religiosity index and an item 
measuring the centrality o f one’s religious self-concept, was a significant predictor o f 
the holistic belief score. Buddhist religious integration was negatively related to 
dispositionist thinking. The latter provides partial support for the hypothesis derived 
from the cross-cultural literature (Minoura, 1992; Fiske et al., 1998; Nisbett et al., 2001; 
cf. House, 1981) implying a relationship between immersion in a cultural group and 
patterns o f inference. However, as a key dimension of social H-A cognition, this 
particular result also reinforces Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) view on the role of 
interdependence in shaping thought. Both o f these findings underscore overall group 
differences on measures o f beliefs. They also provide some support to House’s (1981) 
proximity and components principles, which call for a breakdown o f macro variables 
into indicators that are more reflective o f culture and social structures (e.g. religion) 
affecting individual outcomes (e.g. beliefs).
Buddhist meditation only had an effect on holistic categorisation and beliefs, which 
supported my hypotheses derived from Whitehouse’s cognitive theory o f imagistic 
religions. More specifically, a ‘meditation frequency’ by ‘years o f practice’ interaction 
variable significantly correlated with rule-based versus family-resemblance 
categorisation and the holism score. These findings show that there is some extent of 
learning o f holistic thought through the practice o f Buddhism, even when the strength of 
the Buddhist self-concept is controlled for.
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4.4.3 Implications
This study was unable to support the hypothesis that Western Buddhists have a 
separate holistic knowledge system subject to priming manipulation, as implied by the 
religion as meaning-belief system theory (Spilka et al., 1985) in conjunction with 
research on biculturalism (e.g. LaFromboise et al., 1993; Hong et al., 1997; Ji et al.,
2004, Peng & Knowles, 2003) and the H-A cognition as ‘toolkit’ perspective (Nisbett et 
al., 2001; Nisbett & Norenzayan, 2002). We are left to conclude that relatively more 
holistic thinking is chronically accessibility to Western Buddhists, but further priming 
research is needed to confirm this theory.
Results provide evidence for religious differences in H-A cognition as determined 
by religious group membership. As such, findings go beneath the cultural-level 
distinctions that have been made by Nisbett and his colleagues (Nisbett et al, 2001; 
Nisbett, 2003). In terms o f the ‘religion and cognition’ model used in this thesis (Fig.
4.1), an independent influence o f religious ‘cultural content’ and ‘social structure’ on H- 
A beliefs or theories was found. This is evident in the effect o f religiosity (capturing the 
strength of Buddhist values and practices) and the strength o f the Buddhist self-concept 
on holistic beliefs, as well as the impact of religious integration on theories o f behaviour. 
Meditative practices were able to predict explicit holistic beliefs, while penetrating even 
deeper into more implicit H-A processes in the form o f categorisation.
It is likely that cognitive self-selection into both Buddhism and Secular-Humanism 
accounts for some o f those differences, since membership in those groups tends to be 
the result o f some sort o f conversion. Compared to Anglicans, Secular-Humanists were 
significantly more analytic on the grouping and holism variables. The latter measure 
showed the most dramatic group differences, with Anglicans scoring intermediately 
between secular and Buddhist groups. Self-selection for Buddhists more specifically 
could not be ruled out (and a learning effect not supported), indicated by a lack of
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influence o f years of overall Buddhist practice (when age is held constant) on any o f the 
dependent variables. However, a backing o f the ‘meditative learning’ hypothesis by this 
study’s data suggests that the frequency of engaging in Buddhism’s core practice over 
time may have an effect on aspects o f holistic thought.
Secular-Humanists, whose educational attainment and age was closely matched by 
the Buddhist sample, did not differ from Buddhists on the two variables indicating 
tolerance o f contradictions. I believe that this is not entirely surprising, as TC appears to 
be a cognitive pattern related to but not necessarily indicative o f H-A thought. As noted 
by Nisbett (2003), holism encourages the “recognition o f complexity and change, as 
well as o f contradiction among its many and varied elements” (p. 36). But in order to go 
from a recognition o f contradictions to actual willingness to compromise or find a 
middle way we may also have to consider TC origins in social practices (Nisbett & 
Masuda, 2003) or beliefs about how knowledge can be obtained (Samson, 2004). As 
argued in the beginning o f this chapter, Buddhists and Secular-Humanists have been 
said to share a critical outlook o f the world that encourages reason in the form o f 
“’personal investigation o f the truth’ rather than ‘blind faith’” (Waterhouse, 1997, in 
Kay, 2004, p. 21; also Biddulph, 1996). It is plausible that a resulting complexity in 
epistemological thinking can account for the groups’ similarity in tolerance for 
contradictions. Alternative measures o f TC are needed to develop this argument further.
Religious priming had an effect on the variable with the most explicit religious 
content among Buddhists. Moreover, the strongest evidence for overall group 
differences in H-A thought were manifested among reflective inferences in the form o f 
holistic beliefs and folk theories o f behaviour, which, among Buddhists, were 
themselves also predicted by religiosity and religious integration. Findings thereby 
demonstrate a theoretical link between values or attitudes and the self-concept, on the 
one hand, and theories or beliefs on the other, as suggested by Peng et al. (2001).
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However, while this study uncovered a particularly strong relationship between religion 
and explicit beliefs for two of the three H-A factors, the ‘tolerance for contradictions’ 
dimension did not include a more general measure o f TC. I will attempt to provide 
additional evidence on group differences for this acceptance in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5 -  Follow-Up Studies
5.1 Introduction
Religious context effects in Study 1, including religious priming, 
religiosity/identification and religious integration, were mainly found for explicit H-A 
variables directly measuring beliefs (holism score and theories o f behaviour) as well as 
variables with religious content (surprise about expectation violating behaviour). Group 
differences were also particularly strong for variables measuring beliefs, such as the 
holism score. The most consistent differences emerged between Buddhists and 
Anglicans with the exception o f relational-contextual versus category-based grouping, 
where both religious groups stood apart from the secular sample. Relative to the two 
comparison groups, Buddhists were significantly more holistic thinkers than both 
groups for three o f the measures and more holistic than either the secular or Christian 
group on two measures. Out o f 12 (6 variables, 2 comparison groups) possible holism 
contrasts, Buddhists score eight, Anglicans two and Secular-Humanists zero (see Table
5.1).
Table 5.1: Relative Holism S cores for H-A D im ensions in Study 1
H-A Dim ensions Comparative Holism Score
Secular- Anglican 
Humanist
Buddhist
1. Grouping a/ Holism b 0 / 0 1 /1 1 / 2
2. Categorisation / Theories of Behaviourc 0 / 0 0 / 0 2 / 2
3. TC: Differentiation / Expectation V io l.a 0 / 0 0 / 0 ( 1 ) /1
TOTAL 0 2 8
Notes: 1 = signific. more holistic than one comparison group
2 = signific. more holistic than two comparison groups 
(1) = Mahayana Buddhists only 
Religious context effects (Buddhists): a = religious prime (analytic shift)
b = religiosity/self-concept (holistic shift) 
c = religious integration (holistic shift)
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Although priming had an impact on grouping and surprise about expectation 
violating behaviour, the effect was not in the expected direction. One key question 
raised by these results is simply whether holistic thinking can be primed. Considering 
the effect o f religiosity and the strength o f the Buddhist self-concept on the holism score, 
Study 2 in this chapter tests whether a primed religious context can influence responses 
on this task. Study 3 seeks to further clarify the observed religious vs secular differences 
on the grouping task. Finally, another area o f H-A thought that needs explanation based 
on Study 1 ’s results is that o f tolerance o f contradictions (TC), where group differences 
were least convincing (see Table 5.1). A third follow-up study in this chapter (Study 4) 
extends the range o f TC further by including a more explicit or higher-order TC variable 
along with one that has quasi-religious content.
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5.2 Study 2: Priming Holistic Beliefs among Western Buddhists
Study 1 could not support the expected effect o f a Buddhist religious prime on 
holistic thought. Several explanations for the missing priming effect in the expected 
direction are possible. The first explanation would hold that H-A cognition is not 
subject to contextual variation and hence cannot be influenced by means o f priming, but 
this is not supported by past research. Some aspects o f H-A cognition have already been 
successfully primed in the past, such as a language prime for grouping (Ji et al., 2004), 
an identity prime for attributions o f physical causality (Peng & Knowles, 2003) as well 
as a pictorial prime for social attributions (e.g. Hong et al., 1997; Benet-Martinez, et al., 
2002). In addition, Study 1 shows overall effects in grouping across both religious 
groups, which indicate that H-A thinking can in fact be manipulated. (However, there 
were no differences across religious groups and priming tended to lead to more analytic 
thinking.) The possibility that different dimensions o f H-A thought are not all equally 
susceptible to priming, on the other hand, is more plausible.
A second explanation o f the first study’s findings may claim that religious contexts 
cannot be primed. This is an unlikely option, as the results o f Study 1 demonstrated that 
a religious context could be successfully induced. However, differences were only 
evident in Buddhist ratings o f ‘surprise about expectation violating behaviour’, which 
had the most explicitly religious content (religious setting; religious value o f 
compassion), as well as related beliefs about behavioural attributions.
In light o f the relationship between holistic beliefs and religiosity/identification, a 
more convincing explanation would state that both H-A cognition and religion can be 
primed, but religious priming did not adequately activate relevant knowledge. Asking 
people about their religious practices, identification and values does not also activate a 
meaning system associated with H-A cognition. It is possible that a different prime 
would more successfully activate holistic cognition. In addition, a shortening o f the
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study can allow for the possibility o f priming effects decaying with elapsing time and 
the number o f tasks completed. Although the completion o f multiple tasks in priming 
experiments is not uncommon (e.g. Lido et al., 2005), it is possible that certain tasks 
interfere with the activated knowledge by a “restacking” o f accessible cognitive 
constructs (Higgins, 1996, p. 148). In Study 1, the holism score was completed as the 
last H-A measure, which may explain why it was not affected by the priming 
manipulation, even thought it strongly correlated to the strength o f the religious self- 
concept.
5.2.1 Hypotheses and Measures 
Hypotheses
Due to strong group differences found in Study 1 for the explicit holism score, along 
with the effect o f religiousness, we would expect the Buddhist priming condition to 
either directly influence holism (a main effect) or indirectly through the strength o f the 
religious self-concept (a moderation effect). Relational-contextual vs category-based 
grouping, the implicit measure corresponding to the holism score, did not co-vary with 
religiosity or religious integration. In fact, it showed a shift in an analytic direction as a 
result o f the Buddhist prime. Hence, we should not expect to find a holistic shift for the 
grouping task.
Prime
This experiment used pictorial primes, designed as a cue for participants to reflect on 
cultural or religious beliefs. Study l ’s findings on meditative learning and family- 
resemblance based categorisation, which backed the distinction between doctrinal (e.g. 
Anglican) and imagistic (e.g. Buddhist) modes o f religion, suggest that using a 
perceptual stimulus may be more effective in creating a religious context. The most 
universally recognised symbol for Buddhism, the ‘Wheel o f Life’, was presented to 
participants who were then asked to summarise (in no more than 2-3 sentences) the
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beliefs that they thought were represented by the symbol. In a comparison and “neutral” 
condition, American and Swiss flags, respectively, were shown and participants asked 
to summarise the cultural beliefs that they thought were associated with those countries. 
The American prime condition served as a cultural comparison that was aligned with 
participants’ ascribed identity as Americans. The Swiss cultural comparison, 
representing a European country with Christian heritage and political neutrality, was 
chosen as a “neutral” comparison condition, because it did not match participants’ 
ascribed identity as either Americans or Buddhists.
In sum, this study seeks to establish a link between H-A cognition and the ‘cultural 
content’ o f Buddhism, through the metaphysical and epistemo logical beliefs symbolised 
by the ‘Wheel o f Life’, and by means o f the ‘Self as a switching mechanism between 
relatively holistic and analytic thought (Fig.5.1; relevant concepts in grey). Two related 
H-A measures are the dependent variable -  holistic beliefs (an explicit or ‘theories’ 
level o f H-A thought) and H-A grouping (a more implicit measure). Based on Study 1 ’s 
findings, we cannot expect the ideas evoked by the religious prime to have a ‘trickle 
down’ effect on grouping in a holistic direction.
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Fig. 5.1: Study 2 Model
Fig. 5.1: Study 2
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Dependent and Moderating Variables
For this experiment, H-A variables consisted of the holism score, which was strongly 
correlated with Buddhist religiosity, and its implicit kin, the relational-contextual vs 
category-based grouping measure. The ‘religious self or degree of religious 
identification question was included as a potential moderating variable in this 
experiment, as it was most strongly associated with individuals’ holism score.
5 .2 .2  M eth o d  
Participants
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Ninety-six American Buddhists from four Buddhist organisations participated in the 
experiment, eighty-two (61 female, 21 male) of which met the criteria of being white 
American-born US residents and were included in the analysis. Respondents were 
between 23 and 74 years o f age (mean o f 53.1), half of which were educated to 
postgraduate level. Participants were rewarded with a chance to enter the prize draw and 
a small (US$1) donation to the organisation through which they were recruited.
Design and Procedure
The same Internet-based design used in Study 1 was adapted for this experiment, 
with a JavaScript-based random assignment to conditions. Participants first completed 
the priming task, presented to them as a symbol interpretation task as part o f my PhD 
work. They then completed the grouping and holism score measures, introduced to them 
as an unrelated pilot study. At the end o f the experiment, participants accessed a page 
with the opportunity to enter their email address for the prize draw and a debriefing text.
5.2.3 Results
Main Effect o f  Priming
Participants’ answers to the pictorial primes were diverse. A selection o f examples of 
cultural and religious beliefs mentioned by individuals is provided below.
Buddhist Prime:
Cycle of birth and death, karma and reincarnation, interconnectedness of life 
Actions and intentions have consequences; interdependent origination 
Realms of existence/experience 
“You keep going around until you get it right”
“We are trapped in a cycle of birth and death but through enlightenment we can escape that 
cycle”
American Prime:
Individual choice, freedom, right to choose and speak freely 
Democracy, equal opportunity, progress, “American dream”
Diversity, melting pot, different interests united 
Materialism, greed, (religious) fundamentalism, tyranny 
“Neutral ” (Swiss) Prime:
Autonomy, independence, neutrality
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Duty, stability, dependability, hard work 
Compassion, Christianity 
Peace, simplicity, multi-ethnicity
As expected, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) on the grouping and 
holism scores, including the control variables of education, age and gender, indicated no 
shift towards holism for grouping scores in the Buddhist prime condition, F(2, 71) = .18, 
ns. There was a marginal difference for the Swiss (mean = 5.48) vs Buddhist (mean = 
5.81) prime contrast on the holism score, F(2, 71) = 1.73,/? = .067.
Moderating Effect o f  Buddhist Self-Concept
In order to analyse a possible moderating effect o f the religious self-concept on 
priming, multiple regression with standardised (centred) independent and dependent 
variables was used to investigate the relationship between priming condition and holism, 
as done in Brown et al. (2003). This involved a recoding o f the three priming conditions 
into two contrast variables (see also Fox, 1997, pp. 198-199) in order to better analyse 
the contrast o f interest (the Buddhist vs comparison conditions) along with the 
orthogonal complement (American vs Swiss comparison conditions). The first model o f 
the regression analysis revealed the effect o f control and potential moderator variables, 
followed by an adding o f the contrast variables in a second model and the contrast- 
moderator interaction terms in a final model (see Table 5.2). The addition of interaction 
term in model 3 decreased the significance o f the ‘Buddhist vs Comparison’ priming 
contrast, suggesting a moderating effect o f the religious self-concept (see Figure 5.2), 
with a tendency for lower-identification Buddhists to be more affected by priming. No 
significant effects were found for grouping (probably due to the smaller sample size in 
this experiment compared to Study 1), although means were in the same direction as 
Study 1, with the Buddhist prime actually leading to more analytic grouping choices for 
low-identification Buddhists (means o f-4 .5  for the Buddhist prime and -2.3 for 
comparison conditions).
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Table 5.2: Standardised  C oefficients for S tep w ise  R egression  o f Holism  S core on  
S elec ted  Independent V ariables Show in g M oderation Effect o f R elig ious S elf-C on cept
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variable Beta t Beta T Beta T
Control variables
Age
Gender
Education
-.130
-.026
.160
-1.195
-.242
1.474
-.132
.006
.211
-1.230
.057
1.917
-.163
-.015
.166
-1.578
-.146
1.558
Moderating variable 
Buddhist Self-Concept .404*** 3.670 .419*** 3.788 .456*** 4.091
Contrast variables 
US v s “Neutral”
Buddhist v s  Comparison
-.035
.223*
-.322
2.059
-.075
.202
-.711
1.914
Interaction terms 
Self * [US vs “Neutral”] 
Self * [Buddhist vs Comp.]
-.006
-.293**
-.054
-2.750
R2 .21 .25 .33
Note: * p  <  . 0 5  ** p < .01 *** p < .0 0 1
Fig. 5.2: Religious Self-Concept (Identification) Interaction with Priming 
Condition
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5.2.4 Discussion
Study 1 demonstrated not only clear religious variations in H-A cognition, but also 
the importance o f taking into account contexts in which those differences are produced. 
Holistic beliefs were significantly influenced by strengths o f religiosity among 
Buddhists, measured by questions on religious identity, practices and values. At the 
same time, beliefs about the attribution of social behaviour co-varied with individuals’ 
integration in their religious community. This was only the case among Buddhists, 
indicating that the effect o f integration may be different across religious groups. A 
religious prime in the form o f first asking Buddhist participants to reflect on their 
religion, however, did not produce the expected holistic shift in cognition. Instead, it 
seemed to invoke a Buddhist context o f thought in the form o f either the core value of 
‘compassion’ or generally a more dispositionist view o f religious actors. Resulting 
surprise levels about unexpected behaviour indicated greater internal attributions 
compared to the no-prime condition, where lower surprise levels (implying more 
complex attributions) consistent with holistic thought became evident. Although a 
religious mindset could be activated in Study 1, it appeared to supersede holistic 
thinking.
Using a pictorial stimulus and asking Buddhists to reflect on associated beliefs, 
Study 2 shows that Western Buddhists can be primed to think more holistically on the 
explicit holism measure. However, holistic beliefs are more chronic with increasingly 
strong religious self-concepts. This provides direct backing for McIntosh (1995), who 
argues that the degree o f a religion’s centrality to the self-concept affects the 
accessibility and activation o f beliefs related to religion. It also lends further support to 
a need to understand the ‘theories’ tradition o f culture and human inference in relation 
to that o f the ‘self, as stipulated by Peng et al.’s (2001) integrative theory. The 
importance o f such an approach becomes evident in Benet-Martinez et al. (2002), for
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example, who found that Chinese-Americans who saw their cultural identities as 
compatible responded in congruent ways to cultural priming, whereas those who 
perceived their identities as oppositional exhibited contrast effects.
Study 1 indicated that holism and grouping scores represent variables o f the same 
latent dimension. Yet grouping scores were subject to an analytic shift as a result of the 
religious prime in Study 1. Study 2 again demonstrates an absence o f holism shift for 
grouping preferences in the Buddhist prime condition, which challenges some o f the 
assumptions about theory-cognition links outlined by Nisbett (2003). More research is 
needed to investigate whether the apparent lack o f a holism-grouping connection is a 
one-off or if it is representative o f other theories-cognition connections within H-A 
thought. If  the theories-cognition relationship is similar for different types o f H-A 
thoughts, it is possible that, while religious beliefs can be activated and applied to 
explicit H-A thought, they are not readily applied to more implicit H-A cognitive tasks.
If  the holism-grouping dimension represents a unique case, on the other hand, it is 
possible that beliefs or theories are more effortlessly applied to the explanation of 
events, like causal reasoning evident in social attribution, than the organisation of 
information, such as relational-contextual vs category-based grouping. Although Ji et al. 
(2004) successfully triggered holistic responses by using English vs Chinese research 
instruments, past studies that involved non-linguistic primes (as in Study 1) aiming at 
the activation o f values or beliefs were mainly concerned with their effect on judgments 
about social behaviour or physical causality. I would suggest that dimensions o f H-A 
thought with a stronger applied ‘theories’ component might be more susceptible to 
priming.
This research provides further encouragement for studies on acculturation or 
biculturalism and cognition (e.g. Hong et al., 1996, 1997, 2000). From the perspective 
o f cultural psychology, it could be said that quasi-bicultural processes are at work even
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for people who do not live in a foreign country or were socialised into two cultures. 
However, religious contexts, though moderated by the religious self-concept, only 
affected explicit or beliefs-based variables.
In Study l ’s sample, the average reported age at which people started to practice 
their Anglican religion was around ten years. Most o f them stated that they were raised 
with their current religion. This was very rarely the case among Buddhists, where the 
average “age o f conversion” was thirty years. Minoura (1992), discussed previously, has 
theorised that the age range between 9 and 14 is a crucial stage in acquiring a cultural 
meaning system. In his research, older children were more aware o f cultural differences 
and exhibited greater resistance to incorporating the meaning system o f the host society. 
Similar to Ji et al.’s (2004) explanation o f the effect o f language on grouping 
preferences, learning a new culture simultaneously with another early in life may result 
in cultural beliefs, just like languages, becoming representationally fused (e.g. 
Weinreich’s [1953] ‘compound bilinguals’). Acquiring a culture later in life, after 
another one has already been acquired, may lead to more distinct cognitive 
compartments (e.g. Weinreich’s ‘coordinate bilinguals’) and hence susceptibility to 
priming manipulations. It would be interesting in future research to compare cognitive 
differences between Western ‘converted’ Buddhists and those whose parents had 
already adopted the religion.
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5.3 Study 3: Religion and Holistic versus Analytic Grouping: A Correlational
Approach
The only variable in Study 1 where no differences between Christians and Buddhist 
emerged was that o f H-A grouping. I proposed two possible explanations for this 
finding. First, it is possible that being a member o f a religious group is generally 
associated with organising the world in more holistic terms, as indicated by the holistic 
beliefs, categorisation and grouping tasks in Study 1. In the case of grouping, where 
religious-secular differences were most marked, greater perceived interdependence 
among religious individuals may also be responsible. Feelings o f interdependence may be 
the result of religious doctrine (e.g. caring or compassion), greater social integration among 
religious or spiritual individuals, or both. If  relational-contextual thinking is associated with 
interdependent self-orientations, as proposed by Markus and Kitayama (1991), one 
source o f the religious-secular differences should be found in self-construals.
A second explanation would hold that Buddhist and Christian responses were 
reflective o f the general population, while the Secular-Humanist group may be the one 
that stands out. Buddhists and Secular-Humanists had similar mean levels o f education, 
but in the light o f the positive relationship between levels o f education and analytic 
grouping, there may be something about the Secular Humanist world view akin to that 
o f highly educated individuals.
Another question that arose in Study 1 pertains to the possibility o f self-selection. 
Unlike many Christians, most Secular Humanists and Buddhists made a decision at 
some point in their lives to join a group or organisation dedicated to their creed. As a 
result, the proportion o f cognitive differences due to self-selection rather than 
enculturation cannot be known. Ideally, research on H-A self-selection into religious 
groups would try to obtain a sample of individuals who are about to convert, but it
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would be a very difficult task to find such a sample from the general population. There 
was some evidence for learning effects through Buddhist meditative practice over time 
in Study 1. Nevertheless, we can expect that individuals’ attraction to the ideas 
espoused by those creeds is greater among potential joiners. The following small 
experiment on American students is designed to provide answers to issues about 
Buddhist vs secular grouping differences in the light o f possible self-selection issues.
5.3.1 Hypotheses and Measures 
Hypotheses
Evidence for a H-A cognitive self-selection effect into Buddhist or Secular Humanist 
groups would be evident in a correlation between an attraction to those worldviews and 
grouping. An effect o f only the strength o f the religious self-concept on grouping, on the 
other hand, would provide greater support for a ‘religious learning’ (practice effect) 
hypothesis. I f  the strength o f the religious self-concept, along with liking o f Buddhist 
ideas, are associated with holistic grouping, the hypothesis o f grouping differences due 
to religion is supported. I f  this occurs with a correlation between attraction to Secular 
Humanist rather than Buddhist ideas and analytic grouping, we would find support for 
the hypothesis that grouping differences are the result o f secular thought. Both o f these 
cases, however, suggest self-selection and socialisation or learning effects operating 
together.
Hypotheses Study 3:
HI: ‘Self-selection’: Liking o fB or SH H  or A grouping
H2: ‘Religious Learning ’: Religious self H  grouping
H3: ‘Religious Difference’: a. Liking of B -> H grouping
b. Religious self -> H grouping
H4: ‘Secular Difference ’: a. Liking o f SH A grouping
b. Religious self H grouping
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If Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) theory were correct, we would expect variations in 
independence-interdependence to be reflected in grouping. If such an effect occurred 
along with a relationship between INDINT and the religious self-concept, there would 
be evidence in support for a hypothesis that religious differences in grouping (3) are 
caused by (at least in part) greater interdependence among people who practice a 
religion or spirituality.
H5: ‘Indep.-Interdep.’ INDINT H-A grouping
H6: ‘Religion and Interdependence Religious self INT
H7: ‘INDINT explanation o f religious difference H3 + H5 + H6
Measures
Texts expressing the beliefs underlying Buddhism and Secular Humanism were 
taken directly from the most popular Internet sites on the subjects.12 Only minor editing 
was necessary to ensure equal length. The Secular Humanist text consisted o f the 
principles behind the creed, such as a concern for the growth o f humankind on the basis 
o f reason rather than blind faith, openness to the exchange of ideas as well as a 
preference for scientific methods o f inquiry. Buddhist beliefs centred around text on 
Buddha’s Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, covering concepts o f 
impermanence, craving, suffering, compassion and self-awareness. These beliefs were 
relatively universal and non-sectarian, similar to those epitomised by the Wheel o f Life 
used in Study 2. Likeability, familiarity and understanding of those ideas were measured 
on 7-point scales (ranging from ‘not at all familiar’/ ‘very easy [to understand]’/ ‘strongly 
dislike’ to ‘very familiar’/ ‘very difficult’/ ‘like very much’). The second question 
(understanding) was reverse-coded in order to reduce acquiescence effects. Participants
12 A word search for ‘Buddhism’ and ‘Secular Humanism’ was conducted on Google the search engine, 
which automatically returns sites ranked by relevance. For Buddhism, the site was buddhanet.net, for 
Secular Humanism it was secularhumanism.org. Both of these sites are dedicated to providing an 
educational resource to the public about those worldviews.
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also answered a question about their own religious identity and the question measuring 
degrees of importance o f that self-concept, which were used in Studies 1 and 2.
Jung and Polyorat’s (2005) short version o f Independent versus Interdependent 
(IND-INT) self-construals scale originally developed by Singelis (1994) was used, 
consisting o f 12 items with 7-point Likert-type scales (ranging from 1-disagree strongly 
to 7-agree strongly). Independence was indicated by agreement with statements such as 
‘I enjoy being unique and different from others’ or ‘I act as a unique person, separate 
from others’. Interdependence involved statements like ‘My happiness depends on the 
happiness o f those in my group’ or ‘I would sacrifice my self-interests for the benefit of 
my group’. An overall INDINT score is obtained by subtracting the independence score 
(mean o f 6 IND items) from the interdependence score (mean of 6 INT items), resulting 
in positive values indicating relatively greater interdependence. The grouping measure 
was the same as in Studies 1 and 2.
The introduction o f an INDINT variable in this study represents an individual-level 
attitudinal measure o f the ‘self in relation to ‘social structure’ (Fig. 5.3). The study as a 
whole examines possible connections between attraction to the teachings o f Buddhism 
or Secular-Humanism (‘cultural content’ that may or may not be reflected in individual 
‘values’), self-orientations (INDINT ‘values’) and H-A thought in the form o f grouping 
choices (‘cognitive processes’).
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Fig. 5.3: Study 3 Model
Fig. 5.3: Study 3
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5.3.2 Method 
Participants
105 American-born students (66 white, 39 non-white) with mean age o f 24.3 years 
participated for psychology course credit at a Californian community college.
Design and Procedure
The study was designed to be correlational. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two question order conditions (Secular Humanism first versus Buddhism first) in 
order to achieve a counterbalance. After answering demographic questions, they first 
completed the grouping task. Participants then read the Buddhist and Secular humanist 
texts and rated their familiarity, understanding and liking of each. This was followed by
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the INDINT questions. Finally, they were asked their religious affiliation and the 
strength o f the religious self-concept.
5.3.3 Results
As we would expect, Asian-American students’ (about one-third of who 
identified with Buddhism) scores were more holistic on grouping (mean = 0.2, vs -1.3 
for white and —1.0 for other non-white) and more interdependent on their INDINT 
ratings (mean = -1.1, vs -1.8 for white and -2.0 for other non-white). They also were 
more familiar with Buddhist ideas (mean = 5.2, versus 4.1 for white and 4.3 other non­
white). Other American-born ethnicities (mainly Hispanic/Latino) did not differ from 
white Americans on any o f the variables and were kept in the sample, while ethnicity 
was controlled for in all analyses.
A correlational path model (Fig. 5.4) was constructed in order to simplify the 
analysis. This was based on a regression o f grouping scores on all independent variables 
(Religious self, INDINT, Liking of Buddhism [or Secular-Humanism, in a separate 
regression]), controlling for understanding o f and familiarity with Buddhist [or Secular- 
Humanist] worldviews, as well as demographic variables. Liking o f Buddhism [Secular- 
Humanism] was regressed on INDINT and the religious self-concept (identification), 
controlling for understanding o f and familiarity with Buddhism [Secular-Humanism]. 
Finally, a bivariate correlation was run between religious self-concept (identification) 
and INDINT.
The data in this sample do not support the hypothesis (H4) that attraction to Secular 
Humanist ideas is associated with analytic thinking as measured by the grouping 
variable. Buddhism, on the other hand, appears to attract relational-contextual thinkers 
(H3a), as evidenced in a significant correlation between the liking o f Buddhist ideas and 
holistic grouping (H3a; see Figure 5.4). At the same time, there is an independent effect 
o f  the strength o f the religious self-concept (identification) on grouping, with a tendency
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for more religious individuals to be relational-contextual thinkers.13 Taken together, 
these results lend support to both a cognitive self-selection (HI) and religious learning 
hypothesis (H2). More importantly, it suggests that the secular versus religious grouping 
differences found in Study 1 are more likely due to the effect o f religion (H3) than that 
o f Secular Humanism (H4).
Fig. 5.4: Effect of the Religious Identification (Self-Concept), Liking of 
Buddhism on H-A Grouping
Control variables:
- familiarity ($-.24)
-  understanding ($-.32)
Religious
Identification
ns
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Buddhism
.28
ns
nsInterdependent « 
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Control variables:
- ethnicity (ns)
- gender (ns)
- age (ns)
Holistic Grouping
Self-orientations could not directly predict grouping preferences, as suggested by 
Markus and Kitayama’s theory (H5), while interdependence ratings varied with degrees 
o f the religious self-concept (H6). Consequently, the independence-interdependence 
hypothesis o f religious difference (H7) could only be partially supported. Nevertheless, 
although neither INDINT nor the strength o f the religious self-concept ratings can be 
assumed to be causally prior, it could be argued that there is an indirect effect o f self­
orientations on grouping. This is because feelings o f interdependence or independence
13 Although both religious self-categorization and degrees of religious identification were measured, the 
data suggest no added benefit from the inclusion of self-categorization (secular vs religious), as self­
identified secular individuals—including agnostics and atheists—gave corresponding (i.e. low) ratings on 
the scaled religious identification variable. In fact, the use of a religious self-categorization by degrees of 
identification interaction variable yields very comparable results.
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should influence the magnitude to which an individual perceives group membership (i.e. 
religion) as an important part of who they are.
I would like to suggest three explanations for the finding that there is no direct effect 
between INDINT and grouping. First, it may be the case that INDINT scores are too 
abstract to map onto a more implicit measure like grouping. Degrees o f importance of 
religion in an individual’s self-definition, by contrast, are a concrete application o f self­
perceptions in relation to group membership. Perhaps future work on INDINT scales 
would benefit from a focus on self-ratings applied directly to group memberships, such 
as religion, being a student, employee, etc.
Secondly, it is conceivable that self-orientations correspond to certain ways of 
organising the world only across cultures due to profound differences in socialisation 
that cannot be found in within-cultural variations. A more convincing third reason for 
the result may lie in differences between measures about how the world is organised in 
contrast to explanations o f causality, discussed in the previous study, where holistic 
beliefs could not predict holistic grouping preferences. Markus and Kitayama propose 
that “[i]f one perceives oneself as embedded within a larger context o f which one is an 
interdependent part, it is likely that other objects or events will be perceived in a similar 
way” (1992: p. 24). The lack o f relationship between INDINT beliefs and grouping in 
this study indicates that it may be true that the perception o f events (e.g. behaviour) is 
influenced by self-orientations, but that the same does not apply to objects (e.g. 
organising information). In fact, the correlation between religious integration and 
situational explanations o f behaviour found in Study 1 bolsters this explanation. All of 
these proposed explanations warrant future investigations into the relationship between 
INDINT self-orientations and H-A cognitions.
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5.3.4 Discussion
One o f the questions that emerged in the previous two studies was why religion, 
particularly Buddhism, has a stronger effect on explicit H-A thought. I would propose 
that this is the case because the implicit variables used in this research, namely 
categorisation and grouping, are only weakly related to explicit beliefs. The causal path 
described by Nisbett (2003), leading from social organisation to theories and lastly 
cognition may apply to the explanation of events, but less clearly the organisation of 
information. The latter is more likely to be the result o f both beliefs and social factors. 
Study 3 provides some evidence in support of this proposition. It shows that self- 
concepts that are strongly influenced by religious group membership are associated with 
holistic grouping choices, although INDINT ratings at best had an indirect effect on that 
variable. In Study 1, holistic choices in rule versus family-resemblance based 
categorisation were empirically related to theories supporting complex social 
attributions. From the perspective o f intuition, rule-based categorisation, just like 
dispositionist thinking, can be seen as a form o f essentialism. The theory supported by 
Nisbett and colleagues holds that greater interdependence leads to perceptual field- 
dependence (not measured in this thesis), which in turn should influence attention to 
whole-object attributes rather than individual features.
I would suggest that the results o f this research, fused with Peng et al’s theory about 
values, theories and self approaches to cognition, calls for a two-pronged causal chain 
between social systems and human cognition, which validates the conceptual model 
used throughout this thesis. The first chain takes into account social structures that 
influence perceptions. It may best answer the question what information is attended to 
and enters the reasoning process. The second of these is interested in cultural content in 
the form o f values and beliefs that may inform individual cognitive inferences. It 
represents the question o f how norms and theories are applied to the information in
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order to arrive at a judgment. In this process, the self-concept may give greater or lesser 
weight to different cognitive alternatives.
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5.4 Study 4: A New Look at Tolerance of Contradictions
Among the three H-A dimensions that emerged out o f the first study’s data, tolerance 
o f contradictions (TC) was the dimension with the weakest evidence for group variation, 
whereas the other two H-A areas showed clear differences between the Buddhist and 
secular samples. There was some support for the hypothesis that Buddhists are more 
tolerant o f contradictions than Anglicans, while Secular-Humanists’ TC level fell 
between those two groups. TC was measured by virtue o f its application to concrete 
instances (i.e., the plausibility o f scientific research findings and surprise about 
particular actors’ behaviour). While religious cognitive differences in the other two 
dimensions o f H-A thought were most evident in explicit variables measuring folk 
epistemologies or metaphysics, TC did not include a higher-order variable or more 
general measure o f TC beliefs.
In Study 1, contradictions were relatively implicit. In the case o f surprise about 
expectation violating behaviour, contradictions were evident in the contrast between 
stated personality type and actual behaviour. In the differentiation versus compromise 
task, contradictions were the result o f seemingly incongruent information. In order to 
investigate this area further, two additional measures will be used that extend the range 
o f TC from the reflective to the intuitive, while also making contradictions more explicit. 
The first o f these is represented by an explicit beliefs-based TC variable developed by 
Chan (2004). The second dwells deeper in the realm o f the counter-intuitive (Cl), a 
quasi-religious region o f thought that has been likened to a form o f TC by Franks 
(2003) and Samson (2004). As argued in Chapter 3, TC and Cl primarily overlap based 
on the common property o f acceptance for the unexpected. In contrast to TC measures 
in Study 1, contradictions in Cl concepts are not explicit unless their unexpectedness is 
made salient. This is done by taking into account individual expectations o f Cl concepts 
before presenting a counter-factual scenario. Results will have the potential to show
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whether there is indeed a difference in TC between Buddhist and Anglican groups while 
clarifying the more ambiguous position of Secular-Humanists.
5.4.1 A H igher-O rder Tolerance for Contradictions: Hypotheses and Measures
In the light o f existing results for the area of TC and H-A measures, we would expect 
a beliefs-based (explicit) measure o f TC to elucidate group differences. A strengthening 
o f the finding that Buddhists exhibit higher TC scores than Anglicans but not 
necessarily Secular-Humanists would lend further credibility to the results o f Study 1.
An absence o f difference between secular and Buddhist samples in that area would also 
reinforce arguments that TC does not clearly follow the logic of other areas o f H-A 
thought, where Buddhist were unmistakably more holistic than Secular Humanists.
Alternatively, if Buddhists turn out to have higher TC than all o f the comparison 
groups, overall H-A differences found in Study 1 would be bolstered, while further 
supporting the importance o f reflective, higher-order beliefs in explaining H-A 
distinctions across religions. Finally, differences between religious and non-religious 
groups, or no difference between any of these samples, would detract from the 
suggestive findings about TC in Study 1 and drive a conceptual wedge between TC and 
core measures o f H-A thought.
Chan (2004), a researcher in the psychology of work, claims to have developed a 
measure that taps into a higher-order ‘tolerance o f contradictions’ (TC). He devised a 
10-item TC index consisting o f agreement ratings with statements such as ‘People who 
maintain that it is possible for two opposing interpretations o f the same event to be both 
true are illogical or unrealistic’ or ‘In assessing whether someone is supporting a team, 
team members often make statements such as ‘He is either for us or against us’. Team 
members who make such statements fail to see many other real possibilities’. In a study 
conducted with Asian participants, Chan presents both convergent and discriminate
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validity evidence in favour o f TC as a separate construct. As expected, he shows TC to 
be correlated with certain personality constructs. For example, TC was positively 
related to tolerance o f ambiguity and negatively related to personal need for structure, 
although it is not clear whether these associations indicate greater open-mindedness or 
simply apathy among high TC scorers. Importantly, however, research by Dubin (1994) 
found Buddhists to have greater tolerance of ambiguity than other religious groups, 
rendering Chan’s TC scale (as a separate but related construct) an even more 
compelling measure to adopt in a study o f religious differences.
5.4.2 Tolerance for Contradictions in Counter-Intuitive Concepts
Theoretical Background
In cross-cultural psychology, TC has been investigated as the result o f culturally- 
derived epistemological beliefs and social practices. Cognitive anthropologists (see 
Chapter 3) have discussed supernatural representations as violations o f universal 
intuitively held beliefs (Sperber, 1996; Boyer 1994, 2000; see also Franks, 2003; 
Sperber and Hirschfeld, 1999; Lawson, 2001). Counter-intuitive beliefs are “explicit 
modification o f intuitive concepts” (Pyysiainen, 2004, p. 143) that are inherently 
contradictory and as such can be likened to a form o f TC that prevails in religious 
domains (Franks, 2003; Samson, 2004). For example, a person who can walk through a 
wall violates our intuitive knowledge o f the law o f physics, while a person who can 
predict the future contradicts our intuitive knowledge o f psychology. Studies have 
shown counter-intuitive concepts to be more memorable under some conditions and 
hence enjoy a cultural transmission advantage (Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Barrett & 
Nyhof, 2001; Lisdorf, 2004; Norenzayan & Atran, 2003).
Research also indicates the counter-intuitive category of persons—rather than 
artefacts or animals—to be a promising area for an investigation o f group differences. 
This is the case for three reasons. First, Boyer and Ramble (2001) found that Buddhist
monks in Asia, unlike French students, have higher recall rates for artefact violations 
than person violations, implying that they are more used to (or tolerant of) person 
violations in supernatural concepts. Second, Boyer (2000) has theorised that we should 
expect supernatural templates activating our theory o f mind expectations to be more 
salient, because they are more socially and culturally relevant. Such concepts include all 
members o f the person category or a transfer of psychological expectations to a member 
o f the artefact category. Third, person or theory o f mind violations are probably the 
most central and cross-culturally similar types of counter-intuitive representations in the 
religious domain (cf. Barrett & Keil, 1996).
The Role o f Surprise and Predictability
The so-called ‘bizarreness effect’ (e.g. Hirshman, Whelley, & Palu, 1989; Michelon, 
Snyder, Buckner, McAvoy, & Zacksa, 2003; Worthem, Garcia-Rivas, Green, & Vidos, 
2000) relates to phenomena investigated in cognitive psychology that are akin to the 
recall o f counter-intuitive concepts, but it has been largely disregarded by the cognitive 
anthropological literature. The effect refers to the memory advantage o f atypical or 
incongruous stimuli, such as the sentence ‘the pig fed the farmer’ or a depiction o f a 
thing that is half toaster and half horse. It has been found that such items are better 
recalled if they are presented alongside common items (see Worthem et al., 2000, for a 
summary).
Examples o f incongruous visual information, such as the toaster-horse, have been 
found to improve the frequency o f recall mainly due to an elaboration effect, an 
enhanced cognitive effort in the encoding o f information (Michelon et al., 2003). 
Alternatively, Hirshman et al (1989) have proposed a surprise effect due to the 
expectation-violating nature o f such bizarre items. Consider bizarre sentences like ‘the 
rattle put the baby in its mouth’, used in Hirshman et al. (1986; Experiment 6). The 
researchers found that reducing surprise by making people aware o f the bizarreness and
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normalness o f sentences (i.e. adding the parenthesised word ‘normal’ or ‘bizarre’ in the 
sentence, such as ‘the baby put the rattle [normal] in its mouth’) made the rate o f recall 
o f bizarre items similar to normal ones.
To my knowledge, the ‘bizarreness effect’ literature has not examined counter­
intuitive concepts. However, surprise effects seem to have characteristics shared with 
Upal, Owsianiecki, Slone, & Tweney’s (2005) notion o f the memorability o f counter­
intuitive concepts as rooted in levels o f predictability. Upal and colleagues hypothesise 
that the superior memorability o f minimally counter-intuitive concepts occurs in 
contexts o f low predictability along with a high postdictability. Predictability is related 
to expectations and should lead to varying levels o f surprise, while postdictability is 
associated with a sense-making process. More precisely, predictability depends on the 
prior context in which a concept appears in any given narrative context. Norenzayan and 
Atran (2003) showed that predictability o f Cl items could also be lowered by including 
normal or natural concepts. This was done in a study that was presented as a memory 
exercise, requiring participants to learn counter-intuitive items from a list. When non­
natural concepts were presented alongside intuitive ones, rates o f recall and degradation 
depended on the ratio o f intuitive-to-counterintuitive concepts. Lists with only few 
counter-intuitive concepts and mostly intuitive ones enjoyed the highest rate o f overall 
delayed recall and the lowest rate of memory degradation.
In sum, findings from both the psychology o f bizarreness and counter-intuitiveness 
indicate that low predictability is a key factor for levels o f surprise, which in turn leads 
to variations in memorability.
Belief vs Acceptance
Boyer and Ramble’s (2001) investigation o f non-natural concepts asked individuals 
to categorise representations as ‘normal’, ‘possible but very rare’ and ‘impossible’ in 
order to determine their inclusion in the counter-intuitive category. For the purpose o f
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an assessment o f a tolerance for counter-intuitiveness, a better approach may be to also 
measure people's surprise about intuition-violating beliefs, as done in Choi and 
Nisbett’s (2000) experiments on expectation violating behaviour adapted in Study 1 o f 
this thesis. Surprise is used as an indicator of the ability to ‘accept the unexpected’. 
Indeed, Huss (2004) has argued that Peng and Nisbett’s tolerance for contradictions is 
essentially about acceptance, not belief per se. According to Huss, actual beliefs are 
more involuntary than acceptance; they are feelings aimed at the truth. Acceptance, by 
contrast, is an act o f the will—a suspension of disbelief. A dramatic example may be 
that o f a lawyer who accepts the innocence of her defendant, even though she believes 
him to be guilty. A greater ability to accept an event to be true should be reflected in 
lower levels o f surprise if, contrary to expectations, it turns out to be true.
In Study 1, surprise about expectation violating behaviour was investigated. In that 
measure, two pieces o f information were contained in a story: one about a target actor’s 
predispositions and the other about his actual behaviour. The apparent contradiction 
arose because, intuitively, we would expect a person to behave in line with the 
dispositions (e.g. helpfulness) that are made explicit in the story, leading to surprise if 
the resulting expectations are not met (e.g. not helping). Similarly, counter-intuitive 
representations contain contradictions that arise from what we intuitively know or 
expect a person’s physical or psychological capabilities to be (e.g. able to have false 
beliefs) and what s/he is represented to be (e.g. capable o f in supernatural thought, such 
as being all-knowing). However, unlike the ‘Bad Samaritan’ example, information on 
which expectations can be based is not made explicit in non-natural concepts. Someone 
who is not surprised about the idea o f a supernatural person may simply have stronger 
beliefs in the existence o f such unusual beings. Hence, one way to get at actual 
tolerance or acceptance would include the measurement o f baseline expectations about 
the existence o f such non-natural representations. Tolerance o f contradiction arising
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from  counter-intuitive representations, then, is indicated by surprise ratings that are 
lower than those we would anticipate based on expectation ratings. The larger the gap 
between those two ratings, the larger the acceptance or tolerance.
It could be argued that expectations or beliefs and surprise about counter­
intuitiveness measure the same cognitive phenomenon. I do not think that this is the 
case. Although a person’s expectation o f a supernatural concept should co-vary with the 
amount o f surprise experienced if it were true, degrees o f expectation and surprise are 
conceptually dissimilar because their levels o f representation are different. Huss’ 
construal o f actual belief as something akin to a ‘feeling’ (the lawyer may ask ‘how 
likely is it that my defendant is not guilty?’) and acceptance as an ‘act o f the will’ 
essentially mirrors first-order intuitive and second-order metarepresentational beliefs.
As argued by Donaldson (1985), the human capacity for surprise is related to the ability 
to have beliefs about beliefs. By asking individuals how surprised they would be if 
something implausible turned out to be true, we invite them to suspend (intuitive) 
expectations, a process that requires a capacity for second-order thought. Tolerance for 
contradictions about counter-intuitive concepts in Study 4, therefore, is based on levels 
o f surprise about such concepts, taking into account baseline levels o f predictability or 
expectations.
Hypotheses
Boyer's idea o f non-natural concepts is about the violation o f intuitive expectations 
from ontological categories, while some measures o f TC have been based on less 
“strongly” intuitive expectations. In the measure o f surprise about expectation violating 
behaviour used in Study 1, TC is derived from a human tendency to think in terms o f 
dispositions, especially in contexts in which no situational information is available. 
Investigating TC by introducing Cl content allows us to look at more strongly held 
intuitions that are relevant to religion.
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In contrast to TC measures in Study 1, contradictions in Cl concepts are not explicit 
unless their unexpectedness is made salient. This can be achieved by taking into account 
individual expectations of Cl concepts before presenting a counter-factual scenario. By 
quantifying degrees o f surprise about such scenarios, TC about Cl comes to represent a 
measure o f one’s ability to “cope” with the unexpected or intuition-violating content.
The religious or quasi-religious nature o f Cl allows us to assess whether TC can vary 
depending on the content o f the expectation-violations individuals are presented with.
Due to their quasi-religious content, non-natural person concepts should be judged as 
more credible or probable (and therefore less surprising) by members o f religious 
relative to secular groups. The first hypothesis to be tested in this study is that religious 
groups have higher tolerance of counter-intuitiveness (TCI) relative to the secular group, 
where C1E stands for expectations o f learning about the existence o f counter-intuitive 
concepts and CIS designates surprise about their actual existence.
HI: ‘TCI’: CIE: Buddh./Angl.. > Sec.; CIs-' Budd./Angl. < Sec.
At the same time, Study 1 indicates that a general tolerance for contradictions is greatest 
among Buddhists. From this we can derive a second hypothesis, namely that Buddhists’ 
TC for counter-intuitive concepts (TCCI) is higher than that o f the other two groups (see 
Table 5.3). Higher TCCI is indicated by relatively higher values when TCI measured by 
surprise (TCIs) is subtracted from TCI measured by expectation (TCIe).
H2A: ‘TCCI’: TCIE-T C IS: Buddh. > Angl/Sec.
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Table 5.3: R elig ious G roups and T olerances for C ontradictions and C ounter-intuitiveness
H-A D im ensions Comparative Score
Secular-
Humanist
Anglican Buddhist
T olerance of Contradictions (Study 1) Intermed. Low High
T olerance of Counter-intuitiveness (Cl) 
(H ypothesis 1, this study) Low High High
Tolerance of Contradictions about Cl 
(H ypotheses 2 + 3, this study) Low-Intermed. Intermed.
High
Among Secular Humanists, TCCI should also be evident in a drop of tolerance for 
contradictions if the source o f the contradiction is rooted in intuition-violating concepts 
rather than intuitive items. TC should also be weakened among Christians, where 
supernatural content would increase the explicitness or salience o f the contradiction. 
However, since it is a group that should tolerate quasi-religious representations, this 
drop in tolerance should be less severe than for the secular sample. Finally, the drop in 
TCCI relative to intuitive/natural control items should be least severe among Buddhists, 
who should have both high TC and high TCI.
H2B: ‘TCCI': TCControl - TCCI: Sec. > Angl. > Buddh.
Measures
Counter-Intuitive Concepts
In order to identify counter-intuitive concepts, I conducted a confirmatory study with 
53 students from a British university who participated for course credit. Measures 
consisted o f person violations adapted from Boyer and Ramble's (2001) research on 
counter-intuitive concepts and their transmission. A total o f eight category incongruous 
concepts were used. Four o f those were physical breaches (e.g. ‘a person who can walk 
through walls without damaging the walls or him/herself) and four were psychological 
or theory o f mind breaches (e.g. ‘a person who can see events as they will actually 
happen in the future’) of intuitive expectations we hold about persons. Counter-intuitive 
items were randomly interspersed with so-called kind-incongruous items (what Barrett
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& Nyhof, 2001 have termed ‘bizarre’ concepts, such as ‘a person who can fell a tree 
with his bare hands’) as well as standard items (e.g. ‘a person who has short hair’). Half 
o f the participants were asked how plausible they considered the concepts, while the 
other half rated their surprise about the hypothetical existence o f those persons, based 
on a 20-point scale ranging from ‘not surprised [plausible] at all’ to ‘very surprised 
[plausible]’.
As expected, the sample showed the lowest tolerance for counter-intuitive concepts 
and the highest for standard ones (mean difference o f about 10). Ratings between 
bizarre and both psychological and physical counter-intuitive person concepts differed 
significantly, but not surprisingly, tolerance for persons violating intuitive psychology 
was greater than for intuitive physics. Factor analysis warranted the inclusion o f three 
out o f four items in the experiment.
Measuring First-Order Beliefs
How can we measure baseline beliefs about counter-intuitive concepts? One option 
may be to ask people about degrees to which they think the existence o f those persons is 
possible or likely. Unfortunately, the interpretation o f such questions about intuitions of 
possibility, as discussed in the literature on modal logic (e.g. Hughes & Cresswell,
2001; Bealer, 2002; Melia, 2003), may itself be strongly influenced by cultural or 
religious differences. It would not be feasible to determine the degree to which 
questions o f possibility are affected by second-order religious beliefs.
Hence, Boyer and Ramble’s (2001) question whether concepts are ‘normal’,
‘possible but very rare’ or ‘impossible’ are problematic. In some groups, ‘impossible’ 
could refer to epistemic possibility, whereas other groups may tend to think o f it as a 
metaphysical possibility (Bealer, 2002, p. 81). Epistemic possibility is a judgment based 
on actual knowledge. Metaphysical possibility, by contrast, is about conceivability: it is 
possible for a ghost to exist, even though the existence of ghosts is not known. While
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the non-existence o f supernatural phenomena can be falsified, this is not the case for 
arguments in favour o f their existence, which often rely on an appeal to metaphysical 
claims and inherent limits of science to understand certain phenomena. The concept of 
faith or belief, in most religions, is all about metaphysical belief or conceivability. As a 
result, epistemic expectations come closest to a comparable bottom-line measure for 
counter-intuitive concepts. This study’s baseline ratings, then, consisted o f 20-point 
scales asking about the individuals’ perceived likelihood of learning about the existence 
of different persons, composed o f people with normal, bizarre or counter-intuitive 
features. Participants were then asked about their levels o f surprise applied to a scenario 
in which certain kinds o f persons were discovered and their existence verified beyond 
doubt. By reducing the interference o f metaphysical possibility in baseline measures as 
much as possible, while also asking about their personal expectations (rather than a 
diffuse possibility), this procedure should induce a contradictions between expectations 
(or intuition) and the counter-factual scenario.
Broadly speaking, then, this study investigates (quasi-) religious content, reflected in 
individual beliefs and forms o f TC (‘cognitive processes’) (Fig. 5.5).
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Fig. 5.5: Study 4 Model
Fig. 5.5: Study 4
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5.4.3 Method 
Participants
The sample consisted of people recruited from the same organisations who took part 
in Study 1 one and one-half years prior to the current study, yielding a total of 62 
Buddhists (mean age 47.3; 36 males, 26 females), 61 Anglicans (mean age 49.5; 29 
males, 32 females) and 107 Secular Humanists (mean age 46.3; 41 females, 66 males). 
All respondents participated voluntarily. Response rates were 75% for Buddhists, 87% 
for Anglicans and 89% for Secular-Humanists. Educational attainment of people 
represented in the sample was similar to that of Study 1, with a median education of 
‘university graduate’ in each group.
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Design and Procedure
Potential respondents were contacted by email and asked to participate in a study 
about how people solve problems in everyday life and how they think about unusual 
persons. Participants first completed Chan’s TC questions, consisting o f ten 5-point 
Likert scale items (with answers ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’), 
asking about explicit beliefs related to tolerance o f contradictions. These were followed 
by baseline ratings o f epistemic expectations in the form o f judgments about the 
likelihood o f ever learning about the existence o f normal (3 items), bizarre (3 items) and 
counter-intuitive (6 items; 3 psychology-violating and 3 physics-violating) persons, 
measured on a 20-point scale ranging from ‘not at all likely’ to ‘very likely’. In the 
‘counter-intuitive’ condition, participants were then presented with the scenario o f 
psychology and physics-violating concepts turning out to be true and asked about their 
ratings o f surprise. In the control condition, ratings were done for normal and bizarre 
items.
5.4.4 Results
Religious Difference on the TC Score
As expected, Buddhists’ TC scores (mean=3.66) were higher than those o f Anglicans 
(mean=3.39), replicating findings about tolerance for contradictions found in Study 1. 
Moreover, this measure shows particularly striking differences between the Eastern 
religious group and Secular-Humanists (mean=3.22), mirroring finding from the beliefs- 
based holism score in Study 1, F{2, 216) = 18.98,/? = .000. There was no effect o f age, 
gender or education.
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Fig. 5.6: Religious Differences on TC Score
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A closer analysis of responses indicates that differences between religious and 
secular groups are particularly striking for agreement with the statement ‘People who 
maintain that it is possible for two opposing interpretations of the same event to be both 
true are illogical or unrealistic’. For the Secular-Anglican contrast another item with 
strong differences was ‘When my friend's view on an issue is opposite to my view, I 
usually think of situations in which both my view and my friend's view can be valid at 
the same time’. This may well be influenced by a more reconciliatory orientation 
towards conflict with significant others among religious individuals. The Buddhist- 
Anglican contrast was particularly evident in a statement that seems to tap into the heart 
of the TC construct, namely ‘When faced with a puzzling issue in which there are two 
opposing but equally possible interpretations, I would typically gather information to 
rule out one of the two interpretations’. Finally, contrasting worldviews with respect to
Secular-Humanist BuddhistA n g lica n
Group
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moral relativism were manifested in Buddhists’ lower agreement with the statement that 
in ‘most situations, whether an act is morally right or wrong is clear cut’.
Religious Differences in Tolerance o f Counter-intuitiveness
Tolerance o f contradictions with different kinds o f content is measured in the second 
part of the study, ranging from counter-intuitive to bizarre and normal person concepts. 
There are three types o f ‘tolerances’ that are addressed, a general tolerance of counter­
intuitiveness (TCI), a general tolerance of contradictions (TC), as well as tolerance of 
contradictions about counter-intuitiveness (TCCI).
A general tolerance o f counter-intuitiveness is simply evident in relatively high 
epistemic likelihood (expectation) ratings o f those concepts, alongside relatively low 
surprise ratings about their existence. For example, a person might give a score o f 15 
out o f 20 for a Cl concept’s likelihood of existence (TCIe = 15) and a corresponding 5 
out o f 20 rating about their surprise if the Cl item did exist. Since lower surprise ratings 
indicate greater tolerance, TCIs is indicated by the reverse-coded score: 15. In this 
example, TCI is high, but the surprise rating corresponds exactly to the expectation 
rating. General tolerance o f contradictions (TC), on the other hand, is reflected in a lack 
o f need for consistency between expectations and surprise for any type o f representation. 
A ‘tolerance o f contradictions about counter-intuitiveness’ (TCCI) would be indicated 
by TCIs being greater than TCIe. For example, a person with high TCCI might consider 
it unlikely to ever learn about the existence o f a person who knows the future (e.g. 
expectation rating o f 5, hence TCIe= 5), while also indicating that she wouldn’t be 
particularly surprised about their actual existence (e.g. surprise = 5; hence, TCIs = 15).
The first hypothesis (HI) tested in this study was that counter-intuitiveness is more 
tolerated among religious groups than its secular comparison group. A multivariate 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) o f religious group on both expectations o f and 
surprise about counter-intuitive persons, controlling for age, education and gender,
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confirms the hypothesis that religious groups have both higher expectations (measured 
on a 20-point scale, with means of 4.76 for Anglicans, 5.58 for Buddhists) and lower 
surprise levels (means of 13.17 and 11.34, respectively) for quasi-religious concepts 
compared to Secular-Humanists (means of 2.79 and 16.47), F(2, 101) = 11.36,/? = .000, 
and F(2, 101) = 10.31, p = .000. None of the control variables had a significant effect. 
Figure 5.7 illustrates these differences with surprise levels reverse-coded (TCIs). Hence 
a higher position of the line indicates greater overall TCI. A greater slope of the line 
represents higher levels of TCCI.
Fig. 5.7: Overall Tolerance of Counter-Intuitive Concepts
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TCCI arises when the difference between the surprise-based tolerance (TCIs) and 
expectations-based tolerance (TCIe) is relatively great, due to low surprise even when, 
epistemically, individuals expect a low likelihood of learning about the existence of
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certain person concepts. It was hypothesised (H2A) that Buddhists, a religious group 
with relatively high tolerance o f contradictions overall, have a high tolerance of 
contradictions for quasi-religious content. This was in fact the case, indicated by TCCI 
that was greatest for Buddhists (mean=3.14), intermediate for Anglicans (mean=2.07) 
and lowest for Secular-Humanists (mean=0.74), F(2, 118) = 4.80,p  = .01 (see Figures 
5.7 and 5.8).
For groups either lacking in the religious component (Secular-Humanists) or TC 
component (Anglicans), tolerance levels should drop with counter-intuitive content, 
because the contradictions become increasingly salient. T-tests corroborate the expected 
difference in tolerance o f contradictions in the counter-intuitive condition (H2B), which 
is significant for Secular-Humanists, /(105) = -3.08, p  < .01, but not Buddhists, f(58) = - 
.01, ns. The intermediate position o f the Christian sample is reflected in a significant 
decline of TC for counter-intuitive physics violations, /(59) = -3.37, p  = .001, but not 
intuitive psychology breaches, /(59) = .28, ns. This was not the case in the other samples 
under examination.
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Fig. 5.8: Tolerance of Contradictions: Control vs Counter-Intuitive 
Concepts
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5.4.5 Discussion
Tolerance of contradictions was investigated in this study by expanding its range 
‘upwards’, to a reflective level, and ‘downwards’, to a more implicit level of thought.
The results of the experiment are able to both complement and strengthen findings in 
Study 1. Strong religious differences on the TC score directly mirror variations in H-A 
beliefs measured previously, with Buddhists showing levels of TC that are higher than 
both Christian and secular comparison groups. This places renewed emphasis on robust 
H-A differences with respect to explicit beliefs. A replication of Study 1 including the 
TC Score would be needed to confirm whether this variable clearly fits into the 
‘tolerance of contradictions’ dimension of H-A thought or even represents a higher 
order variable.
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By bringing the concept of counter-intuitiveness to bear on tolerance of 
contradictions, quasi-religious content was introduced in a more fine-grained analysis of 
TC. While past work in H-A and tolerance of contradictions has been primarily 
interested in structures or processes, the present study investigated the intersection 
between content and structure. It was hypothesised that religious groups would be more 
accepting o f person concepts that violate intuitive psychology or physics. This was 
indeed the case, as both Anglicans and Buddhists demonstrated significantly higher 
expectations and lower surprise about non-natural representations than their secular 
counterparts.
In the ‘surprise about expectation violations in behaviour’ variable adapted for 
Study 1, expectations were not directly measured. Contradictions were implied (or made 
indirectly explicit) by the discrepancy between the actor’s dispositions and his actual 
behaviour. The instrument in this study, by contrast, made contradictions explicit by 
both introducing more strongly counter-intuitive content and by first asking participants 
about their perceived likelihood of learning about counter-intuitive persons’ existence 
before being presented with a counter-factual scenario. I expected that the salience o f 
this contradiction would be influenced by both tolerance of counter-intuitiveness and 
tolerance o f contradictions. Among Secular-Humanists, a group with relatively low 
levels o f both types o f tolerances, the resulting tolerance o f contradictions about 
counter-intuitive concepts was hypothesised to be low. On the other hand, by virtue o f 
being a religious group with high TC levels, Buddhists were expected to have high 
tolerance for contradictions arising from counter-intuitiveness. Anglicans, a religious 
group with low tolerance o f contradictions, were hypothesised to score intermediately. 
The data provided a very good backing for this hypothesis. More specifically, it 
emerged that Christians’ intermediate level o f TCCI was the result o f tolerance of 
contradictions that were higher for psychology than physics violations.
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Perhaps a group with high TC and low tolerance o f counter-intuitiveness would be a 
useful addition in future research in order to learn about the dynamics between the two 
types o f tolerances. For now, the findings o f this study may represent a first step in 
bringing together cross-cultural psychology and cognitive anthropology, fields that 
converge in the emerging area o f ‘cognition and culture’ research, but approach similar 
questions from different directions. More specifically, future investigations should 
direct attention to the intersection o f culture and religion. What happens when tolerance 
for counter-intuitiveness meets tolerance for contradictions, such as among religious 
groups in Eastern cultural areas? What is the effect o f this convergence on the 
memorability, transmission and spread o f quasi-religious representations?
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Chapter 6 -  Conclusions and Implications
6.1 Summary
Buddhism, the most popular East Asian religion in Western culture, contains 
metaphysical and epistemological teachings that are enmeshed with holistic thought, 
including compassion, the ideal o f self-transcendence, assigning multiple causes to 
events, as well as dialectical thinking. Although there may be varying emphases on 
some o f these teachings across different Buddhist traditions, a certain degree o f 
homogeneity was assumed for the purpose o f this thesis, which focused on Buddhists in 
the UK. The central theme discussed in this exploration was the question whether 
Westerners practicing an Eastern religion think more holistically than other religious or 
secular groups in our cultural region. By applying measures adapted from the cross- 
cultural psychology o f ‘holistic versus analytic’ thought, four studies were conducted, 
consisting o f  one main experiment and three follow-up studies that clarified some issues 
raised by the initial data. Taken together, findings provide support for within-cultural 
differences in H-A cognition, while also raising new questions about the nature and 
dynamics o f those cognitive patterns. Although the research upon which this thesis is 
based is not without limitations, its theoretical and practical implications are far- 
reaching, spanning from our understanding o f contexts o f thought to mechanisms 
operating between culture and individual reasoning.
Study 1 was administered to ethnically white British-bom Buddhists, Anglicans and 
Secular-Humanists and included six H-A measures, which ranged from more implicit to 
explicit variables and together made up three underlying dimensions. In contrast to 
Anglicans, Buddhists scored more holistically on the H-A continuum in five out o f six 
variables. The strongest group differences emerged for ‘theories o f behaviour’ and the 
‘holism score’, both o f which were reflective, beliefs-based variables. They were also
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subject to context effects among Buddhists, in the form o f religious group integration 
and religiosity (Study 1) as well as religious priming (Study 2). The importance o f 
religion as part o f the self-concept was a moderator o f Buddhists’ holistic beliefs 
(Studies 1 and 2) and holistic grouping in a mixed student sample (Study 3). In 
‘relational-contextual vs category-based grouping’, both religious groups stood apart 
from Secular Humanists in their holistic preferences. Study 3 demonstrated that this 
difference is more likely due to religious group membership than secular thought, 
although this may be partly produced by cognitive self-selection among Buddhists (see 
section 6.3). ‘Differentiation vs compromise’ and ‘surprise about expectation violating 
behaviour’ variables constituted the ‘tolerance for contradictions’ dimension in Study 1, 
but only showed significant differences between Christian and Buddhist samples. Study 
4 increased the range o f TC, leading to the expected and robust group differences when 
using either a beliefs-based TC score or making contradictions more salient.
Overall, religious differences in the results o f this thesis show a diversity o f thinking 
that goes beyond the realms o f what may often be assumed to be part o f religiosity, such 
as values, beliefs and norms associated with being a good person, coping with life or 
hoping for an afterlife. Although the strongest differences in H-A thought did emerge 
for beliefs, which were themselves subject to variations in religious contexts, there were 
also differences in cognitive preferences on a cognitively ‘deeper’ or more implicit level. 
Thinking processes o f this kind cannot be taught directly by religious doctrine or 
practice.
6.2 Theoretical Implications
6.2.1 The Cross-Cultural Psychology of Holistic versus Analytic Thought
For cross-cultural scholars, the findings o f this research provide both affirmations 
and challenges to Nisbett et al.’s (2001, 2003) H-A ‘systems o f thought’. The most
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obvious support for the cultural origins o f H-A distinctions is provided by the 
convincingly more holistic cognition present among Western groups who have adopted 
an East Asian religious lifestyle. However, equating H-A thought with East-West 
cultural distinctions implies that cognitive differences are the result o f socialisation and 
a continued cultural reinforcement in their respective social environments. Western 
Buddhists’ cognitive patterns confront this assumption. Buddhists in the West are only a 
subculture, but exhibit differences previously found only in cross-cultural studies. 
Considering also that their “age o f conversion” does not usually occur until adulthood 
(thirty years on average in Study 1), and assuming that H-A differences are in part the 
outcome o f religious practice rather than their cause, findings produced by this thesis 
indicate that ‘culture’ does not have to be internalised before adulthood in order to 
change cognitive patterns. In that sense, Buddhists are at a clear learning disadvantage 
compared to individuals who have absorbed two cultures from an early age, yet they 
exhibit some o f the characteristics o f a bicultural group. This is not only evident in their 
more holistic cognition overall, but also in variations due to the strength o f the religious 
self-concept, practices and integration.
If, on the other hand, we consider holistic thought among British Buddhists as a 
‘natural’ variation o f H-A within a Western cultural area, parallels to within-cultural 
distributions o f personality structures could be drawn. However, my results seem to 
challenge strong views o f such a culture—personality link and cross-cultural 
differences. The best know of these relatively reductionist and totalising theories in the 
anthropological tradition o f ‘culture and personality’ (for an overview see Inkeles & 
Levinson, 1969; Toren, 1996) is probably that o f ‘national character’ (e.g. Benedict, 
1946), a school o f thought that generalized personality traits for whole populations and 
was particularly popular in the post-WWII U.S. However, my findings are not 
necessarily inconsistent with the ‘modal personality’ strand o f this school (for early
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work see e.g. DuBois, 1960), which allows for more within-cultural variation in 
psychological characteristics. Western Buddhists could simply be located on the holistic 
tail o f the H-A distribution. Since the work of Alex Inkeles (1953), some o f the modal 
personality ideas have ‘merged’ or been replaced with ideas in the ‘personality and 
social structure’ area o f sociology (House, 1981), which has become more interested in 
investigating sub-units o f culture in relationship to personality.
Results presented in this research challenge some implicit assumptions about H-A 
systems’ internal consistency and dynamics. The six H-A indicators used in Study 1 
made up three different latent dimensions that were not correlated, suggesting that the 
connection between components of H-A systems cannot be readily supported by 
empirical evidence. One o f the three H-A clusters even gave rise to a paradox. Grouping 
preferences became more analytic as a result o f the religious prime in Study 1, while its 
explicit sibling, the holism score, was affected in a holistic direction in Study 2. 
Moreover, H-A categorisation, which was presented either before or after grouping in a 
counter-balanced design in Study 1, was subject to an order effect (controlled for in the 
analysis) that was close to the magnitude o f religious group differences. These 
unexpected findings warrant further scrutiny of the nature o f H-A cognition as a whole, 
as well as particular contexts in which it occurs.
In Chapter 2 ,1 noted a lack o f empirical exploration o f interrelations between H-A 
measures and no attempt to find a higher-order H-A variable in past research that could 
back up the ‘holistic-analytic’ distinction. H-A differences are not an actual dichotomy, 
but degrees o f cognitive preferences that tie together perception/attention, metaphysics 
and epistemologies that seem to dominate certain cultural areas. I concluded that H-A 
thought should be seen as systems o f theoretically related styles of information 
processing rather than cognitive styles. Norenzayan and Heine’s (2005) distinction 
between true non-universals, existential universals and functional universals, discussed
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in the beginning, may be a useful point o f reference. According to the authors, true non- 
universals only exist if cognitive tasks lead to completely different preferences or 
solutions across cultures, regardless o f context. If  there is a variation only for certain 
functions/contexts, or if differences are based on frequency of use, we can only refer to 
them as ‘existential universals’ across cultures. The results of this thesis indicate that H- 
A cognition is at best about such ‘existential universals’. Not only are H-A differences a 
matter of degree, exhibited on cultural and subcultural levels, but apparent non­
universality is also strongly affected by context effects. Both expected and unexpected 
context effects uncovered in this thesis can be interpreted as a challenge to Nisbett and 
colleagues’ emphasis on entrenched cross-cultural differences; at best, the findings call 
for the construction o f more dynamic H-A models.
Peng et al. (2001) labelled the approach that Nisbett and most o f his students have 
used as the ‘theories’ tradition o f culture and human inference, which must be 
understood in a dynamic system with the ‘values’ (individualism-collectivism OR 
INDCOL) as well as the ‘self (independence-interdependence or INDINT) traditions in 
cross-cultural psychology. The first three studies in this thesis highlighted the 
importance o f viewing H-A thought as the product o f those processes, particularly the 
‘self in relationship to the ‘theories’ dimension. In Study 1, the strength of individuals’ 
Buddhist self-concept was an even more powerful predictor of holistic beliefs than the 
more complex religiosity measure. Study 2 showed how degrees o f this ‘Buddhist self 
may lead to different levels o f accessibility o f holistic beliefs, while Study 3 illustrated 
its relationship to both INDINT and H-A in the form o f relational-contextual grouping 
preferences.
Evidence in support o f the ‘meditative learning’ hypothesis derived from 
Whitehouse’s modes o f religiosity theory indicates that religious practices (in this case 
meditation) have a bearing on both Tower’ and ‘higher’ cognitive processes. More
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advanced meditation not only seemed to lead to greater holistic categorisation 
preferences, but also an enhanced appreciation of more reflective holistic theories, 
suggesting that religious practices could play a role in the absorption o f ‘cognitively 
costly’ aspects o f religion. This finding, along with the association between 
religiosity/self-concept/integration and holistic beliefs underscores the relevance of 
House’s (1981) proximity and components principles in statistical comparisons of 
different sociocultural groups or positions. Group membership alone does not tell us 
much about the mechanisms operating at the intersection o f culture and the individual, 
such as social integration or practices that may produce individual-level differences in 
thoughts and behaviours. House’s view complements the socialisation or enculturation 
perspective inherent in most o f Nisbett et al’s H-A literature.
6.2.2 The Psychology of Religion
With respect to the psychology o f religion, research findings on context effects 
suggest that religion can act as a schema (Spilka et al., 1985; McIntosh, 1995). Evidence 
obtained in Study 2, more particularly, lends credence to McIntosh (1995), who argues 
that the relative centrality o f religious schemas to the self-concept should have 
implications for the accessibility and activation o f knowledge. Differences in H-A 
cognition overall also demonstrate the impact o f religion on thought that goes beyond 
the content or context o f religion itself, most dramatically apparent in the implicit 
measures used in my research. Following past studies on causal attribution among 
religious populations (e.g. Loewenthal & Cornwall, 1993; Lupfer et al., 1992; Parsuram 
& Sharma, 1996; Spilka et al., 1985), H-A cognition may be a promising area o f inquiry 
into cognitive mediators between religiosity and outcomes ranging from general 
decision making to well-being.
From the perspective o f causal (social) attributions more specifically, results 
demonstrate no dramatic differences between Anglican and nonreligious populations.
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The inclusion o f non-Western religions, however, shows a possible new direction that 
goes beyond religious versus naturalistic attributions for events. H-A thinking, in the 
main, could be investigated as a possible link between religiosity and everyday thoughts 
and behaviours. For example, the interaction between H-A cognition, especially 
attribution, and degrees o f religiosity, integration or identification could be studied in 
more detail in relationship to coping and well-being. In a more social psychological 
vein, the scope o f causal thinking could be expanded to self and other as well as in­
group and out-group attributions. Do H-A preferences across religions interact with 
religious values and beliefs (e.g. fundamentalism) that influence levels o f out-group 
intolerance, or do affective components o f religion drown styles o f thinking in 
determining those kinds o f outcomes? In order to address those kinds o f issues, more 
research may be needed to reduce complex H-A systems o f thought into a reliable set of 
coherent H-A indicators.
6.2.3 Culture and Cognition: Bringing Together Top-Down and Bottom-Up 
Approaches
In the introduction o f this thesis, I identified the emerging area o f ‘culture and 
cognition’, a field in which the search for cultural differences by psychologists has not 
adequately accounted for the work by cognitive anthropologists and evolutionary 
psychologists who are interested in cognitive universals. I discussed two relevant 
theories in cognitive anthropology that seek to explain how religion is transmitted: 
religious representations as counter-intuitive ‘cognitively optimal’ concepts (e.g. Boyer 
1994, 2000) and Whitehouse’s (2000, 2004, 2005) ‘modes of religiosity’ theory for 
more ‘cognitively costly’ aspects o f religiosity.
Whitehouse’s doctrinal and imagistic modes of religiosity seem to capture the 
cognitive consequences of Christian and, to some extent, Buddhist religions. The 
transformative power o f religious experience in the imagistic mode, through practices
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like Buddhist meditation, along with the study o f its complex metaphysical teachings, is 
one possible explanation for differences in cognition outside o f the religious context. 
Rather than the relatively passive learning and repetition o f religious beliefs, values and 
rituals in the doctrinal mode, Buddhism may have the power to change individuals’ 
perception and interpretation of the world around them in more profound ways. 
Although both Christians and Buddhists value pro-social emotions and behaviour, 
Buddhist teachings and practices go beneath the surface o f those ideals, for example by 
raising a requisite awareness of interdependence in the form of a relationship between 
mind, body and the physical as well as social environment. The data in Study 1 showed 
some o f the cognitive implications o f meditative practices.
Unlike scholars interested in universal aspects o f religion, much of the cross-cultural 
psychology o f H-A reasoning has been preoccupied with cognitive processes that 
operate independently o f their content, with the notable exception o f causal reasoning 
about social behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 3, some intuitive foundations o f human 
psychology, theory o f mind and essentialism, have already captured the attention o f 
cross-cultural researchers in this area. I argued that, in contrast to the more experience- 
based intuitive aspects o f holism, essentialism captures analytic thought particularly 
well. It can be viewed as the core o f how the world is organised (e.g. by categorising 
objects according to necessary and sufficient rules or grouping concepts on the basis of 
shared essences) and low TC, which often relies on the non-violation o f essence 
properties, such as individual dispositions. Viewing people’s dispositions as essences 
extends the concept o f essentialism to the realm o f social attribution. However, 
universal dispositionism is thought to occur only under conditions where information 
about the context o f behaviour is absent. As a result, real-world social attributions tend 
to be modified by cultural theories about the causes of behaviour. Clearly,
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dispositionism lacks the strong intuitive foundations that are violated in non-natural 
counter-intuitive beliefs occurring in the domain o f religion.
Study 4 highlighted the importance o f varying degrees o f counter-intuitive content in 
the person domain. By looking at TC for Cl concepts, it was an attempt to investigate 
the interaction o f content and process. It revealed that, while Christians were least 
tolerant of contradictions in some areas (Study 1), relative to the secular group their TC 
levels were greater when quasi-religious content was introduced. They were more 
tolerant of counter-intuitive person concepts that violate basic assumption about 
psychology and physics than their secular counterparts. However, Buddhists were most 
tolerant of contradictions arising between expectations and the possible existence o f 
those persons. In addition, content that was strongly counter-intuitive reduced TC 
among secular individuals, and less so Anglicans, but had no such effect on Buddhists.
The distinction between cognitively optimal and costly aspects of religion runs 
parallel with intuitive versus reflective levels o f thinking. Study 4 showed that reflective 
beliefs related to TC, in the form o f a TC score, are highest for Buddhists, intermediate 
for Anglicans and lowest for Secular Humanists. Similarly, tolerance o f cognitively 
optimal non-natural concepts (TCI) is higher among religious groups, but increasing the 
explicitness of the contradictions apparent in those representations only left Buddhists’ 
TCCI unaffected. If TC, like holistic beliefs, is an expression o f cognitively costly 
religious teachings and practices, these findings can be interpreted as an example o f the 
interaction between cognitively optimal and costly aspects o f religion. In other words, 
they reinforce Pyysiainen’s (2004) reasoning that counter-intuitive concepts are explicit 
modifications o f the intuitive beliefs and that thinking in the religious domain is 
“characterized by both counterintuitiveness and a tendency to rationalize” (p. 143). 
Study 4 shows that, compared to Anglicans, Buddhists may have superior tools (TC) to 
rationalise beliefs that run counter to our intuition.
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These findings are an important step in creating synergies between cognitive 
anthropology and cultural psychology in culture and cognition research. The cross- 
cultural discipline would do well in bringing intuitive foundations to bear more closely 
on cognitive differences in order to gain a better understanding o f the complexity of 
human thought. My work on TC and Cl could be advanced by using story-telling 
formats and then measure rates of recall. Those stories could then be re-told in order to 
simulate cultural transmission. Are there different implications for recall o f Cl concepts 
among populations with varying levels o f TCCI? We should expect that high TCCI is 
associated with low rates of recall due to a decreased ability o f those concepts to be 
attention-grabbing and hence memorable.
A second implication o f TC in conjunction with Cl relates to domains or contexts in 
which counter-intuitive beliefs thrive. If TC were indeed a tool to “rationalise” Cl, we 
would expect tolerance for supernatural concepts to more readily spill into domains 
outside of religion among high TC cultures. This hypothesis could be investigated by 
comparing religious and secular groups’ TC, TCI and TCCI across cultures, potentially 
revealing less significant subcultural differences in high TC cultures. In addition, it 
could be explored whether Cl concepts are more prevalent in texts outside of the 
religious domain in certain cultures.
6.2.4 Implications for a ‘Religion and Cognition’ Model
The ‘religion and cognition’ model presented in this thesis (see Section 4.1.2) was an 
attempt to fuse relevant theoretical approaches concerned with the understanding o f 
cultural effects on individual thinking from cross-cultural cognitive psychology, social 
psychology and sociology. Due to the origins o f the model’s main components (from 
closely related disciplines with similar methodologies), it cannot account for dynamics 
that anthropologists or evolutionary psychologists might consider equally relevant, 
ranging from historical and collective aspects o f culture, religion and cognition, to
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innate cognitive structures, as well as the bi-directional flow between the individual and 
culture.
In the model, religion was represented as a subculture with two main conceptual 
dimensions: social structure and cultural content. In my empirical work, cultural content 
stood for a religion’s teachings, expressed in its metaphysics and epistemology, and 
ultimately individuals’ values and beliefs. Social structure, on the other hand, took the 
form o f a more objective measure o f religious integration (Study 1) and, on the level o f 
the self, values related to independence versus interdependence (Study 3). As indicated 
by Nisbett (2003; also Markus & Kitayama, 1991), perceptions of interdependence are 
themselves a reflection o f attention (to self versus social group or object vs context), 
which mediates the relationship between social structure and individual thought. Study 
1 demonstrated that greater religious integration decreases dispositional thinking, while 
Study 3 showed that the strength o f religious self-concepts could itself be predicted by 
values in favour o f interdependence. Considering that the religious self-concept, along 
with overall religiosity, was also a determinant o f holistic beliefs (Study 1) and 
moderator of religious context effects (Study 2), results taken together suggest a 
triangular relationship between social structure, cultural content and the self.
It could be said, then, that the self-concept, such as degrees o f religious identification, 
serves as a switch or dial adjusting the impact of religion on individual thought.
Religious practices, included in Study 1 ’s religiosity measure and separately in the form 
o f meditation, showed to have an impact on holistic beliefs, and, on a more implicit 
level, categorisation. As a result, my analysis indicates that a cognitive ‘trickle down’ 
effect o f learned explicit beliefs that become applied in everyday inference, as 
illustrated by Nisbett’s model, are too simplistic in explaining H-A differences. This 
thesis supports a more complex causal model taking into account effects o f both 
beliefs/theories and social structures/integration, on the system level o f religion,
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affecting cognition via the self-concept, the strength o f internalised values and beliefs, 
as well as individual-level religious practices, such as meditation.
6.3 Limitations
Despite some compelling findings produced by this thesis, they are not without 
limitations. Due to the large number of measures developed in past H-A studies, this 
research had to be limited to a selection of variables. Similarly, although the use o f 
Internet-based methods allowed for an efficient large-scale recruiting from specialised 
and dispersed populations, it restricted the scope o f variables that could safely be 
included in the research instrument. Most notably, perceptual measures that would have 
made a useful addition to implicit H-A variables, but rely on strict experimental controls, 
were absent. Internet experiments do not provide a constant setting like a laboratory, 
invariable screen size and viewing distance, or even a reliable measurement o f response 
times. Assuming that the less stringent controls possible in this research did not lead to 
systematic biases, any remaining influences that could not be controlled for must be 
relegated to random error in the interpretation o f results.
The use o f Internet technology may also have influenced the demographics o f the 
samples, although this problem has decreased over time as the age range and socio­
economic backgrounds o f Internet users has increased. In the case o f Buddhists, 
technology (along with general accessibility issues) contributed to the fact that 
recruiting efforts excluded individuals at Buddhist monasteries. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that highly devoted Western Buddhists, such as monks, would 
have produced cognitive differences on the same or even larger scale than the actual lay 
samples.
Studies 1 and 2 tried to curb response biases by offering both prize draw entries and 
donations, while students in Study 3 participated for course credit. Nonetheless, some 
response biases or self-selection issues are likely to remain. These would be particularly
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problematic if, despite the offering o f different incentives, motivations for participation 
were markedly different across the populations studied. Since experimental research is 
about the comparison o f groups, contributing to internal validity, random assignment to 
conditions renders non-random self-selection issues somewhat less challenging than 
other methods. Nevertheless, as is the case for most experimental studies in psychology, 
the generalisability of finding always has to be interpreted with caution.
A second type o f self-selection could have occurred earlier at the stage o f individuals 
joining religious or secular groups. In contrast to most Anglicans, the majority of 
Buddhists and Secular-Humanists joined or converted at some point in their adult lives. 
People who become Buddhists or Secular-Humanists may already have certain holistic 
or analytic preferences or patterns o f thinking in place. For Buddhists, this was 
indicated by the correlation between likeability o f Buddhist beliefs and holistic 
grouping in Study 3. Due to their reflective and normative nature, we should expect 
self-selection to be most apparent in explicit H-A variables, as evident in Anglicans’ 
intermediate position on the holism and TC scores. Years o f practice, in an interaction 
with meditation frequency, did seem relevant in explaining aspects o f H-A thoughts, but 
this thesis did not produce sufficient evidence in support o f a training, learning or 
socialisation effect o f Buddhism on H-A cognitive outcomes. Indeed, the significance of 
the religious self-concept in explaining cognition indicates that subjective variables may 
be even more powerful in explaining more reflective aspects o f H-A thought than 
objective measures like meditation practices.
Finally, a cautionary note should be made about research with specialised samples. 
Student samples can be largely considered naive subjects with respect to the aims o f 
experiments, which is particularly relevant in priming research. Recruiting from 
specialised populations, who tend to be targeted by other social scientists as well, leads 
to participants who may suspect that they are being recruited due to their religion or
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lifestyle. Even though I attempted to reduce this problem in the wording of my calls for 
participation, a risk o f biases can never be ruled out.
6.4 Directions for Future Research
As mentioned, some unresolved questions remain at the end o f this thesis. Clearly, a 
need for a fuller understanding o f interrelationships between components of H-A 
thought remains, although I hope to have shown some o f their complexities. This 
includes differences between explicit (beliefs-based) and implicit (applied) holism and 
their relevance for learning, change and contexts in H-A reasoning. In the case of 
religion, expanding the scope o f variables to include perceptual measures, such as field- 
dependence versus independence, would improve our understanding o f Buddhism’s 
effect on different H-A dimensions and their connection with social structures, cultural 
content and religious practices. By the same token, variables measuring people’s 
explanations or predictions o f events might show whether, as posited, religious or 
cultural priming manipulations are more relevant for judgments that directly apply 
theories (epistemology) to cognitive processes, such as causal reasoning as opposed to 
the organisation o f information (metaphysics). A look at a wider spectrum o f Buddhist 
practices (spanning collective rituals and more ‘individualistic’ meditation practices 
examined in this thesis) and their role in producing cognitive differences would be 
useful to have a more complete understanding of the mechanisms operating between 
religion and reasoning. Finally, investigations of religious conversion in relationship to 
H-A cognition could advance our knowledge o f possible self-selection and learning 
issues.
The religious groups investigated in this thesis directly correspond to cultural areas 
in which H-A distinctions are most evident. There may be an opportunity for future 
research to broaden the span of cultural groups and contexts under investigation,
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including other world religions like Hinduism (which emerged in the same cultural area 
as Buddhism), Judaism or Islam. The latter two cases may be particularly interesting 
because they represent religions that can be found in various cultural areas, ranging 
from the United States to East Asia. Unfortunately, I am not familiar enough with either 
religion’s doctrine to speculate about their implications for H-A cognition, but I suspect 
there may be ample variation across different cultural contexts. The reason behind this 
line o f reasoning is simply that there are other aspects o f religions that influence thought, 
not just teachings directly relevant to H-A metaphysics and epistemology (such as 
egolessness or dialecticism in Buddhism). I would also speculate that monotheism in 
Abrahamic religion is more closely allied with analytic thought, while nontheistic and 
especially perhaps polytheistic religions should espouse holism. Other important factors 
relate to structural and cultural aspects to do with degrees o f individualism-collectivism, 
where we might find differences between tightly-knit and highly collectivist religions in 
contrast to individualistic religions with dispersed communities.
For now, research on religions in different cultural contexts could start with a natural 
extension o f this thesis’ work: an investigation o f Christians in East Asia. Ultimately, 
research o f this kind can shed more light on the interaction between cultural and 
subcultural influences. In addition, research on both East-to-West and West-to-East 
flows o f culture and cognition can address the issue whether analytic cognition in the 
East is acquired at the same rate as holistic cognition in the West. A tentative argument 
in favour o f analytical thought being more easily learned than its holistic counterpart 
could be made. Holism, particularly its dialectical dimension, promotes complexity in 
reasoning. For instance, judging behaviour on account o f both contexts and dispositions 
or giving equal credence to seemingly opposed propositions at the same time should be 
more difficult than reducing causes to essential properties or avoiding apparent 
contradictions.
196
However, a different take on the matter would highlight the less formal nature of 
holistic cognition and imply a learning advantage by virtue of intuitiveness, as evident 
in family-resemblance based categorisation, for example. It is likely that the ease o f 
change or acquisition o f holistic as opposed to analytic thought is different for reflective 
than implicit cognition. On the level of H-A beliefs, issues o f resistance to change may 
be important. Hence, I think that the verdict is still out there and serious empirical 
investigations would be needed to answer questions about differences between holistic- 
to-analytic or analytic-to-holistic transitions. The results of this kind of work may allow 
us to probe deeper into the cognitive mechanisms underlying the H-A distinction.
6.4.1 Research in the World of Business
Assuming that H-A cognition is a meaningful distinction, we have to ask ourselves 
to what degree statistically significant H-A differences also translates into meaningful 
differences in the thoughts and actions o f everyday life. The psychology o f H-A thought 
would greatly benefit from approaches that seek to relate those cognitions to more 
practically relevant behaviour, including decision-making processes. Nisbett’s (2003) 
book The Geography o f  Thought was an attempt to bring H-A differences between 
Eastern and Western cultures to a wider audience, including politicians and business 
people, who are increasingly faced with intercultural communication issues. For 
example, do H-A differences affect the ways in which managers evaluate the 
performance of their employees, their business or the product that they are selling? Are 
they more likely to look for causality in relationships between larger contexts (e.g. the 
economy as a whole) and their business or do they tend to isolate causes? What is the 
implication of H-A differences on styles o f argumentation and persuasion?
Another illustration from the world o f business is the Net Promoter Score (NPS), a 
benchmarking tool that measures customer loyalty and word-of-mouth. Due to its 
simplicity, the NPS has become increasingly popular in recent years (Reichheld, 2003;
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Marsden, Samson & Upton, 2005; Samson, 2006). The score is based on research 
conducted in the U.S. and uses an 11-point scale question asking people about their 
likelihood of recommending a company to someone they know. It is computed by 
subtracting the percentage o f ‘detractors’ (0-6 scores) from ‘promoters’ (9-10 scores). 
There is no published cross-cultural work on the NPS to-date, but there are issues for 
which H-A thought might be relevant. Firstly, research on differentiation versus 
compromise would suggest that people with holistic cognitive backgrounds are more 
likely to give neutral ratings whereas analytic thinkers would use more extremes, 
changing the meaning o f cut-off points on the scale. Secondly, there is the issue of what 
‘goes into’ people’s responses. Based on H-A research, we know that analytic reasoning 
emphasises links between dispositions and behaviour more than between contexts and 
behaviour. Can we expect answers to the NPS question to be more predictive o f actual 
behaviour among analytic thinkers? Or, at the very least, are holistic thinkers more 
cautious in making predictions about their likelihood o f behaving in a certain way?
6.4.2 Cognition and Emotion: Tolerance for Contradictions and Religious 
Fundamentalism
Similarly, the relationship between emotions and cognition has been neglected in H- 
A theories and research. Emotion already has a prominent role in connection with 
cognition for at least three o f the theories discussed in this thesis. In Markus and 
Kitayama (1991), ego-focused (e.g. pride) versus other-focused emotions (e.g. 
compassion) are indicative o f the INDINT distinction between cultures, believed to 
contribute to H-A cognitive differences. In the psychology o f religion, emotional well­
being has been studied as an effect o f religiosity, mediated by cognitive processes like 
causal attributions. Finally, in ‘modes of religiosity’ theory, the emotional effect of 
ritual plays an important part in the kind o f memory system produced by doctrinal
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versus imagistic types. Empirical evidence for a connection between Buddhist versus 
Christian religious practices, emotion and H-A cognition is still needed.
One interesting starting point may be provided by the fact that the majority o f both 
Christians (74%) and Buddhists (90%) in the first study o f this thesis mentioned other- 
focused emotions as core values o f their religion, but only Buddhists’ H-A cognition 
was affected by a religious context. Buddhists’, but not Anglicans’, surprise levels about 
a religious individual not helping a person in need increased significantly as a result o f 
the religious prime. The priming effect could be either the result of a dispositionist shift 
among Buddhists or a matter o f the degree to which other versus self-focused emotion is 
valued in Buddhist and Anglican religions. For example Buddhists may be more 
strongly encouraged to express egolessness or other-focus in religious practice, ranging 
from pro-social behaviour to meditation. As a result, they may be more compelled to 
think (or feel) in a manner consistent with their religion’s core value. Nevertheless, the 
interesting part about this story is evident in Buddhist surprise levels being lower than 
that of the Anglican group in the no-prime condition, indicating greater TC and more 
complex theories o f behaviour for Buddhists. These findings suggest that Buddhists’ 
holistic way of thinking may be subject to possible clashes with religious emotions or 
values.
The history and current state o f humankind, with its many examples o f both 
cooperation and conflict, can only be understood by taking into account human emotion. 
A highly pertinent concept may be religious fundamentalism (e.g. Armstrong, 2000; 
Marty & Appleby, 1995). With this in mind, TC is perhaps the most promising H-A 
area, with the potential o f giving insights about not only psychological but inter­
personal and inter-group conflict resolution. Buddhism, the core focus o f this thesis, 
may well be one o f the least dogmatic and most peaceful world religions. By 
comparison, fundamentalist interpretations o f monotheistic religions appear to give rise
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to a paradox. This occurs if contradictions are accepted internally, within a religion’s 
teachings, but not externally between different worldviews. For example, not taking the 
lives o f other human beings may well be a universal religious value. In practice, 
however, the past and present has shown devastating results when the world is reduced 
into believers and non-believers or good and evil, which in turn justifies the violation o f 
fundamental humanitarian values espoused by most religious creeds.
The application o f H-A thinking to religious dynamics in psychological and social 
areas of conflict would be a fascinating area o f future investigation, addressing 
questions about the relationship between religious groups, emotion and cognition. It is 
possible that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between fundamentalism and 
analytic stances, particularly a lack o f TC. Fundamentalism may be both influenced and 
affected by an analytic or low TC tendency to reduce the nature o f objects and causes o f 
events to essential properties, as well as a general need for clarity and differentiation.
More specifically, a differentiation vs compromise measure similar to that used in 
Study 1 could be devised with content relevant to religious beliefs. The context in which 
those beliefs are framed could then be varied in order to compare intra-religious 
(contradictions within a religion’s teachings) and inter-religious (contradictions between 
different religions’ teachings) TC. This could be achieved by using pro-social values 
that are relatively constant across religions, as well as content that is more specific to 
particular creeds. Aside from elementary social, economic and political factors that 
determine inter-religious strife (see e.g. Atran, 2003, on causes o f suicide terrorism), I 
would hypothesise that religions made up o f individuals with high intra-religious TC but 
low inter-religious TC are most prone to encourage religiously-motivated conflict. A 
cross-culturally validated measure o f religiosity that covers emotional aspects o f 
religion, such as religious fundamentalism, could be included as a possible moderating 
factor. The resulting data would allow us to compare or “rank” religions according to
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their TC levels by taking into account affective characteristics o f religiosity that may 
influence TC.
6.4.3 Globalisation and Holistic versus Analytic Cognition
The same globalising forces that may have stirred conflict on local and international 
levels have also raised the need for cross-cultural cooperation. East Asian emerging 
markets, especially China, and their rise in global importance will only intensify the 
need for an understanding o f the holistic worldview. At the same time, I think that we 
should also expect globalisation to have a potentially homogenising effect on the way 
people think, although the past decades may have favoured the spread o f Western 
(especially American) culture eastwards more than a flow o f culture in the opposite 
direction (e.g. Barber, 1996). Discussions o f globalisation and resulting ‘world culture’ 
would agree with this in the sense o f at least a Western-dominated homogenisation 
process. The sociologists Boli and Lechner (2001) argue that cultural homogenisation 
has an ontological dimension with cognitive outcomes that is still open to investigation: 
increasing individualism, a disenchantment of nature, and a “reliance on rationalized 
images o f society,” promoted by “modem institutions [like] formal education, 
experimental science, national accounting and statistical systems and advanced- 
technology engineering” (p. 6263). In the process, far older worldviews manifested in 
religious traditions have played a role in cultural differentiation and conflict, but also 
cultural diffusion o f the kind studied in this research.
In the lives o f many Western individuals, then, adopting Eastern religious spiritual 
practices like Buddhism may be both an outcome o f and antidote to globalisation in 
‘late modernity’, with religion representing a possible tool for individuals to deal with 
uncertainty and fragmentation of life (cf. Giddens, 1991) or the self in the ‘postmodern’ 
condition (Pickering 2004a, 2004b). Similarly, theories about Western “postmaterialist” 
society (Inglehart, 1977) imply that religions more compatible with anti­
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authoritarianism, while also allowing for self-actualisation, would be readily embraced 
in place of traditional institutionalised Christianity. Whether or not we subscribe to 
some of those theories, I think it is likely that people with certain backgrounds (e.g. 
middle class Westerners) will continue to draw on an intercultural pool o f spiritual and 
lifestyle alternatives. I hope to have shown that the outcome o f those choices is not only 
a change o f values and customs, but ways o f thinking that go beyond the realms o f the 
religious.
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Appendix -  Research Instruments
STUDY 1: RELIGIOSITY /  RELIGIOUS PRIME
P lease answ er som e q u estion s about your spirituality or religion ...
In an a tte m p t  to  b e tte r  u n d ersta n d  p e o p le  w h o  identity  w ith a particu lar relig ion , 
faith or sp iritual te a c h in g , p le a s e  a llow  m e  to  a sk  s o m e  m o re  d e ta ile d  q u e s t io n s .
How long h a v e  y o u  identified  w ith  or practiced  B uddhism ?  
r
l e s s  th a n  o n e  y e a r
r
o n e  y e a r  or lo n g er
r
all m y life  (I w a s  b ro u g h t up w ith th e  relig ion )
If y o u  c h o s e  "one y e a r  or longer" a b o v e , p le a s e  sp ecify  th e  a p p ro x im a te  n u m b er  
o f  y e a rs :
r ~ 3
W h eth er  or  n o t you  g o  to  a te m p le ,  to  w h a t e x te n t  would y o u  s a y  th a t  yo u  a re  a 
sp iritual or  re lig io u s p erso n ?  P le a se  c h o o se  a point on th is  s c a le
IP**®
n o t a t  all re lig io u s v e r y  relig io u s
1 2 3 4  5 6 7
A b out how  o fte n  d o  y o u  m e d ita te?
I 3
Ab o u t h ow  o ften  do  y o u  read  t e x ts  or scr ip tu res rela ted  to  B ud dh ism ?
I 3
How  o ften  do  y o u  v is it  a te m p le?; i
3
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  a g re e  w ith  th e  fo llo w in g  s ta te m e n ts ?
My sp iritual life is an  im p ortan t part o f  w ho I a m .
C  C  C  C  C  I
1 2 3 4  5 6  7
■P*"^ p1^ p1*5!
d efin ite ly  no d e fin ite ly  y e s
My sp iritual or  re lig iou s b e lie fs  h a v e  a g r e a t  d ea l o f  in flu en ce  on  th e  d e c is io n s  I 
m a k e  in m y life .
F4^ F4^ pr*i F-*1^
d efin ite ly  no d e fin ite ly  y e s
Finally, in th e  b o x  b e lo w , p le a s e  w rite  three va lu es th a t  y o u  c o n s id e r  to  b e  
cen tra l a s p e c t s  o f  B ud dh ist te a c h in g s:
STUDY 1: Categorisation (Page 1)
As yo u r  first ta sk  in th is  on lin e  q u es tio n n a ir e , I w ou ld  like y o u  to  m a k e  c a te g o r y  
ju d g m e n ts .
On th e  n e x t  e ig h t  p a g e s ,  yo u  will b e  sh o w n  a ta r g e t  o b je c t  a lo n g  w ith tw o  g r o u p s o f  
o b je c ts . For e a c h  ta r g e t  o b je c t, p le a se  d e te r m in e  w hich one o f th e  tw o  groups 
show n th e  o b je c t  is m ost sim ilar to .
P le a se  ta k e  y o u r  t im e  w h ile  resp o n d in g , but d o  n o t sp en d  to o  m uch  t im e  on  any  
sin g le  item . D on 't w orry if yo u  th ink th a t  o th e r  p eo p le  m ight n o t a g r e e  w ith y o u  - 
th e r e  a re  no righ t and  w rong a n sw e r s . J u st m ark  it th e  w ay  y o u  s e e  it.
B efore  w e  b e g in , p le a s e  u se  th e  fo llow ing exam p le a s  a p ractice  item :
Group 1 Group 2
TZJ TZ3T
TUT
Which o f th e  tw o  groups above is th is  ob ject m ost sim ilar to?
Answer:
Group 1 ( le ft)  ^
Group 2  ( r ig h t ) ^
Click o n  'next' b e lo w  to  g e t  s ta r te d . For e a c h  o f  the fo llow in g  p a g e s  in th is  ta sk ,  
p le a se  n o te  th a t  y o u  will n o t b e  a b le  to  u s e  yo u r  brow ser's 'back' b u tto n .
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STUDY l f 1, 3: Grouping
In th e  fo llow in g  lis ts , a m o n g  th e  th r e e  th in g s  lis ted  to g e th e r , p le a se  in d ica te  
which tw o  o f  th e  th r e e  are m ore c lo se ly  related  by ch eck in g  th e  
co rresp o n d in g  b o x e s . D on't w orry if y o u  th ink  th a t o th e r  p e o p le  m ig h t n ot a g r e e  
w ith y o u  - th e r e  a re  no right and  w rong a n sw e r s . Just m ark it th e  w a y  yo u  s e e  
it.
r
S ea g u ll
Black
M agazine
Piano
D irection
Child
C om p u ter  m on itor  
^ C o l o u r f u l  
W inter  
A irplane  
^  L etter  
S e c o n d  
Bright
r Panda  
M onday  
E du cated
r 
r Hair
r
r
G rass
W hite
Pen
Violin
T ravel
T e e n a g e r
A n ten n a
G allery
Spring
D uck
S ta m p
M inute
Sk y
B anana
W e d n e sd a y
U n iversity
S h a m p o o
r c . .
Squirrel
Blue
N o teb o o k  
G uitar  
^  Map 
A dult
p
T elev isio n
P ain tin gs
A utum n
r  u uHawk
P ostcard
Hour
S u n sh in e
r  M Uonkey
p '
Friday
r
P ro fesso r
C on dition er
p  r~
M orning E vening A fternoon
r r
P o stm a n  P olicem an  Uniform
r
Child W om an Man
STUDY 1: Differentiation versus Compromise
Scientific  findings are not a lw ays co n sisten t w ith each other, and 
so m etim es th ere  is a discrepancy b etw een  scien tific  research findings 
and popular b eliefs . In th is  section , I w ant to  ask  you how  much you  
b elieve  th e  fo llow ing s ta tem en ts  based on recent research resu lts.
S ta te m e n t  1A:
A d e v e lo p m e n ta l p sy c h o lo g is t  s tu d ied  a d o le sc e n t  children a n d  a s s e r te d  th a t  
th o s e  ch ild ren  w h o  w ere  le s s  d e p e n d e n t  on  th e ir  p aren ts and  had w ea k er  fam ily  
t ie s  w e r e  g e n e r a lly  m o re  m a tu re .
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
p** p»i
strongly disbelieve ^  strongly believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
neutral
S ta te m e n t  IB :
A so c ia l p sy c h o lo g is t  stu d ied  y o u n g  a d u lts  and  a s s e r te d  th a t  th o s e  w h o  fe e l  
c lo s e  to  th e ir  fa m ilie s  h a v e  m o re  sa tis fy in g  so c ia l re la tio n sh ip s .
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
strongly disbelieve ^  E  C  C  E  E  E  E  E  strongly believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
neutral
S ta te m e n t  2A:
A so c io lo g is t  w h o  su r v e y e d  c o lle g e  s tu d e n ts  from  1 0 0  u n iv er sit ie s  c la im ed  th a t  
th e r e  is a h igh corre la tio n  a m o n g  c o lle g e  fe m a le  s tu d e n ts  b e tw e e n  sm o k in g  and  
b ein g  sk in n y .
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
strongly disbelieve C  C C C C C C C C  strongly believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9
neutral
S ta te m e n t  2B:
A b io lo g is t  w h o  stu d ied  n ico tin e  a d d ictio n  a s s e r te d  th a t  h e a v y  d o s e s  o f  n ico tin e  
o fte n  lea d  to  b eco m in g  o v e r w e ig h t.
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
strongly disbelieve E  C C C C C C C C  believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
neutral
S ta te m e n t  3A:
A stu d y  by  a h ea lth  o rg a n iza tio n  s u g g e s t s  th a t  it is m u ch  m o r e  h ea lth y  to  b e  a 
str ic t v e g e ta r ia n  w h o d o e s  n o t e a t  m e a t  a t  all.
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
strongly disbelieve C  C C C C C C C C  strongly believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
neutral
S ta te m e n t  3B:
A h ea lth  m a g a z in e  su rv e y  foun d th a t  p e o p le  w h o  live  a long life  e a t  s o m e  so r ts  
o f  w h ite  m e a t , e .g . ,  fish  or  ch ick en .
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
strongly disbelieve C  C C C C C C C C  strongly believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
neutral
S ta te m e n t  4A:
A rep o rt on  th e  prison  o v ercro w d in g  is su e  s u g g e s t s  th a t  o ld er  in m a te s  a re  le s s  
likely  to  c o m m it n e w  c r im es . T h erefo re , if th e r e  is a prison  p o p u la tio n  crisis , 
th e y  sh o u ld  b e  r e le a s e d  first.
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
strongly disbelieve C  C C C C C C C C  strongly be,ieve 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
neutral
S ta te m e n t  4B :
A su r v e y  fou n d  th a t  o ld er  in m a te s  are m o re  likely to b e  o n e s  w h o  a re  serv in g  
long  s e n t e n c e s  b e c a u s e  th e y  h a v e  c o m m itte d  s e v e r e ly  v io le n t  c r im es . T he  
a u th o rs  co n c lu d ed  th a t th e y  sh o u ld  b e  held  in prison e v e n  in th e  c a s e  o f  a 
prison  p o p u la tio n  crisis .
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
strongly disbelieve C  C E C C C C C C  strongly believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
neutral
S ta te m e n t  5A:
A grou p  o f  e n v iro n m en ta l s c ie n c e  u n d erg ra d u a te  s tu d e n ts  e x a m in e d  fuel u s a g e  
in a la rg e  n u m b er  o f  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  and a sse r te d  th a t  r e c e n t  p r a c tic e s  are  
likely to  m ultip ly  a lrea d y  w o rsen in g  en v iro n m en ta l p r o b le m s su ch  a s  "global 
w arm ing."
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
it1 p* r" p*1 r"* p" p* p*strongly disbelieve ^  ^  Lj  b  L  L  Lj  Lj  Lj  strongly believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
neutral
S ta te m e n t  5B:
A m e te o r o lo g is t  stu d ied  te m p e r a tu r e s  in 2 4  w id ely  se p a r a te d  p a rts  o f  th e  world  
and a s s e r te d  th a t  te m p e r a tu r e s  had a c tu a lly  d rop p ed  by a fraction  o f  a d e g r e e  
e a ch  o f  th e  la s t  f iv e  y e a rs .
H o w  m u c h  d o  y o u  b e lie v e  th is  s ta te m e n t  to  b e  tru e ?
C C C C C C E C  strongly believe
2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
neutral
r -
strongly disbelieve ^
STUDY 1: Surprise about Expectation Violating Behaviour
In th is  part of m y questionnaire I am trying to  in vestiga te  how  people  
m ake ju d gm en ts about others.
P lease read th e  fo llow ing short story. W hen you are done, you m ay  
continue on to  th e  n ext page.
John w a s  a s tu d e n t  a t  a sc h o o l for th e  s tu d y  o f  th e o lo g y  and  p h ilo so p h y  o f  
relig ion . He w a s  p h y sica lly  sh o r t and so m e w h a t  sto ck y  w ith a w id e  fa c e . He w a s  
q u ie t and  a bit a lo o f, th o u g h  n o t sh y . T he p erson a lity  t e s t s  in h is h igh sc h o o l  
in d ica ted  th a t  h e  w a s  h o n e s t , had  a g o o d  s e n s e  o f  hum our and th a t , a lth o u g h  h e  
w ould  n o t b e  an  e a s y  p e r so n  to  g e t  to  kn ow , h e  w a s probab ly  loyal and in te n se  
on  re la tio n sh ip s  w ith  h is c lo s e s t  fr ien d s.
John w a s  a v ery  sp iritual p e r so n . He a lw a y s tried  to a p p roach  h is life from  a 
re lig io u s p o in t o f  v iew . He b e lie v e d  th a t  all his a c tiv it ie s , g o a ls  and  fu tu re  
e x p e r ie n c e s  w ou ld  b e  d e te rm in e d  by a d iv in e  p o w er .
Last y e a r , h e  w a s  tak in g  a c la s s  o n  how  to  m a k e  relig ious s p e e c h e s  by P ro fesso r  
E arlham . O ne o f  th e  c o u r se  r eq u ire m en ts  w a s  to  record th e  s tu d e n t’s  ow n  
sp e e c h  four  t im e s  during th e  s e m e s t e r  and  to  turn in th e  ta p e s .  John  w a s  
su p p o se d  to  record  h is first sp e e c h  th a t  d a y  in a recording room  n e x t  to  
P ro fesso r  E arlham 's o ffice . T he to p ic  o f  th e  sp e e c h  w a s  ’sy m p a th y ’. S in ce  
P ro fesso r  Earlham  did n o t a llow  h is  s tu d e n ts  to  u s e  an y  n o te s  for s p e e c h e s ,  John  
had to  m e m o r ise  all th e  th in g s  h e  w a n ted  to  sa y . S ince h e  did n o t w a n t a n y  
d istra c tio n s , h e  w e n t  to  a sm a ll p r a y e r /m ed ita tio n  room  to  r e h e a r se  h is sp e e c h .
A fter a w h ile , John su d d en ly  r ea lised  th a t  h e  w a s  a lready 10  m in u te s  la te  for th e  
record in g . P ro fe sso r  E arlham  w a s  n o to r io u s for criticising h is s tu d e n ts  for n o t  
b ein g  on  t im e . John w a s  v e ry  w orried and hurried to  th e  record in g  build ing  
w hich w a s  n e x t  to  w h er e  th e  p r a y e r /m ed ita tio n  room  w a s .
W hile h e  w a s  p a s s in g  th e  d o o rw a y  lead in g  to  th e  recording bu ild in g , John found  
a m an sittin g  s lu m p e d , h ea d  d o w n , e y e s  c lo s e d , n o t m o v in g . T he m an  co u g h ed  
tw ice  and  g r o a n e d , k eep in g  h is h ea d  dow n a s  John w as p a s s in g  by.
John n o ticed  th e  m a n , b u t k ep t on  g o in g  w ith o u t stop p in g  to  o ffer  him  
a ss is ta n c e .
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STUDY 1: Surprise about Expectation Violating Behaviour
W hen y o u  read  th e  o u tc o m e  o f  th e  s to r y , how  surprised  w e r e  yo u  to  h ea r  th a t  John  
did n o t h e lp  th e  m an?
not surprised at all extremely surprised
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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STUDY 1: Surprise about Expectation Violating Behaviour
In th is  part of my questionnaire I am trying to  in vestigate  how  people  
m ake ju d gm en ts about others.
P lease  read th e  fo llow ing short story. When you are done, you m ay  
continue on to  th e  n ext p age.
T om  w a s  a s tu d e n t  a t  a sc h o o l for th e  stu d y  o f  th e o lo g y  and p h ilo so p h y  o f  
relig ion . He w a s  p h ysica lly  tall and  so m e w h a t th in  w ith a narrow  fa c e . He w a s  
a c tiv e  an d  a s s e r t iv e .  T h e  p erso n a lity  t e s t s  in h is h igh sch o o l in d ica ted  th a t h e  
w a s q u ite  a m b itio u s  and  u n tru stw orth y .
A lthou gh  T om  w a s  a re lig io u s p e r so n , h e  w a s  q u ite  se lfish . He n e v e r  a llo w ed  his 
c o lle a g u e s  to  u s e  h is n o te s  b e fo r e  e x a m s .
L ast y e a r , h e  w a s  tak in g  a c la s s  o n  how  to  m a k e  relig iou s s p e e c h e s  by P ro fesso r  
E arlham . O ne o f  th e  c o u r se  r eq u irem en ts  w a s to  record th e  s tu d e n t 's  ow n  
s p e e c h  four t im e s  during th e  s e m e s t e r  and to  turn in th e  ta p e s .  T om  w a s  
su p p o se d  to  record  h is first s p e e c h  th a t  day  in a record ing room  n e x t  to  
P ro fesso r  E arlham 's o ffice . T he to p ic  o f  th e  sp e e c h  w a s  'sy m p a th y '. S in ce  
P ro fesso r  Earlham  did n o t a llow  h is s tu d e n ts  to  u se  any  n o te s  for s p e e c h e s ,  Tom  
had to  m e m o r ise  all th e  th in g s  h e  w a n ted  to  sa y . S in ce h e  did n o t w a n t a n y  
d istr a c tio n s , h e  w e n t  to  a sm all p ra y er /m ed ita tio n  room  to  r e h e a r se  h is sp e e c h .
A fter  a w h ile , T om  su d d en ly  rea lised  th a t h e  w a s  a lready  10  m in u te s  la te  for  th e  
reco rd in g . P ro fe sso r  E arlham  w a s  n o to r io u s for criticising his s tu d e n ts  for n o t  
b ein g  o n  t im e . T om  w a s  v e ry  w orried  and  hurried to  th e  record ing build ing w hich  
w a s  n e x t  to  w h er e  th e  p r a y e r /m ed ita tio n  room  w a s .
W hile h e  w a s  p a ss in g  th e  d o o rw a y  lea d in g  to  th e  recording bu ild ing, T om  found  
a m a n  sittin g  s lu m p ed , h ea d  d o w n , e y e s  c lo sed , n o t m ov in g . T he m an c o u g h e d  
tw ic e  and  g r o a n e d , k eep in g  h is h ea d  dow n a s  T om  w a s p a ssin g  by.
T om  n o ticed  th e  m an  and  s to p p e d  im m ed ia te ly  to  offer a s s is ta n c e .
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STUDY 1: Surprise about Expectation Violating Behaviour
W hen y o u  read  th e  o u tc o m e  o f  th e  s to r y , how  surp rised  w e r e  y o u  to  h ea r  th a t  
T om  h e lp e d  th e  m an?
„ , , „ C C C C C E E C C C C  „ , . .not surprised at all extremely surprised
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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STUDY 1: Folk Theories of Social Behaviour
P lease rate how  much you d isagree  or a gree  w ith th e  follow ing  
argum ents.
1 . How p e o p le  b e h a v e  is m o stly  d e te rm in e d  b y  th e ir  p erso n a lity . O n e's  
p erso n a lity  p r e d isp o s e s  an d  g u id e s  an  individual to  b e h a v e  in o n e  w a y , n o t in 
a n o th er  w a y , no m a tter  w h a t c ir c u m sta n c e s  th e  p erson  is in . In a s e n s e ,  
b eh a v io u r  is an  unfold ing o f  p e rso n a lity . O n e’s  b eh a v io u r  is rem arkab ly  s ta b le  
a c ro ss  t im e  and  c o n s is te n t  a c r o s s  s itu a tio n s  b e c a u se  it is g u id ed  by p erso n a lity . 
T h erefo re , if w e  know  th e  p erso n a lity  o f  o n e  p erso n , w e  ca n  e a s ily  p red ict how  
th e  p erso n  will b e h a v e  in th e  fu tu re  and ex p la in  w hy th a t  p erso n  b e h a v e d  in a 
particu lar w a y  in th e  p a st.
n  p*  F*1 F*1 F*' F*1 P"* F * F*
strongly disagree strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 .  How p e o p le  b e h a v e  is m o stly  d e te rm in e d  by th e  s itu a tio n  in w h ich  th e y  find 
th e m s e lv e s .  S itu a tio n a l p o w er  is s o  s tr o n g  th a t  w e  can  s a y  it h a s  m o re  in flu en ce  
on b eh a v io u r  th a n  o n e 's  p er so n a lity . O ften , p e o p le  in a particu lar s itu a tio n  
b e h a v e  v e ry  sim ilarly , d e sp ite  la rg e  individual d iffe re n c es  in p e rso n a lity . 
T h erefo re , in order to  p red ict and  ex p la in  o n e 's  b eh av iou r, w e  h a v e  to  fo c u s  on  
th e  s itu a tio n  ra th er  th an  p e r so n a lity . P erso n a lity  p lays a w e a k e r  role in 
b eh a v io u r  th a n  w e  u sed  to  th ink .
p* p* p* p* p* p^ p** p* p*
strongly disagree strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9
3 .  How p e o p le  b e h a v e  is a lw a y s  jo in tly  d e te rm in e d  by the ir  p erso n a lity  and  th e  
s itu a tio n  in w hich th e y  find th e m s e lv e s .  W e c a n n o t cla im  th a t  e ith e r  p e rso n a lity  
or th e  s itu a tio n  is  th e  on ly  d e te rm in a n t o f  our behav iou r. Our b eh a v io u r  is an  
o u tc o m e  o f  th e  c o m p lex  in tera c tio n  b e tw e e n  p erso n a lity  and  situ a tio n a l fa c to r s .  
W e a lw a y s h a v e  to  c o n sid e r  th e ir  p e rso n a lity  and  situ a tio n  s im u lta n e o u s ly . 
T h erefo re , w e  c a n n o t p red ict and  ex p la in  a p e r so n 's  b eh a v io u r  w ith p erso n a lity  
or s itu a tio n  a lo n e .
r
strongly disagree
l
C F” F " F ” F** F* F "Lj  Lj  Lj  Lj  Lj  Lj  strongly agree
2 3 4 5 6
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STUDY 1, 2: Holism Score
Finally, p lea se  rate how  much you d isagree  or agree w ith th e  follow ing  
sta tem en ts.
1. It's n o t p o s s ib le  to  u n d ersta n d  th e  p ie c e s  w ith o u t co n sid er in g  th e  w h o le  
picture.
r* p  n  n  p  p  p
strongly disagree strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 . E very e v e n t  h a s  n u m er o u s r esu lts  a lth o u g h  s o m e  of th e  r e su lts  a re  n o t  
know n.
■Ml p p p p p  p
strongly disagree ^  *“* strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 . Every e v e n t  h a s  n u m ero u s c a u s e s  a lth o u g h  s o m e  o f  th e  c a u s e s  are  n o t  
know n.
r r r r r r rstrongly disagree ^  ^  strongly agree
4 .  A m arker o f  g o o d  a rch itectu re  is how  h a rm on iou sly  it b len d s w ith o th e r  
b u ild in gs around  it.
r r r r r r rstrongly disagree ^  u  u  “  strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 . N oth ing in th e  u n iv er se  is u n re la ted .
strongly disagree C  C  C  C  C  C  C  strongly agree
6 . T he w h o le  is a lw a y s  g r e a te r  th a n  th e  su m  o f  its parts.
P “*l IF"*! jp"*1 P"*® P**8® W***
strongly disagree “  ^  ^  ^  strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 . Paying a tten tio n  to  th e  c o n te x t  in w h ich  th in g s  e x is t  is m ore  im p ortan t th a n
p ay in g  a tten tio n  to  th o s e  th in g s  th e m s e lv e s .
p* p* p^ p^ p^ p^ p*
strongly disagree ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 . T he e m p ty  s p a c e  in a pa in tin g  is ju s t  a s  im portant a s  th e  o b je c ts  d e p ic ted .
r r"'1 r eh' r”s strongly disagree ^  ILj strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 . In order  to  u n d ersta n d  an o b je c t's  b eh a v io u r  it is m o re  im p ortan t to  fo cu s  on  
th e  p ro p er tie s  o f  th a t o b je c t  th a n  th e  co n d itio n s  under w h ich  th e  b eh a v io u r  
o ccu rs .
r r r r r r rstrongly disagree 1-1 *“* ^  strongly agree
1 2 3 4  5 6 7
235
STUDY 1: Religious Integration
You a lrea d y  s ta te d  how  o ften  y o u  v is it  a te m p le  in an ea r lier  q u e s t io n . In th is  
q u e s tio n , I w ou ld  like to  a sk  h ow  o ften  you  m e e t  o th er  B u d d h ists  in s e t t in g s  
o th e r  th a n  a te m p le  (a n y  grou p  or o rg a n iza tio n  th a t h a s  to  d o  w ith B u d d h ism ).
W hen y o u  w e re  grow ing  up , w e re  o n e , both  or n e ith er  o f  y o u r  p a ren ts  a lso  
B ud d h ists?
C both  p a ren ts
r
o n e  p a ren t
P
n e ith e r  p aren t  
Are y o u  currently  m arried?
c y e s
r
no  (n e v e r  m arried , se p a r a te d , d ivo rced , or w id o w ed )
If y o u  a re  currently  m arried , d o e s  yo u r  s p o u s e  co n sid er  h e r /h im s e lf  a B ud dh ist 
a s  w ell?
c  yes
C  no
How m a n y  c lo s e  fr ien d s (not including you r s p o u s e ,  if y o u  a re  m arried ) w ou ld  
y o u  s a y  th a t  yo u  h av e?
N u m b e r  o f  c lo se  fr ie n d s :
How m a n y  o f  t h e s e  p e r so n s  (n o t  including yo u r  sp o u s e )  a re  a lso  B u d d h ists?  (If  
y o u  are  n o t cer ta in , p le a se  e n te r  yo u r  b e s t  g u e s s ) .
N u m b e r  o f  c lo se  fr ie n d s  w ho  a re  a ls o  B u d d h is ts :
R eg a rd less  o f  how  im p ortan t relig ion  or sp iritua lity  is to  y o u  in th o s e  
r e la tio n sh ip s , how  o ften  a re  you  in c o n ta c t  w ith a t le a s t  o n e  o f  th e s e  c lo s e  
fr ien d s (n o t  including y o u r  s p o u s e )  w h o  a re  a lso  B uddhists?
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STU D Y 2: B u d d h is t P rim e
P a r t  o f  my Ph.D . concerns  i tse lf  w ith  w ays in w hich  people  from  
va r io u s  sp ir i tu a l  b a c k g ro u n d s  in te rp re t  symbols. Below you should  see 
a dep ic t ion  o f  the  B u d d h is t  ’W heel o f  Life '. P lease a n s w e r  the  question  
following the  image.
Please briefly summarize the beliefs that you think are represented by the 
Wheel o f Life.
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STUDY 3: Liking of Buddhism /  Secular-Humanism
You are p resen ted  w ith  tw o  te x ts  describing w orld v iew s. P lease  read 
each  o n e  carefully, then  answ er th e  q u estion s b elow  each  tex t.
1.
Secular Hum anism  is  a term  w hich  h a s  c o m e  into u s e  in th e  la st  th irty  y e a r s  to
d e sc r ib e  a w orld  v iew  w ith th e  fo llow in g  e le m e n ts  and princip les:
•  A prim ary co n cern  w ith  fu lfillm ent, grow th, an d  creativ ity  for both  
t h e  individual and  hum ankind in g e n e ra l.
•  A concern for th is  life and  a c o m m itm e n t to  m ak in g  it m ean in gfu l 
th ro u g h  b e tte r  understanding of ou rselves, our history, our  
in tellectual and artistic  ach ievem en ts, and th e  ou tlooks o f th o se  
w h o differ from  u s .
•  A se a r c h  for  v ia b le  ind ividual, so c ia l and  political principles of ethical 
conduct, ju d g in g  th e m  o n  th e ir  ab ility  to  enhance hum an w ell-being  
an d  individual responsibility .
•  A co n v ictio n  th a t  w ith reason , an open m arketplace o f id eas, g o o d  
will, an d  to leran ce, progress can  b e  m a d e  in bu ild ing a b e tte r  world for  
o u r se lv e s  and  our ch ild ren .
•  A co n v ictio n  th a t  dogm as, id eo log ies and traditions, w h eth er  
relig ious, political or  so c ia l, m u st  b e  w e ig h e d  and  te s te d  by each  
individual and not sim ply accepted  on faith .
•  C o m m itm en t to  th e  u se  o f  critical reason , factual ev id en ce , and  
sc ien tific  m ethods o f inquiry, rather than faith  and m ysticism , in
s e e k in g  so lu t io n s  to  h u m an  p ro b lem s and  a n sw e r s  to  im p o rta n t hum an  
q u e s t io n s .
•  A c o n sta n t  se a r ch  for ob jective truth, w ith th e  u n d ersta n d in g  th a t  new  
k n o w led g e  and  e x p e r ie n c e  co n sta n tly  a lter  ou r  im p erfec t p e rcep tio n  o f  
it.
QUESTIONS:
How fam iliar  w e r e  y o u  w ith  th e  id e a s  e x p r e s s e d  in th is  t e x t  b e fo r e  y o u  read  it?
p1 p* r" r* r" r"
n o t a t  all fam iliar  v e ry  fam iliar
1 2 3 4  5 6 7
H ow difficu lt is it for  yo u  to  u n d ersta n d  th e  id e a s  in th is  te x t?
E Cv ery  e a s y c c c c c v e ry  difficu lt
1 2 3 4  5 6 7
To w h a t e x te n t  do  y o u  like or d islik e  th e  b e lie fs in th is te x t?
r
s tr o n g ly  d islik e C C C c c c like v ery  m uch
1 2  3 4  5 6 7
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2.
Buddhism is a w orldview  w ith th e  fo llow in g  e le m e n ts  and princip les:
•  T he "world out there" is constantly  changing, e v er y th in g  is 
im perm anent and  it is im p o ss ib le  to  m a k e  a p e r m a n e n t rela tion sh ip  
w ith  a n yth in g  a t all.
•  T he first n ob le  truth  is th a t  life is suffering. This is  an irrefu tab le  fact 
th a t  ca n n o t b e  d e n ie d . B ud dh ism  e x p la in s  how  su ffer in g  ca n  b e  a v o id ed  
and  how  w e can be truly happy.
•  T h e  se c o n d  truth  is th a t  suffering is caused  by craving and
aversion . W anting d e p r iv es  u s  o f  c o n te n tm e n t  and h a p p in e ss .
•  T he third truth is th a t  if w e  give  up u se le ss  craving and learn to  live 
each  day at a tim e (n o t  dw ellin g  in th e  p a s t  or th e  im a g in ed  fu tu re)  
th e n  w e  ca n  b e c o m e  happy and free. W e th en  h a v e  m o re  t im e  and  
e n e r g y  to  help  o th e r s . T his is N irvana.
•  T he fourth  truth  is th a t  th e  N ob le  Eightfold Path is th e  path  w hich lea d s  
to  th e  en d  o f  su ffer in g .
•  T h e  N ob le  Eightfold Path is being moral (th ro u g h  w h a t w e  sa y , do  and  
ou r  liv e lih o o d ), focusing th e  mind on being fully aw are of our 
th ou gh ts and actions, and develop ing w isdom  and com passion  
for others.
C o m p a ssio n  in c lu d es q u a lities  o f  sh a r in g , r e a d in e s s  to  g iv e  co m fo r t, sy m p a th y ,  
co n cern  and carin g . In B ud dh ism , w e can really understand others, w hen  
w e can really understand ou rselves.
QUESTIONS:
How fam iliar  w ere  y o u  w ith th e  id e a s  e x p r e s se d  in th is  te x t  b e fo re  yo u  read  it?
n ot a t  all fam iliar c c c c c c c v e ry  fam iliar
1 2 3 4  5 6 7
How difficu lt is it for y o u  to  u n d ersta n d  th e  id e a s  in th is  te x t?
very  e a s y ■ l - j  L  j  L  j  t  - j  L  a  I .  - j v ery  difficu lt
1 2  3 4  5 6  7
To w h a t e x te n t  do  y o u  like or d islik e  th e  b e lie fs  in th is  te x t?
stro n g ly  d islik e like v ery  m uch
1 2  3 4  5 6  7
STUDY 3: Independence-Interdependence Scale
P lease  rate how  much you d isagree  or agree  with th e  fo llow ing  
sta tem en ts .
1. T he se c u r ity  o f  b e in g  an a c c e p te d  m e m b er  o f  a group is v ery  im p o rta n t to  
m e.
P* P*1 IT* P* P^ P®* P*strongly disagree ^  Lj  Lj  strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 . My p erso n a l id en tity , in d e p e n d e n t o f  o th e r s , is very  im p ortan t to  m e .
P"*1 F’*’ p*1 f-*1 r  rstrongly disagree ^  s-i Lj Lj Lj Li jlj strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 . I e n jo y  b e in g  un iq u e  and  d ifferen t from  o th e r s .
r81 r r r r  r8* r"strongly disagree l-i t-i t-i s-i lj strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
4 . 1 w ou ld  sa cr if ice  m y se lf - in te r e s ts  for th e  b en e fit o f  m y gro u p .
r  P**1 P"” P"” F^ 1 F^ 1strongly disagree t-i i-i t-i t j  t -j strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 . My r e la tio n sh ip s  w ith th o s e  in m y group  are  m o re  im p ortan t th a n  m y  
p erson a l a c co m p lish m en t.
strongly agree
strongly agree
P** P* P* P* P* P* P**strongly disagree lu Lj  Lj  L-j ^  L
3 4 5 6 7
6 . H aving a lively  im a g in a tio n  is im p ortan t to  m e .
strongly disagree C C C C C C C
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7 . It is im p ortan t to  c o n su lt  c lo s e  fr iend s and  g e t  th e ir  id ea s  b e fo r e  m aking  
d e c is io n s .
F“* IT* m F*1 m  ip*strongly disagree ^  Lj IU Lj  Lj  Lj  strongly agree
8 . I a c t  a s  a u n ique p e r so n , se p a r a te  from  o th e r s .
F " F*1 F ” P1” P* P""1 F ”
strongly disagree u  strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 . I h a v e  an op in ion  a b o u t m o st  th in g s: I know  w h a t I like and I know  w h a t I 
don 't like.
P"*1 F*1 P"*1 F*1 F*1 F*1 p-*1
strongly disagree u  strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0 . My h a p p in e ss  d e p e n d s  on  th e  h a p p in e ss  o f  th o s e  in m y grou p .
f*^  f *1 in  r* m  r** w**
strongly disagree ^  ^  ^  strongly agree
1 1 . It is im p ortan t for m e  to  a c t a s  an in d e p e n d e n t p erso n .
p  F* F* p“* F  ^ F* p“*
strongly disagree ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 . 1 try to  m e e t  th e  d e m a n d s  o f m y group , e v e n  if it m e a n s  con tro llin g  m y ow n  
d e s ir e s .
strongly disagree ^  C  C  C  C  C  C  strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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STUDY 4: TC Score
This questionnaire is designed for you to indicate the typical ways in which you 
approach or solve problems in everyday life. There are no right or wrong 
answers. For each item, please use the following 5-point rating scale to indicate 
the ex ten t to  w hich you agree  or d isagree that the sta tem en t accurately  
d escrib es th e  w ay you typically approach or so lve problem s.
1. When a problem appears to have two equally effective but opposing 
solutions, it is likely that the problem has been poorly defined or poorly 
represented.
C P"* P** P“* IF**
2 3 C  4  5C
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a g r e e  a g r e e
2 . When faced with a puzzling issue in which there are two opposing but equally 
possible interpretations, I would typically gather information to rule out one of 
the two interpretations.
C r  p  in
3 4 5iC
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a g r e e  a g r e e
3 . When my friend's view on an issue is opposite to my view, I usually think of 
situations in which both my view and my friend's view can be valid at the sam e  
time.
E p“* P“* INI p“*2c 3c 4 c 5c
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a g r e e  a g r e e
4 . People who often give ambiguous answers when answering a question should 
take a position and give a more exact answer.
2c 3c 4 c 5c
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a g r e e  a g r e e
5 . People who maintain that it is possible for two opposing interpretations of the 
sam e event to be both true are illogical or unrealistic.
iC
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a g r e e  a g r e e
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6 .  W ithin a t e a m , c o o p era tio n  and  co m p etitio n  can e x is t  a t th e  sa m e  t im e .
m** |*“*1 m**
1 L  2 3 4  5 * ^
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a g r e e  a g r e e
7 .  A s in g le  a c tio n  or b eh a v io u r  can  o fte n  a ch iev e  o p p o s ite  o b je c t iv e s  a t  th e  
sa m e  t im e .
2C  3C  5C
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a g r e e  a g r e e
8 .  "If A is tru e , th e n  B m u st b e  tru e . I f B is fa lse , th en  C m u st b e  tru e . G iven  
th a t  A is fa lse , is  C tru e  or  fa lse?"  S u ch  q u estio n s lead  to  in e ffec tiv e  p ro b lem ­
so lv in g  sk ills  in m a n y  a r e a s  o f  life .
r  r  r  p r1 L  2 3 4 ^  5*^
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a g r e e  a g r e e
9 .  In a s s e s s in g  w h e th e r  s o m e o n e  is su pp orting  a teartn, te a m  m e m b e r s  o ften  
m a k e  s ta te m e n ts  su ch  a s  "He is e ith e r  for us or a g a in st u s .” T eam  m e m b er s  
w h o m a k e  su ch  s t a t e m e n t s  fail to  s e e  m a n y  other r§3il p o ss ib ilit ie s .
C r-* p-”' r* r*
2 3 4 ^  5
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a ig r e e  a g r e e
1 0 .  In m o s t  s itu a tio n s , w h e th e r  an  a c t is m orally righ t or  w rong is c lea r  cu t.
,C  2C 3C 4 C 5C
s t r o n g ly  s t r o n g ly
d i s a g r e e  d i s a g r e e  n e u tr a l  a«g ree  a g r e e
STUDY 4: Tolerance of Counter-intuitiveness /  Tolerance of Contradictions in Counter­
in tuitiveness: Baseline Expectation Ratings
There are m an y  d ifferen t kinds of p eop le  in th e  world, ranging from  ordinary to  m ore u nu sual p e r so n s—so m e  
fam iliar and o th ers le s s  fam iliar to  you .
P lea se  rate how  likely you think  it is th a t you will ever learn about the actual ex isten ce  o f th e  p erso n s  
listed  below .
A p erso n  w h o can  fell a tr e e  w ith h is bare han d s.
not at a,I likely C  C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10  11 12  13  14  15  1 6  1 7  1 8  1 9  2 0
A p erso n  w h o u n d e rsta n d s jo k e s .
c c c c
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13  14  15  16  17 18  19  2 0
not at aii likely  c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c  veryljkely
A p erso n  w h o can  s e e  e v e n ts  a s  th e y  will actually  hap p en  in th e  fu tu re.
not at all likely C  C C C C C  C C C C C C C C C C C C C C  v„
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10 11 12  13  14  15 16  17  18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w h o can  w alk  th rou gh  w alls w ith ou t d a m a g in g  th e  w a lls  or h im /h e rse lf .
 c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c cnot at all likely very likely
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10 11 12 13  14  15 16  17  1 8  19  2 0
A p erso n  w h o e a t s  o ften  during th e  day .
c c c c c c
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13  14  15 16  17  1 8  19  2 0
not at all likely ^  C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
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A person who has no shadow even when light is shining at him/her.
„„„ . C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C Cnot at all likely — very likely
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10 11 12 13  14  15 16  17 18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w h o can  flu en tly  sp e a k  thirty  d ifferen t la n g u a g es .
not at all likely C  C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10  11 12  13  14  15 16  17  18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w h o  s o m e t im e s  v a n ish e s  th en  rea p p ea rs .
not at all likely C  C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
1 2 3 4  5 6  7  8  9 1 0  11 12  13  14  15  1 6  17  1 8  1 9  2 0
A p erso n  w h o runs fa s te r  th a n  a ga llop in g  h o rse .
not ^  all likely C  C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  13  14  15 16  17  18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w h o can  r em e m b e r  ev ery th in g  th a t h a s  e v e r  h a p p en ed .
not at all likely C  C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11 12  13  14  15 16  17  18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w ho a lw a y s w ea rs  w arm  cloth in g .
not at all likely C  C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
1 2 3 4  5 6  7 8  9 10  11 12 13  14  15 16  17  18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w h o can  h ear  c o n v e rsa tio n s  from  th e  p a s t a s if th e y  are a c tu a lly  tak ing  p la ce  now .
not at all likely C  C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9  10  11 12  13  1 4  15  1 6  17  1 8  19  2 0
very likely
very likely
very likely
very likely
very likely
very likely
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STUDY 4: Tolerance of Counter-Intuitiveness /  Tolerance of Contradictions in Counter­
intuitiveness: Surprise Ratings, Counter-Intuitive Condition
Now su p p o se  sc ie n tis ts  h ave recently  d iscovered  a person w ho h as o n e  o f th e  m ore unu sual a b ilities or 
p rop erties d escrib ed  previously . D ue to  th e  extraordinary nature o f th e  d isco v ery , th e  p erson 's e x is te n c e  h as  
a lso  b een  in d ep en d en tly  verified  by an oth er group of sc ien tis ts , jo u rn a lists  and lay p eop le  from  th e  
com m u n ity . As a resu lt, th ere  is no longer any doubt ab out th e  e x is te n c e  o f th is  kind of p erson .
For each  o f th e  fo llow ing e x a m p les , p lea se  rate how surprised you w ould be if th e  e x is te n c e  o f th e  person  in 
q u estion  could be e s ta b lish ed  beyond an y doubt a s  d escrib ed  ab o v e .
A p erso n  w h o can  s e e  e v e n t s  a s  th e y  will actua lly  hap pen  in th e  fu tu re.
not surprised at all ^  C  C  C  E  E  E  E  E E E E E E E E E E E
surprised
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  15 16 17  18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w h o can  w alk  th ro u g h  w alls w ith ou t d a m a g in g  th e  w alls or h im /h e rse lf .
not surprised at all ^  C  E  E  E  E  E  E  E E E E E E E E E E E E  „ y
surprised
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  15  16 17  18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w ho h as no sh a d o w  e v e n  w h en  light is sh in ing  a t h im /h er .
not surprised at all c  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E E E E E E E E E E E
surprised
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13  14  15  16  17  18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w ho so m e t im e s  v a n ish e s  th en  rea p p ea rs .
n o .  s u r p r i s e d  a t  a „ C  E E E E E E E  E E E E E E E E E E E E  „ ly
surprised
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10  11 12  13 14  15 16 17  18  19  2 0
extremely
extremely
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A person who can rem em ber  everything tha t  has ever happened.
not surprised at all ^  C C E E C C C  C C C C C C C C C C C C  „ y
surprised
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10 11 12 13 14  15 16 17  18  19  2 0
A p erso n  w h o can  h ear  c o n v e rsa tio n s  from  th e  p a s t a s  if th e y  are actu a lly  tak ing  p la ce  now .
, „ „ E E E E E E E E  E E E E E E E E E E E E  , ,not surprised at all extremely
surprised
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  15 16  17  18  19  20
